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Sustainability standards such as Fairtrade, UTZ, and Rainforest Alliance have recently gained 
importance in global value chains, with some of the major tropical commodities seeing 
significant increases in the share of their certified area in the last ten years. This trend is directly 
related to consumers in North America and Europe becoming increasingly aware of the 
importance of sustainable agricultural production. These consumers are concerned not only 
about food safety issues; they also want to support a kind of agricultural production that reduces 
negative environmental impacts due to the use of certain agricultural practices while improving 
the livelihoods of rural populations in developing countries. Increasing consumer awareness 
about sustainability issues fosters demand for products that can ensure that particular concerns 
are being addressed along the value chains. Sustainability standards are usually regarded as an 
effective mechanism to do so. Against this background, products certified under sustainability 
standards have moved from niche to mainstream markets. 
Despite differences in their requirements and the extent to which they focus on socioeconomic 
and environmental goals, all major sustainability standards claim that they are beneficial to 
smallholder farmers and workers. These benefits can be in terms of better income, access to 
more secure markets and credit, improvements in food and nutrition security, reduction of child 
labor, among others. A growing body of literature has sought to evaluate the extent to which 
the claims from standards-setting bodies hold, but the results are mixed. This literature is 
already quite comprehensive in terms of the standards, countries, crops, and outcome variables 
covered, but there are still several shortcomings in terms of methodologies and empirical 
approaches used. 
Previous studies relied on data from only a few purposively selected cooperatives, which 
reduces the external validity of these studies. Certification in the small farm sector typically 
takes place through group approaches to reduce the high transaction costs that would otherwise 
be prohibitive for individual farmers. Therefore, one would expect that the benefits drawn from 
group membership and the benefits from being certified are closely correlated. In this 
dissertation, I analyze the effects of sustainability standards (with a particular focus on 
Fairtrade) on economic, social, and environmental indicators using a sampling design that better 
accounts for the institutional heterogeneity in agricultural cooperatives. This sampling design 
allows to control for some important confounding factors at the cooperative level and, due to 
the large institutional heterogeneity captured in the data, present results that have greater 
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external validity. The three articles presented here are based on primary data from 1,000 
certified and non-certified farmers and rural workers randomly sampled from 50 cocoa 
cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire. I focus in particular on Fairtrade certification because, contrary 
to other sustainability standards, Fairtrade gives special emphasis to agricultural cooperatives. 
In the first article, I analyze whether farmers benefit from Fairtrade certification also when 
accounting for cooperative effects. Furthermore, I discuss the importance of using a sampling 
design that sufficiently accounts for institutional heterogeneity in agricultural cooperatives. 
Using regression models with instrumental variables, I show that Fairtrade certification has a 
positive and significant effect on yields, prices and living standards of farmers. These results 
are robust to alternative model specifications in which I additionally control for some key 
cooperative characteristics. However, the magnitude of the estimates changes, with substantial 
differences in the effects on yields. These results show that Fairtrade is beneficial to farmers 
even after controlling for cooperative effects. I also conclude that not accounting for 
institutional heterogeneity leads to omitted variable bias, which underlines that institutional 
characteristics matter and that such heterogeneity deserves more explicit focus in the design of 
future studies. 
In the second article, I focus on the effects of Fairtrade certification on the environmental 
impacts of agricultural production and the health of farmers and workers. Certification can lead 
to some important changes in agricultural practices, especially concerning chemical input use. 
Contrary to previous studies that focused only on the intensity of agrochemical input use, I use 
two measures of aggregated pesticide toxicity – namely the Environmental Impact Quotient 
(EIQ) and the Hazard Quotient (HQ) – to proxy potential impacts on the environment and 
health. In the empirical analyses, I use double-hurdle regression models to estimate the effect 
of Fairtrade on agrochemical input use and aggregated toxicity, and Poisson regression models 
to estimate effects on the incidence of acute pesticide-related health symptoms. Instrumental 
variables are employed to reduce potential endogeneity issues. Fairtrade increases chemical 
input quantities and aggregated levels of toxicity. Nevertheless, Fairtrade reduces the incidence 
of pesticide-related acute health symptoms among farmers and workers. 
In the third article I explore how cooperatives use the Fairtrade social premium – a sum that is 
paid to cooperatives in addition to the agreed price to be used in projects to strengthen the 
cooperative and to benefit the community in the villages more broadly. I use descriptive 
statistics to discuss the communities’ main social needs as voiced by survey respondents and to 
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analyze in what kind of projects the social premium is actually invested. Using principal 
component analysis (PCA), I analyze which kinds of cooperatives are more likely to invest in 
what kinds of projects. I find that larger investments in projects related to education, water, and 
other community infrastructure are correlated with cooperative characteristics like the number 
of assets owned and the number of years that the cooperative has been certified. To illustrate 
the potential benefits of the social premium to the local community, I use regression analysis to 
evaluate if (i) being certified and (ii) living in a village where an education project was financed 
through the social premium have effects on household education expenditures. I find evidence 
that being certified has a positive effect on household education expenditures among farmers 
and cooperative workers. However, living in a village where an educational project was 
implemented has a positive effect only among farmers. 
Two main findings of this dissertation should be highlighted. First, I find evidence that 
sustainability standards have positive effects in the small farm sector, even when taking 
cooperative effects into account. Second, heterogeneity among agricultural should be more 
explicitly taken into account in future studies focusing on the effects of certification. 
Sustainability standards have the potential to engender changes in agrifood systems to make 
them more sustainable. However, local stakeholders (e.g. development agencies, non-
governmental organizations, extension agencies) should provide support to cooperatives to help 
them first meet the requirements for certification and then reap the benefits in a profitable 
manner. Furthermore, state-led initiatives should ensure the existence of a well-functioning 
institutional environment that builds synergies between private and public-led programs that 
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1. General introduction 
 
1.1.Background 
Voluntary private sustainability standards have been gaining importance for the production and 
marketing of some of the major tropical commodities (Lernoud et al., 2018; Potts et al., 2014). 
Currently there are around 400 standards that are classified as “sustainability standards”, with 
some of them being set by single organizations (e.g. 4C and C.A.F.E. Practices), some set by 
multi-stakeholder platforms (e.g. Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil), and others that have 
their origins in non-governmental organizations, such as Fairtrade (Bennett, 2017). Some of 
these standards are crop specific (e.g. Bonsucro and Better Cotton Initiative), while others cover 
a broad range of agricultural and forestry products (e.g. Rainforest Alliance and Organic). 
Although requirements vary from one standard to another, most of them address issues of social, 
economic, and environmental sustainability across value chains to some extent. 
Worldwide there are around 80 million hectares of agricultural land that are certified under at 
least one sustainability standard, which represents no more than 2% of the total agricultural land 
(Lernoud et al., 2018). However, looking at these figures disaggregated by commodity reveals 
some important trends. Around 25% of the agricultural land used for cocoa production is 
certified, followed by coffee (23%), and tea (16%). Cotton and cocoa were the two commodities 
that saw the biggest growth in their share of certified area between 2013 and 2017, which 
increased by 172% and 114% respectively (Willer et al., 2019). These figures suggest that 
products that are compliant with internationally recognized sustainability standards have moved 
from niche to mainstream markets.1 
Such figures mirror global trends related to sustainability concerns and increased consumer 
awareness about the importance of supporting a kind of agricultural production that upholds 
values of social and environmental justice (Iweala et al., 2019; Ladhari & Tchetgna, 2015). In 
fact, sustainability standards tap on many of the issues highlighted in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, such as poverty alleviation (SDG1), decent work conditions (SDG8), 
 
1 It is relatively easy to obtain figures related to the supply of certified products, as most labelling organizations 
have data on the exact number of certified farmers, their farm size, and quantity produced. However, data on the 
actual demand is significantly more challenging to access, as only part of the certified production is actually sold 
as such; the rest is traded in uncertified markets (Potts et al., 2014). 
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inequality reduction (SDG10), and sustainable consumption and production (SDG12). As such, 
sustainability standards have the potential to affect several actors in agricultural value chains 
(from consumers to processors and producers) and address some of the issues faced by the rural 
population in developing countries.  
Following Bonroy and Constantatos (2015) and Swinnen et al. (2015), we can theorize how the 
introduction of a standard affects the functioning of markets and the welfare of different actors 
across the value chain. Standards address market failures by reducing information asymmetries 
related to credence features, i.e. characteristics of a product that cannot be observed by 
consumers. Guaranteeing such features that consumers value increases willingness to pay for 
the products and overall utility derived from consuming them. On the producers’ side, standards 
can affect profits positively by increasing the price that farmers receive (as a result of 
consumers’ increased willingness to pay for the reduction in information asymmetries), and 
negatively due to the costs of implementing the standards. From a distributional perspective, 
the bargaining power between producers and processors (or retailers) over the distribution of 
the surplus generated with the introduction of the standard plays a crucial role. This bargaining 
power, in turn, is affected by market imperfections (e.g. farmers’ access to credit and 
technology) and institutional configurations (e.g. different forms of vertical coordination). 
When empirically analyzing the efficiency and equity effects of standards, several additional 
issues should be taken into account. The costs associated with standards go well beyond those 
incurred by farmers to make the necessary changes to meet the requirements. Cooperatives and 
other kinds of farmer organizations often have to cover the certification fees and other 
administrative and organizational costs associated with certification (Snider et al., 2017), while 
processors are often required to handle certified and non-certified products separately, thus 
increasing management costs. Depending on the institutional organization of value chains and 
specific market setups, these actors in the middle of the value chain can capture most of the 
price premium paid by consumers (Minten et al., 2018). These factors can affect the extent to 
which sustainability standards have an impact on development and poverty (Swinnen, 2016). 
Monitoring is another key issue in the functioning of standards and relates to some of the costs 
that different actors incur. In large plantations, certification is often done individually, in which 
case monitoring is relatively straightforward. In the small farm sector, group certification is the 
more common approach and is often done through cooperatives or other farmer organizations 
(Snider et al., 2017). Some of these organizations have a large number of members, whose farms 
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might be scattered across a big geographic area, which makes the costs for on-site monitoring 
prohibitive. Although standards setting bodies often call for unannounced third-party external 
audits and internal audits, these are not carried out as often as they should, and reports about 
internal auditors cheating are not uncommon (Ansah et al., 2020). Monitoring intermediary 
actors in the value chain can be equally challenging. Some suppliers and retailers might have 
incentives to engage in food adulteration and sell conventional products as if they were certified. 
Such actions can undermine consumers’ trust in certification and decrease demand for such 
products (Lau et al., 2020). 
In addition to consumers’ interest in certified products, other stakeholders are also invested in 
promoting sustainability standards. NGOs and development agencies, for example, have been 
supporting farmers and cooperatives to help them comply with these standards as a means to 
foster sustainable development (Kersting & Wollni, 2012; Oelofse et al., 2010). Given the 
interest of these stakeholders, a large number of studies has sought to identify the effects of 
sustainability standards on smallholder farms in developing countries. This body of literature is 
quite broad in its scope, covering many different standards, crops, countries, and outcome 
variables (DeFries et al., 2017; Oya et al., 2018). Whether and to what extent farmers benefit 
from sustainability standards, however, remains an open question. Some studies have found that 
certification does bring economic benefits to farmers (Akoyi & Maertens, 2018; Chiputwa et 
al., 2015; Meemken et al., 2017; Mitiku et al., 2017). These are often due to increases in yields 
and prices, which can be explained by easier access to inputs and training on better agricultural 
practices and by the price premiums received for selling in certified channels. However, other 
studies have found that certification has little to no economic effect (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011; 
Jena et al., 2012; Ruben & Fort, 2012), which is often explained by increases in costs 
outweighing the benefits from increased prices and yields.  
Focusing exclusively on economic outcomes does not provide a full picture of the effects of 
sustainability standards, as many of them have a strong emphasis on environmental and social 
outcomes. Several studies have reported that certification helps to reduce deforestation 
(Takahashi & Todo, 2013) and can be an effective mechanism to protect local biodiversity, both 
on-farm (Vanderhaegen et al., 2018) and at the landscape scale (Hardt et al., 2015; Tscharntke 
et al., 2015). Rainforest Alliance (RA) is the standard that is most often associated with such 
environmental effects, as it has very strict rules regarding deforestation (Newton et al., 2015). 
Certification has also been often associated with the adoption of more sustainable farming 
4 
 
practices, such as application of organic inputs, maintenance of on-farm tree diversity, and 
mulching (Blackman & Naranjo, 2012a; Haggar et al., 2017; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016). 
The number of studies that focus on social outcomes such as nutrition, gender, health, and child 
education is considerably smaller. A few studies have focused on household nutrition with 
positive findings (Becchetti & Costantino, 2008; Chiputwa & Qaim, 2016; Meemken et al., 
2017), which are likely a result of better overall income. In terms of women empowerment, 
certification improves intra-household distribution of assets, but it does not facilitate access to 
credit for female-headed households (Meemken & Qaim, 2018b). The effect of certification on 
health is also not clear-cut, as there is evidence to support that certification has positive effects 
(Asfaw et al., 2010) as well as negative effects (Ehlert et al., 2014). The evidence of the effects 
on child education is more homogeneous, as most studies find that certification has a positive 
effect (Akoyi et al., 2018; Becchetti et al., 2013; Gitter et al., 2012; Meemken et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, a few studies do not find statistically significant effects of sustainability standards 
on child education (Becchetti & Costantino, 2008; Dragusanu & Nunn, 2018). 
The existing studies are often quite nuanced, and some of them have tried to explain under 
which circumstances and for whom certification is beneficial. Chiputwa et al. (2015) 
highlighted the importance of taking into account differences between standards and showed 
that Fairtrade, UTZ, and Organic standards have different effects on farmers’ livelihoods. 
Similarly, Haggar et al. (2017) and Vanderhaegen et al. (2018) showed that different 
combinations of standards can either result in positive or negative effects in terms of economic 
and environmental outcomes, highlighting a clear trade-off between the two sustainability 
dimensions. Meemken et al. (2019) analyzed the effect of Fairtrade certification on the welfare 
of rural workers in the small farm sector and found that, while cooperative workers benefit from 
participating in a certified value chain, farm workers do not. Lastly, Jena et al. (2012) was 
among the first studies to emphasize the possible relationship between the quality of 
cooperatives and the benefits that farmers draw from certification. 
1.2.Research gaps 
Measuring the impact of sustainability standards is a daunting challenge. Certification usually 
involves several actors across value chains. How standards are implemented and managed can 
be influenced by national institutional arrangements and policies. All of these factors play a role 
in determining how benefits are distributed. The complexity of the topic poses conceptual and 
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methodological challenges to identify causal pathways and suitable counterfactuals. Given 
these challenges and the current state of the literature, I have identified the following three 
research gaps. 
1.2.1. Research gap 1: Cooperative effects 
As described above, the evidence regarding the effects of sustainability standards in the small 
farm sector is rather mixed. The differences in results can be partially attributed to differences 
in the standards, crops, years, and countries under consideration. However, recent studies have 
pointed out that differences in the cooperatives from which respondents are sampled can exert 
an equally important influence on the results (Jena et al., 2012; Mitiku et al., 2017). The 
literature on cooperatives has long established that cooperative membership provides a series 
of benefits to farmers, such as higher prices and dividends, access to inputs, training, and other 
services, and reduction in transactions costs (Abdul-Rahaman & Abdulai, 2018; Grashuis & Su, 
2019; Ragasa & Golan, 2014; Wossen et al., 2017). However, cooperative membership can also 
affect whether farmers participate in certified value chains and to what extent they benefit. 
Because certification in the small farm sector is usually done through cooperatives, it is likely 
that the benefits derived from cooperative membership and the benefits from certification are 
strongly correlated. Previous studies have not tried to take cooperative effects into account when 
estimating the effects of certification. By not explicitly focusing on the role of cooperatives, 
these studies suffer from limited internal and external validity. 
1.2.2. Research gap 2: Input use and access to services 
All major sustainability standards have requirements related to input use. Organic standards are 
the most restrictive in this regard, as they completely ban the use of chemical inputs. Other 
standards, such as Fairtrade, UTZ, and Rainforest Alliance are less stringent, but they still 
regulate which products are allowed, which safety measures should be implemented, and 
recommend alternative means to control pests and diseases (Tayleur et al., 2017). These 
regulations can affect the profitability of farms and the extent to which agriculture impacts the 
environment and human health. A few studies have analyzed the effects of certification on input 
use and other agricultural practices (Elder et al., 2013; Haggar et al., 2017; Ibanez & Blackman, 
2016; Vanderhaegen et al., 2018). However, these studies have two important limitations. First, 
these studies use simple quantity based approaches to measure input use, which do not 
accurately capture environmental and health risks (Möhring et al., 2019, 2020). Second, no 
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previous study has looked into how certification changes input and service provision at the 
cooperative level. Farmers often have access to inputs through their cooperatives, and the 
cooperatives also provide training and other services related to agrochemical input use 
(Grashuis & Su, 2019). Therefore, cooperatives can have an important role in influencing how 
farmers use agrochemicals. The effect that certification has on agrochemical use and how they 
affect the environment and human health might be influenced by cooperative effects. 
1.2.3. Research gap 3: The Fairtrade social premium 
Several studies that look at Fairtrade certification attribute their findings, at least partially, to 
the use of the Fairtrade social premium (Jena & Grote, 2017; Meemken et al., 2017; Van den 
Broeck et al., 2017; van Rijn et al., 2019). This is a sum of money paid to the cooperatives on 
top of the agreed price that can be used for various purposes and it is one of the main differences 
between Fairtrade and other sustainability standards. Although Fairtrade does not give 
cooperatives specific guidelines on how to use the premium, it is often assumed that a 
significant share of this money is used for projects related to community development (Lernoud 
et al., 2018). In fact, previous research has shown that consumers in developed countries tend 
to associate Fairtrade with broader community development. Some studies have qualitatively 
discussed a few important issues related to the premium, such as who benefits from it (Cramer 
et al., 2017) and how democratic the decision-making processes are (Dolan, 2010). However, 
these studies were based on a very limited number of cooperatives, which also limits what kind 
of analyses can be done with the data. Given the importance of the premium for Fairtrade’s 
theory of change and image vis a vis the consumers, it is important to better understand what 
kind of projects this money is being spent on, which factors influence the decision-making 
processes, and how effectively the money is spent. 
1.3.Research objectives and approach 
To address the research gaps identified above, I use a novel sampling strategy that better 
accounts for institutional heterogeneity at the cooperative level. Previous studies on 
sustainability standards have been designed in one of the following three ways. First, a few 
early studies from this body of literature have compared certified farmers organized into 
cooperatives with non-certified farmers who were not members of any cooperative (Becchetti 
et al., 2013). This kind of study design is rather problematic, as certification and cooperative 
membership are perfectly correlated, and their effects cannot be disentangled. A second group 
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of studies sampled certified and non-certified farmers who are members of the same cooperative 
(Chiputwa et al., 2015; Meemken et al., 2017). This approach has advantages over the first one, 
but suffers from very limited external validity, as the chosen cooperative might have some 
idiosyncratic characteristics that are not representative of the whole population. Furthermore, 
this approach is often not feasible, because in most cases cooperative members are either all 
certified or not. Most studies use a third approach, i.e. they compare farmers who are members 
of a certified cooperative with farmers who are members of a non-certified cooperative (Mitiku 
et al., 2017; van Rijsbergen et al., 2016; Vanderhaegen et al., 2018). These studies are thus 
based on a relatively large random sample of farmers who are members of two (or at best a few) 
purposively selected cooperatives. This is problematic because these cooperatives might not be 
similar. Even when authors claim to have chosen certified and non-certified cooperatives based 
on a few simple criteria such as number of members, these cooperatives may still differ 
substantially in other dimensions. These differences can influence how well these cooperatives 
function, which can affect outcomes, regardless of certification. 
In this dissertation, I follow this third approach, but I aim to capture as much cooperative 
heterogeneity in the data as possible. This was done by first randomly selecting a large number 
of certified and non-certified cooperatives and then randomly sampling a few members from 
each cooperative. This approach has at least two advantages over those used in previous studies. 
First, having data with high variability on a large number of cooperative characteristics allows 
me to control for confounding factors at the cooperative level in the analyses, thus increasing 
the internal validity of the results. Second, with a large sample of certified and non-certified 
cooperatives, I ensure that my results are valid across a large number of organizational 
configurations, thus increasing the external validity of my study. 
To implement this sampling strategy, I selected the cocoa sector of Côte d’Ivoire as study 
context. In 2017, there were more than 600 registered cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire (MADR, 
2017), out of which around 150 were Fairtrade certified (Fairtrade, 2019b). Fairtrade is not the 
most prominent standard in the cocoa sector, ranking second in terms of certified area behind 
UTZ (Willer et al., 2019). However, unlike UTZ and other standards, Fairtrade gives explicit 
focus to cooperatives (Dietz et al., 2018). All cocoa cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire 
commercialize their product with the same level of post-harvesting processing, i.e. fermented 
and dried beans. This setting is ideal for the implementation of the sampling strategy described 
above because it presents a large pool of cooperatives to choose from and because they all 
commercialize the same type of product. To reduce logistics costs, I limited the study area to 
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the Southeast of the country, because it is a traditionally important area for cocoa production 
and has a large concentration of certified and non-certified cooperatives. The data were 
collected in 2018 and contain information on 1,000 farmers and rural workers (cooperative 
workers and farm workers) sampled from 50 cooperatives, half certified under the Fairtrade 
standard and the other half not certified under Fairtrade or any other standard. 
Having this specific dataset allows me to address the three research gaps identified above. The 
sampling strategy in itself solves part of the issues described in the first research gap, as 
sampling farmers from a large number of cooperatives increases external validity. To account 
for possible cooperative effects in the estimation of certification effects, I control for a set of 
cooperative characteristics in the regression analyses. By estimating models with and without 
controlling for this set of variables, I provide evidence of the importance of explicitly taking 
into account cooperative heterogeneity when estimating certification effects. I further increase 
the internal validity of my analyses by using instrumental variables (IVs) at the cooperative and 
household levels to deal with farmers’ and cooperative’s self-selection into certification. 
All certified cooperatives in my sample are Fairtrade certified, and two thirds of those are 
additionally certified for UTZ and/or Rainforest Alliance. Since none of the cooperatives follow 
Organic standards, I can analyze how Fairtrade affects agrochemical input use, which, as 
mentioned in the second research gap, previous studies have not done. Furthermore, I analyze 
the risks associated with pesticides using two measures of aggregated pesticide toxicity – the 
Environmental Impact Quotient (Kovach et al., 1992) and the Hazard Quotient (Kniss, 2017) – 
and assess the effects of Fairtrade certification on the health of farmers and workers. Here, I 
estimate treatment effects using double hurdle and Poisson regression models coupled with IV-
based approaches to deal with endogeneity issues. I additionally use statistical tests to analyze 
differences between certified and non-certified cooperatives in terms of what kinds of inputs, 
training, and other services related to input use they offer to farmers. 
Lastly, I tackle the third research gap using detailed information on the use of the Fairtrade 
social premium. Because of the cooperative heterogeneity in the dataset, I can use multivariate 
statistical methods such as principal component analysis (PCA) to analyze if and how the use 
of the premium is correlated with the characteristics of these cooperatives. I complement these 
analyses by using linear regressions to assess if farmers and workers benefit from being certified 





The remainder of this dissertation comprises three essays in the form of journal articles and a 
general conclusion. In chapter 2, I discuss the importance of using a sampling strategy that 
better accounts for cooperative heterogeneity when designing studies that estimate the causal 
effects of sustainability standards and analyze whether smallholder farmers benefit from 
certification also when accounting for cooperative effects. In chapter 3, I focus on how Fairtrade 
certification can affect agrochemical input use and analyze its effects on aggregated pesticide 
toxicity. Furthermore, I analyze the effects of Fairtrade on the incidence of pesticide-related 
acute health symptoms among farmers and rural workers and discuss the role of cooperatives 
in providing services related to the use of agrochemical. The essay in chapter 4 focuses on the 
use of the Fairtrade social premium. I analyze the relationship between the allocation of the 
premium into different kinds of projects and the organizational structure of the certified 
cooperatives. To illustrate how the local population may benefit from the social premium, I 
further analyze if living in a village where an education project financed with the premium 
affects households’ expenditure with child education. To conclude, in chapter 5 I summarize 
the main results of the three essays, discuss the main lessons learned and their policy 







2. Do sustainability standards benefit smallholder farmers also when 
accounting for cooperative effects? Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire2 
 
Abstract. While many studies analyzed effects of sustainability standards – such as Fairtrade or 
Rainforest Alliance – on smallholder farmers in developing countries, most did not sufficiently 
account for systematic differences between certified and non-certified farmers. Certified farmers 
are typically organized in cooperatives. When sampling only from a small number of 
cooperatives, as previous studies did, it is not easy to disentangle certification effects from 
possible cooperative effects. Here, we address this shortcoming by randomly sampling from a 
large number of cooperatives, thus better capturing existing institutional heterogeneity. In 
particular, we collect and use data from cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire that are organized in 
Fairtrade-certified and non-certified cooperatives. Regression models with instrumental variables 
show that Fairtrade has positive and significant effects on cocoa yields, prices, and living 
standards. These effects remain significant also after controlling for cooperative characteristics, 
but the magnitude of the estimates changes. We draw two conclusions. First, in Côte d’Ivoire 
Fairtrade certification benefits farmers economically. Second, and more generally, cooperative 
characteristics are jointly correlated with certification and relevant outcomes, which needs to be 
accounted for to avoid bias when evaluating the benefits of sustainability standards in the small 
farm sector. 
Key words: Certification, cocoa, cooperatives, Côte d’Ivoire, Fairtrade, sustainability standards 
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paper. J.S., E.-M.M., and M.Q. designed the study. J.S. and E.-M.M. collected the data with support from C.K. E.-




Sustainability standards – such as Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance – are claimed to be effective 
mechanisms to link smallholder farmers in developing countries to high-value markets while 
promoting environmentally-friendly and socially acceptable production and trading patterns. 
Many studies tried to test these claims by analyzing whether or not certification under 
sustainability standards actually leads to benefits for farmers. Empirical research was conducted 
in various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (DeFries et al., 2017; Dragusanu et al., 
2014; Oya et al., 2018). The results are mixed. While several studies suggest that sustainability 
standards contribute to higher prices and incomes for participating farmers (Bacon, 2005; 
Chiputwa & Qaim, 2016; Jena et al., 2012; Meemken et al., 2017; Mitiku et al., 2017; Tran & 
Goto, 2019), other studies find very small or no effects at all (Akoyi & Maertens, 2018; Beuchelt 
& Zeller, 2011; Chiputwa et al., 2015; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Valkila, 2009). To some 
extent, differences in effects can be explained by the fact that the studies refer to different 
countries, different years, and partly also to different standards. As is well known, the effects 
of standards can vary between settings with different conditions (Oya et al., 2018). However, 
even within one setting the estimated effects may be unreliable when not properly controlling 
for confounding factors, such as institutional heterogeneity. 
Existing studies on the effects of sustainability standards in developing countries differ 
substantially in terms of the methodologies used. While much of the early work was rather 
qualitative and descriptive (Bacon, 2005; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Raynolds, 2002; 
Raynolds et al., 2004; Valkila, 2009), more recent studies tried to evaluate the net effects of 
standards through larger samples and more sophisticated tools of quantitative data analysis 
(Akoyi & Maertens, 2018; Becchetti et al., 2013; Chiputwa et al., 2015; Haggar et al., 2017; 
Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Jena et al., 2012; Meemken et al., 2017; Ruben & Fort, 2012; 
Vanderhaegen et al., 2018). However, even these more recent studies did not sufficiently 
account for systematic differences between certified and non-certified farmers, which may lead 
to biased impact estimates. One possible source of bias is related to the fact that certification in 
the small farm sector usually happens through agricultural cooperatives (Fenger et al., 2017; 
Oelofse et al., 2010; Snider et al., 2017). Oftentimes, being member of a cooperative is a pre-
condition for smallholders to participate in certification, as the transaction costs can otherwise 
be prohibitive. However, cooperative membership can influence farm performance and 
household welfare also without certification (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Ragasa & Golan, 
2014; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). Hence, when evaluating the effects of certification, it is 
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important to account for cooperative effects, which is only possible through proper sampling 
designs. 
Previous studies used different approaches to sample and compare certified and non-certified 
farmers. Some compared certified farmers that are organized in a cooperative with non-certified 
farmers that are not member of a cooperative (Becchetti et al., 2013). In that case it is not 
possible to disentangle certification effects from possible cooperative effects, as cooperative 
membership and certification are perfectly correlated. Other studies compared farmers in a 
certified cooperative with farmers in a non-certified cooperative (van Rijsbergen et al., 2016), 
or they compared observations from a few certified and non-certified cooperatives (Akoyi & 
Maertens, 2018; Haggar et al., 2017; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Jena et al., 2012; Mitiku et al., 
2017; Ssebunya et al., 2018). While this has clear advantages, bias through cooperative effects 
can still occur, because cooperatives differ in terms of how they are endowed and how well they 
function, which may affect outcomes irrespective of certification. A few studies included 
certified and non-certified farmers from the same cooperative (Chiputwa & Qaim, 2016; 
Meemken et al., 2017). While this is a neat approach to control for cooperative effects, it is 
rarely possible to sample in this way, because in most cases all farmers belonging to the same 
cooperative are either certified or not certified.3 In all cases, the number of sampled cooperatives 
was small, and the few cooperatives included were not selected randomly. Without random 
selection of cooperatives, external validity may suffer, especially when the criteria for selecting 
cooperatives are not well explained. For instance, it is possible that sustainability standards have 
beneficial effects for farmers in cooperatives with very specific characteristics, but that these 
results are not representative for cooperatives on average. We are not aware of previous studies 
that were able to properly control for cooperative effects.4 This is a major drawback, as 
sustainability standards are strongly promoted by various types of public and private sector 
organizations (Dragusanu et al., 2014; Meemken et al., 2019). Hence, it is important to better 
understand whether standards actually deliver on their promise to help smallholder farmers. 
Here, we contribute to the literature by using a sampling design that better accounts for the 
institutional heterogeneity in agricultural cooperatives. In particular, we collected data from 
certified and non-certified farmers in a large number of randomly selected cocoa cooperatives 
 
3 Exceptions can occur in large cooperatives where certification is sometimes implemented only for subgroups of 
the total membership. However, such comparisons within the same cooperative can suffer from limited external 
validity, unless a larger number of cooperatives is included. 
4 Recent studies with panel data, such as Meemken et al. (2017)  and van Rijsbergen et al. (2016), improved the 
identification of certification effects by better controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level, but 
not at the cooperative level. 
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in Côte d’Ivoire, West Africa, to analyze the effects of Fairtrade certification. As our sample 
includes cooperatives with a broad range of characteristics, we reduce the possibility that the 
results only hold under very specific institutional conditions. In other words, our sampling 
design increases external validity. Moreover, by comparing results with and without controlling 
for cooperative characteristics we can test to what extent ignoring institutional heterogeneity 
can lead to omitted variable bias. 
Côte d’Ivoire is the largest cocoa-producing country in the world with a global production share 
of over 40% (ICCO, 2018). As in other tropical countries, the role of sustainability standards 
has grown substantially in the Ivorian cocoa sector, with Fairtrade being the most important 
standard in terms of the number of certified cooperatives and farmers. The aim of Fairtrade is 
to improve the livelihoods of smallholder producers (Fairtrade, 2019b). If a cooperative wants 
to be certified, it has to hand in an application and is physically inspected against the Fairtrade 
standards, which involve certain rules on labor conditions and agricultural practices, as well as 
recommendations for capacity building and community development (Chiputwa et al., 2015). 
Fairtrade certification guarantees producers a minimum floor price (for the quantities sold in 
certified markets) and a Fairtrade premium that is paid to the cooperative to support collective 
services, such as input supply, agricultural extension, or other cooperative activities. We 
hypothesize that Fairtrade certification has positive effects on cocoa yields, prices, and living 
standards of smallholder farm households. Furthermore, we hypothesize that cooperative 
characteristics are jointly correlated with certification and the outcome variables, so that not 
controlling for cooperative characteristics leads to omitted variable bias. 
2.2.Materials and methods 
2.2.1. Sampling design 
Our survey of cocoa cooperatives and farmers was conducted in the Southeast of Côte d’Ivoire, 
covering the country’s traditional cocoa belt. Most of the cocoa farmers in this region are 
members of cooperatives, which provide inputs and other agricultural services to farmers and 
through which the cocoa is marketed (Foundjem-Tita et al., 2017). Farmers sell their cocoa 
directly to the cooperatives that they are members of; side-selling to other traders or middlemen 
is rare in this region. Important to note is that farmers can choose which cooperative to join, 
meaning that membership is not determined by geographic location alone. Farmers may decide 
which cooperative to join based on expected costs and benefits. If a chosen cooperative does 
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not meet the expectations, farmers are free to leave and join a different cooperative operating 
in their vicinity.5 However, the benefits of membership are not always easy to observe, 
especially when they relate to parameters other than output price, such as cooperative services 
in input supply and technical training. In this context, kinship and existing social ties are also 
important criteria for farmers when they decide which cooperative to join.  
In order to capture a wide range of institutional heterogeneity, we randomly sampled 50 
cooperatives in the Southeast of Côte d’Ivoire, differentiating between Fairtrade certified and 
non-certified cooperatives. For the sampling procedure, we first compiled complete lists of all 
active cocoa cooperatives in this part of the country, using official national registries (MADR, 
2017) as well as data and information from Fairtrade and regional extension offices. We also 
called all listed cooperative headquarters to verify that the cooperative is active and to identify 
additional cooperatives that might have been missed on the official lists. The final list included 
59 Fairtrade certified cooperatives and 74 non-certified cooperatives located in three districts 
of Southeast Côte d’Ivoire, namely Comoe, Lacs, and Lagunes. From this list we randomly 
selected 25 certified and 25 non-certified cooperatives. Among the 25 Fairtrade certified 
cooperatives, 16 were additionally certified under UTZ or Rainforest Alliance. We will test for 
the effect of these other standards in a robustness check. All 25 cooperatives that were sampled 
as “non-certified” were not certified under any sustainability standard. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, cooperatives are organized in sections, which are non-legal geographic 
groupings that can comprise one or several villages. All cooperatives provided us complete 
membership lists by section. In small cooperatives with only one section, we randomly selected 
10 farmers in that section. However, most of the cooperatives had more than one section. In 
those cases, we first randomly selected two sections in each cooperative, and then randomly 
selected five farmers in each section. Hence, in total we sampled 500 farmers from the 50 
cooperatives: 250 that are Fairtrade certified and 250 that are non-certified.6 The locations of 
the sample farmers are shown in the map in Figure 1. In all three districts, there are overlaps of 
certified and non-certified cooperatives, meaning that certification is not perfectly correlated 
with regional characteristics, which is an advantage for the evaluation of certification effects. 
 
5 While geographical closeness to the cooperative headquarters is not a precondition to join, long distances are 
impracticable to deliver the cocoa and benefit from cooperative services. 
6 Power calculations had indicated that a sample with 500 observations and 50 cooperatives (half in treatment, half 
in control) is sufficient to identify a 10% treatment effect for yield and living standard at a confidence level of 95% 
and a power of 80%. For cocoa price, even a 1% effect could be identified with this sample size due to the small 
observed standard deviation for price in Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Moreover, Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the three districts are very similar in terms of 
average climate and soil conditions. 
 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of sampled farmers by certification status. 
2.2.2. Survey 
All sampled farm households were visited for a personal interview using a structured 
questionnaire designed and pre-tested for this purpose. The questionnaire was programmed with 
ODK (Open Data Kit) for use with tablet computers. The interviews were conducted by local 
enumerators who were carefully trained and supervised by the researchers. The questionnaire 
included sections on general household characteristics, asset ownership, production and 
marketing of cocoa and other agricultural activities, non-agricultural economic activities, as 
well as infrastructure and institutional details. To capture household living standards, we asked 
for details of food and non-food consumption expenditures (including consumption of own-
produced goods). The interviews were conducted with the household head. For the part on food 
consumption, the person in the household responsible for food purchases and food preparation 
was additionally asked to join the interview. 
In addition to the household interviews, we also designed a cooperative-level questionnaire for 
interviews with the cooperative leader (director, president, or vice president) in each of the 50 
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cooperatives. The cooperative questionnaire captured data on personal characteristics of the 
leader and detailed information on the cooperative’s size, governance structure, asset 
ownership, service provision, sustainability certification, operational costs, and cocoa 
commercialization for the last 12 months prior to the interview. The farm household and 
cooperative-level interviews were conducted in May and June 2018.  
2.2.3. Outcome variables 
We want to analyze the effects of Fairtrade certification on cocoa yields, prices, and farm 
household living standards. Cocoa yields are measured in kg harvested per ha during the 12 
months prior to the survey, as reported by farmers during the interviews. As Fairtrade 
encourages agricultural training and the adoption of better agricultural practices (Fairtrade, 
2017), and the Fairtrade premium can be used by cooperatives to provide inputs and other 
services to their members (Loconto et al., 2019; Meemken & Qaim, 2018b), we expect 
certification to have a positive effect on yield. 
Cocoa prices are measured in West African Francs (CFA) per kg. Farmers deliver their cocoa 
to the cooperative and receive a price that is set by the government independent of product 
quality. All farmers receive this fixed price at the time of delivery. Later on, certain additional 
payments can be made by the cooperative based on dividends from selling in certified markets 
or other types of profits made by better-performing cooperatives (Meemken et al., 2019). Our 
price calculations include these additional payments per kg of cocoa on top of the base price 
that is set by the government. Given that certified cooperatives often use the Fairtrade premium 
to make direct payments to their members (Chiputwa et al., 2015; Loconto et al., 2019), we 
expect certification to have a positive effect on cocoa prices. 
Household living standard is measured in terms of consumption expenditure expressed in CFA 
per capita and day. Consumption expenditure is a widely used indicator of household welfare 
and living standard in the development economics literature (Klasen, 2000). We calculate 
expenditure as the value of all food and non-food goods and services consumed by the 
household for specified recall periods. Food consumption was captured through a 7-day recall, 
covering all food items consumed by the household regardless of whether these were purchased, 
home-produced, or obtained from other sources. For non-food goods and services, we used 30-
day or 12-month recall periods, depending on the particular items considered and typical 
expenditure patterns. We asked about expenditures for housing, education, clothing, 
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transportation, healthcare, fuel, entertainment, and other items relevant in the local context. As 
cocoa is the main source of income for most sample households, we expect that cocoa yield and 
price gains through Fairtrade certification will also result in positive effects on consumption 
expenditure, as was previously shown in other geographical contexts (Chiputwa et al., 2015; 
Meemken et al., 2017; Tran & Goto, 2019). 
2.2.4. Cooperative heterogeneity and certification 
Agricultural cooperatives can be very heterogeneous in terms of their size, structure, asset 
ownership, capacity of the leadership, decision-making rules, types of services provided, and 
various other characteristics. This is also true for cocoa cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire. Many of 
these cooperative characteristics may jointly influence farm and household-level outcomes and 
also whether or not a cooperative is certified. Hence, not controlling for cooperative 
characteristics in the impact evaluation may possibly lead to omitted variable bias. To test and 
control for such bias, we consider a set of cooperative-level variables for which data were 
obtained through the cooperative leadership survey. In particular, we consider the age and the 
size of the cooperative, the education level of the leader, whether or not the leader grows cocoa 
himself/herself, as well as the number of vehicles owned centrally as a proxy of physical capital. 
In addition, we look at the number of agricultural service providers (inputs, training, etc.) to the 
cooperative and the share of cooperative decisions made democratically. 
We also collected data for various other cooperative-level variables, many of which proved to 
be closely correlated with the mentioned ones. Hence, we feel that the chosen set of cooperative 
characteristics captures the existing institutional heterogeneity quite comprehensively. One 
aspect that is important to note is that cooperative characteristics cannot only influence 
certification, but can also be influenced by certification. For instance, cooperatives may grow 
in size after certification through new members entering, or they may intensify their 
membership services. We tried to define and measure the cooperative variables in such a way 
that issues of reverse causality are reduced. For instance, we consider cooperative size at the 
time prior to certification and measure the number of service providers rather than service 
intensity. Nevertheless, reverse causality for some of the cooperative characteristics cannot be 
ruled out completely, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
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2.2.5. Regression models 
In order to evaluate the effects of Fairtrade certification, we estimate regression models of the 
following type: 
!!"# = # + %&'"# + ()$%& + *+& + ,!"#                                         (1) 
where !!"# is the outcome variable of interest (yield, price, consumption expenditure) for 
household - in cooperative . and district /. )$%& is a vector of household-level control variables, 
&'"# is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not cooperative . is Fairtrade certified, and 
+& is a set of district dummies. Even though the three districts are very similar in terms of 
agroecological conditions, district dummies capture possible differences in terms of 
infrastructure, market access, and other possible regional factors. ,!"# is a random error term. 
For the estimates, standard errors are clustered at the cooperative level. 
For the cocoa yield and price models, equation (1) is estimated in linear form. For the 
consumption expenditure model, the dependent variable is log-transformed due to its skewed 
distribution. Of particular interest in all models is the coefficient %. If our hypotheses are true 
and Fairtrade has positive effects on cocoa yields, prices, and consumption expenditures, this 
should be reflected in ( being positive and statistically significant. 
Equation (1) is estimated without controlling for cooperative characteristics. However, as 
mentioned above, cooperative characteristics may be jointly correlated with !!"# and &'"#, 
which may lead to omitted variable bias in the estimate of %. Therefore, in a second set of 
regressions we estimate models of the following type: 
!!"# = # + %&'"# + ()$%& + *+& + 01%& + ,!"#                                 (2) 
where 1%& is a vector of cooperative characteristics, and the other variables are as defined 
before. Here, we are not particularly interested in the estimate for 0, as our intention is not to 
analyze the role of cooperative characteristics for farm performance and household welfare per 
se. Rather, we are interested in whether or not the effects of Fairtrade certification (() remain 
positive and significant also after controlling for cooperative characteristics. Comparing the 
estimates for ( in equations (1) and (2) can furthermore provide an indication of the direction 
of bias when not controlling for cooperative characteristics. If ( in equation (2) is smaller than 
in equation (1), this would indicate that better-endowed or better-performing cooperatives 
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benefit more from certification than less-endowed cooperatives, so that the certification effect 
in equation (1) would be overestimated.7 
2.2.6. Dealing with endogeneity 
As cooperatives choose whether or not they apply for Fairtrade certification, and farmers choose 
the cooperative they want to be member of (i.e., they choose if they want to be member of a 
certified cooperative), &'"# in equations (1) and (2) may be endogenous, which could lead to 
biased estimates of %. The most likely source of endogeneity is unobserved heterogeneity, 
although reverse causality can also not be ruled out without additional tests. Inclusion of 
cooperative characteristics in equation (2) may reduce issues of unobserved heterogeneity at the 
cooperative level. At the farmer level, in addition to standard control variables – such as total 
land owned, education, age, and market access – we also include measures of farmers’ risk 
aversion (Dohmen et al., 2011) and trust (Naef & Schupp, 2009) that may proxy for unobserved 
factors related to personality. 
In addition to including a broad set of control variables, we also use an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach to test and control for endogeneity. This requires finding at least one exogenous 
instrument that is correlated with Fairtrade certification but does not influence the outcome 
variables through other mechanisms. We use two instruments. The first instrument is the 
cellphone network provider of the leader in the cooperative that the particular farmer is member 
of. The second instrument is the share of Fairtrade certified farmers in a specified neighborhood 
radius around the respective farmer himself/herself. Both instruments are explained and tested 
for validity below. 
There are three cellphone network providers in the study region – namely Orange, MTN, and 
Moov – that all offer similar services at similar costs. For the individual, the choice which 
provider to use is mainly a question of the strength of the network signal in the particular 
location and the provider that peers in the own social network use. Positive network externalities 
occur because all three phone providers offer price discounts for calls and text messages 
exchanged within the provider’s network (Meemken et al., 2019). Hence, it is fair to assume 
that more information is exchanged within one network than across the networks of different 
 
7 As mentioned, several of the Fairtrade certified cooperatives are also certified under UTZ and/or Rainforest 
Alliance. To test whether these other sustainability standards have additional effects, or change the effects of 
Fairtrade, we carry out a robustness check where the models in equation (2) are re-estimated with an additional 
dummy to control for double or triple certification. 
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providers. Our data show a significantly positive correlation between the cooperative leader 
using Orange and the cooperative and individual farmer of interest being Fairtrade certified 
(Table A2 in the Appendix).8 We attribute this to informal flows of information about Fairtrade 
that are more intense among people using Orange than among people using other cellphone 
providers. And better access to information about Fairtrade increases the likelihood of 
certification. In principle, causality could also run in the opposite direction, meaning that 
Fairtrade certification would affect the choice of which phone provider to use. However, this is 
unlikely in our case, as people do not seem to switch their phone provider frequently. Out of 
the 25 leaders of certified cooperatives in our sample, only three stated that they had switched 
their phone provider during the last few years, after their cooperative became certified. 
The second instrument, the share of certified neighbors in a 5 km radius around each farmer, 
was calculated using GPS data.9 The instrument also captures social network effects, as farmers 
located closer to several certified farmers are more likely to learn about certification and its 
possible advantages. Even though farmers cannot get Fairtrade certified individually, they can 
decide to join (or leave) a Fairtrade certified cooperative, as discussed above. As one would 
expect, our data show a positive and significant correlation between the share of certified 
farmers in the neighborhood and own certification (Table A2). Hence, both instruments pass 
the test of instrument relevance.10 
For the instruments to be valid it is also required that they are both not correlated with the 
outcome variables. Due to some geographic clustering of Fairtrade cooperatives and farmers, it 
is generally possible that these “Fairtrade” settings have stronger economic activities, better 
flows of information, or more favorable access to infrastructure and markets. It is also possible 
that farmers benefit from the agricultural knowledge of their certified neighbors through farmer-
to-farmer exchange, even when they are not certified themselves. However, the map in figure 1 
shows that the geographic clustering of certified and non-certified farmers is not very 
pronounced. Moreover, in the models we control for regional effects through district dummies 
and variables measuring the distance to roads and other infrastructure elements. Using the 
falsification test proposed by Di Falco et al. (2011), we show that both instruments do not 
 
8 In some cases, cooperative leaders used more than one network provider. In those cases, we asked to specify 
the main provider that they use for most of their cellphone calls and text messages. 
9 We also tested smaller (2 km) and larger (10 km) radii to construct the instrument with very similar results. 
10 The share of certified farmers is more strongly correlated with own certification than the cellphone network 
provider of the cooperative leader (Table A2), so our IV approach primarily controls for farmer-level 
heterogeneity. Cooperative-level heterogeneity is controlled for through the inclusion of cooperative 
characteristics in equation (2). 
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influence cocoa yields, prices, and household consumption expenditures through mechanisms 
other than certification (Table A3 in the Appendix). In addition, we verified that both 
instruments are not significantly correlated with other regional variables that could affect 
household welfare, such as distance to schools, distance to roads, or average rainfall in a 
location (Table A4 in the Appendix). Finally, as we have two instruments for one endogenous 
variable, we performed formal tests of the over-identifying restriction (Tables A5-A7 in the 
Appendix). The null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term cannot 
be rejected in any of the models. Hence, we conclude that the two instruments are valid. 
2.3.Results and discussion 
2.3.1. Household characteristics 
General descriptive statistics for the set of socioeconomic variables that we use as household-
level controls in the regression models are shown in Table A8 in the Appendix. The two groups 
of certified and non-certified farmers are very similar in terms of most variables, including total 
land owned, household size, farmer’s age, and education. 
More notable differences between Fairtrade certified and non-certified farmers are observed for 
the outcome variables, which are shown in Table 1. We see statistically significant differences 
for all three outcome variables. Mean cocoa yields are around 540 kg/ha, which is similar to 
other recent yield estimates for cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire (Wessel & Quist-Wessel, 2015). Cocoa 
yields of Fairtrade certified farmers are around 13% higher than those of non-certified farmers. 
Fairtrade farmers also obtain higher prices for their cocoa, with a 4% difference on average. 
While this price difference is small in magnitude, certification seems to be one of the few 
opportunities to achieve a significant price markup at all. As mentioned, in Côte d’Ivoire the 
base price is fixed by the government without any quality differentiation. At the time of the 







Table 1. Descriptive statistics for outcome variables and poverty incidence by certification status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Certified Non-certified 
Mean 
difference 
Cocoa yield (kg/ha) 540.31 573.58 507.03 66.55*** 
 (250.36) (265.70) (229.76)  
Cocoa price (CFA/kg) 717.34 731.04 703.20 27.84*** 
 (39.69) (46.13) (24.82)  
Consumption expenditure (CFA/capita) 1074.64 1173.04 976.24 196.80** 
 (901.43) (974.47) (812.03)  
Below poverty line (1/0) 0.45 0.37 0.52 -0.15*** 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)  
Observations 500 250 250 500 
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Finally, we also observe a difference of around 20% in per capita consumption expenditures 
between Fairtrade certified and non-certified households. For both groups, mean expenditures 
are above the national poverty line of 737 CFA per capita and day (World Bank, 2018). 
Nevertheless, 45% of the farm households live below the poverty line, with poverty rates being 
significantly higher in the group of non-certified households (Table 1). 
2.3.2. Cooperative characteristic 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the cooperative characteristics, also differentiating by 
certification status. The average cocoa cooperative is around 8 years old and has more than 400 
members. Fairtrade certified cooperatives are significantly older than non-certified 
cooperatives. Certified cooperatives also have better educated leaders, own more physical 
assets, and have more providers of services to their members. In terms of democratic decision-
making, no statistically significant differences are observed. Noteworthy in Table 2 are also the 
relatively large standard deviations for several of the cooperative characteristics. Large standard 
deviations imply considerable institutional heterogeneity within and across groups, which 








Table 2. Descriptive statistics for cooperative characteristics by certification status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Certified Non-
certified 
Mean diff. 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 7.70 9.48 5.92 3.56** 
 (5.04) (4.55) (4.97)  
Coop members before certification (number) 420.12 511.28 328.96 182.32 
 (399.42) (533.55) (154.04)  
Share of decisions made democratically 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.13)  
Education of coop leader (yrs.) 14.34 15.60 13.08 2.52*** 
 (3.13) (2.78) (2.98)  
Leader grows cocoa (1/0) 0.72 0.56 0.88 -0.32** 
 (0.45) (0.51) (0.33)  
Service providers for inputs, training etc.  1.56 2.24 0.88 1.36*** 
(number) (1.49) (1.45) (1.20)  
Coop vehicles (number) 5.00 8.48 1.52 6.96*** 
 (6.03) (6.85) (1.48)  
Observations 50 25 25 50 
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The comparison between certified and non-certified cooperatives in Table 2 suggests that 
several of the cooperative characteristics are correlated with Fairtrade certification. This is 
confirmed in column (1) of Table 3. As the cooperative characteristics are not normally 
distributed, we show Spearman’s correlation coefficients. Certification is positively and 
significantly correlated with the age of the cooperative, the education of the leader, physical 
capital, and the number of service providers, and it is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the leader of the cooperative growing cocoa himself/herself. At the same time, several of 
the cooperative characteristics are also significantly correlated with the outcome variables – 
cocoa yield, price, and consumption expenditure – as is shown in columns (2) to (4) of Table 3. 
This joint correlation means that the estimated effects of certification on the outcome variables 



















Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.421*** 0.052 0.351*** -0.047 
 (0.002) (0.245) (0.000) (0.299) 
Coop members before certification (number) 0.115 -0.107** -0.052 -0.090** 
 (0.426) (0.016) (0.249) (0.045) 
Share of decisions made democratically 0.227 -0.026 0.281*** 0.137*** 
 (0.113) (0.555) (0.000) (0.002) 
Education of coop leader (yrs.) 0.445*** -0.002 0.129*** 0.139*** 
 (0.001) (0.972) (0.004) (0.002) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0) -0.356** 0.072 -0.098** -0.047 
 (0.011) (0.107) (0.029) (0.292) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc.  0.517*** 0.012 0.437*** 0.168*** 
(number) (0.000) (0.796) (0.000) (0.000) 
Coop vehicles (number) 0.673*** 0.066 0.471*** 0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.142) (0.000) (0.003) 
Observations 50 500 490 500 
Note: Spearman’s correlation coefficients are shown with p-values in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Correlations in this column calculated at the cooperative level. 
 
2.3.3. Regression results 
Full results of the regression models to estimate the effects of Fairtrade certification on cocoa 
yield, prices, and per capita consumption expenditure – obtained with OLS and IV estimators – 
are shown in Tables A5-A7 in the Appendix. We show specifications with and without 
controlling for cooperative characteristics. For all models, the Hausman test indicates that the 
OLS and IV estimates do not differ significantly, so that the OLS estimates also seem to be 
consistent (and more efficient than the IV estimates). 
The estimated effects of Fairtrade certification on the three outcome variables are summarized 
in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) show effects without controlling for cooperative characteristics. 
The IV estimates suggest that certification increases cocoa yield by 70 kg/ha, which is a gain of 
14% compared to the mean yield of non-certified farmers. This yield effect can be explained by 
certified cooperatives offering more services to their members, thus improving farmers’ access 
to agricultural inputs, information, and training. Large yield-increasing effects through 
Fairtrade certification were also shown in a few previous studies (Jena et al., 2017; van 
Rijsbergen et al., 2016). Other studies that analyzed effects of Fairtrade-Organic double 
certification found no effects on yield (Jena et al., 2012; Mitiku et al., 2017), or even negative 
effects (Vanderhaegen et al., 2018), probably because Organic prohibits the use of yield-
increasing chemical inputs. 
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Fairtrade certification also increases the average cocoa price that farmers receive by about 29 
CFA/kg, equivalent to a gain of 4% over the mean price received by non-certified farmers. As 
mentioned, Fairtrade certification seems to be one of the few opportunities for cocoa farmers in 
Côte d’Ivoire to achieve a price higher than the government-fixed price at all. Finally, Fairtrade 
certification has a significantly positive effect on per capita consumption expenditure, raising 
household living standards by 18%. This gain in living standard reflects the combined effects 
of both higher cocoa yields and higher prices. 
Table 4. Effect of Fairtrade certification on outcome variables 
Outcome variables 
Not controlling for cooperative 
characteristics 
Controlling for cooperative 
characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Cocoa yield (kg/ha) 63.32** 69.60** 111.75*** 106.61** 
 (27.20) (35.27) (37.27) (49.66) 
Cocoa price (CFA/kg) 26.52*** 29.27*** 22.11*** 25.18*** 
 (3.86) (4.23) (3.38) (3.69) 
Per capita consumption expenditure (log) 0.14* 0.17* 0.15* 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) 
Household controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cooperative controls included No No Yes Yes 
Note: Coefficient estimates for the effect of Fairtrade certification (1/0) are shown with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Separate 
models were estimated for each of the three outcome variables. Yield and per capita consumption expenditure models were estimated with 500 
observations; price models were estimated with 490 observations. Full model results are shown in Tables A5-A7 in the Appendix. * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show the effects of Fairtrade certification with the cooperative 
characteristics included as additional controls. The first important result of these alternative 
model estimates is that certification has positive and significant effects also after controlling for 
cooperative characteristics. That is, the benefits of Fairtrade certification for farmers are not 
solely driven by certified cooperatives being systematically different from non-certified 
cooperatives. This is an important result, as previous research on Fairtrade was not able to 
disentangle certification effects from cooperative effects. 
The second important result of these alternative specifications is that some of the estimates in 
columns (3) and (4) are notably different from those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. This 
means that the estimates in columns (1) and (2) suffer from omitted variable bias, as expected, 
given the joint correlation of cooperative characteristics with certification and the outcome 
variables. More surprising may be the direction of the bias. For cocoa yield, the effects increase 
after controlling for cooperative characteristics. Interpreting the IV estimates, the yield gain 
increases from 70 kg/ha (14%) in column (2) to 107 kg/ha (21%) in column (4). This implies 
that farmers in cooperatives with less favorable initial conditions (physical capital, leadership 
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education, service providers, etc.) actually benefit more from certification than farmers in 
cooperatives with more favorable initial conditions. One could have expected the opposite, 
namely that farmers in better-endowed cooperatives would benefit over-proportionally from 
certification. However, our results are not implausible: better-endowed cooperatives are more 
beneficial for farmers with and without certification, but the net effect of certification seems to 
be larger in less-endowed cooperatives. This is a welcome finding from an equity perspective. 
2.3.4. Robustness checks 
As mentioned, several of the cooperatives that are Fairtrade certified are also certified under 
UTZ and/or Rainforest Alliance (RA). In the analysis so far we have ignored such double and 
triple certification, so that it is not clear whether the observed effects are really due to Fairtrade 
alone. In order to test whether certification under one of the other standards changes the 
findings, we run alternative models in which we control for UTZ/RA through an additional 
dummy variable on top of the regular household-level and cooperative-level controls. These 
alternative estimates are shown in Table A9 in the Appendix, with the main results summarized 
in Table 5. UTZ and/or RA certification is not significant in any of the models, whereas the 
Fairtrade effects on all three outcome variables remain positive, significant, and in the same 
magnitude as in Table 4. We conclude that double or triple certification does not change our 
findings concerning the effects of Fairtrade. 
Table 5. Effects of Fairtrade certification on outcome variables controlling for other standards 
 Cocoa yield (kg/ha) Cocoa price (CFA/kg) 
Per capita consumption 
expenditure (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Fairtrade certified (1/0) 116.92*** 109.21** 22.74*** 25.95*** 0.17** 0.14 
 (41.60) (54.52) (3.57) (4.32) (0.08) (0.11) 
UTZ and/or RA certified (1/0) -15.98 -11.91 -1.93 -3.60 -0.09 -0.07 
 (49.49) (49.72) (4.10) (4.76) (0.14) (0.13) 
Household controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cooperative controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 500 500 490 490 500 500 
Note: Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Full model results are shown in Table A9 in the 
Appendix. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Given that UTZ focuses on the adoption of improved farming practices, one could have 
expected that controlling for UTZ would possibly reduce the effects of Fairtrade, especially on 
yield. However, van Rijsbergen et al. (2016) showed with data from Kenya that there is no 
difference in yield between farmers who are Fairtrade certified and Fairtrade-UTZ double 
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certified. Chiputwa et al. (2015) used data from Uganda and also found no additional benefit 
when Fairtrade farmers were Fairtrade-UTZ double certified. 
Another robustness check relates to possible reverse causality between the cooperative 
characteristics and Fairtrade certification. As mentioned, in the choice of cooperative 
characteristics we tried to avoid reverse causality to the extent possible. But changes in 
cooperative services seem to be particularly relevant for the Fairtrade effect on yield, and we 
included the number of service providers as one of the cooperative characteristics. We ran 
additional models in which we controlled for cooperative characteristics but excluded the 
number of service providers. These additional results, which are shown in Table A10 in the 
Appendix, are very similar to the ones discussed above. 
2.4.Conclusion 
In this article, we have analyzed whether Fairtrade certification has beneficial effects on 
smallholder farmers also when controlling for cooperative characteristics. Most of the 
certification for sustainability standards in the small farm sector happens through cooperatives 
or other types of farmer groups. Cooperatives differ in terms of their size, structure, human and 
physical capital endowment, and other institutional characteristics. These cooperative 
characteristics may influence farm productivity and income with and without certification. At 
the same time, they may also determine whether or not a cooperative is certified. Hence, not 
controlling for cooperative characteristics may lead to omitted variable bias when analyzing the 
net effects of certification. Previous research on the effects of Fairtrade and other sustainability 
standards could hardly control for cooperative characteristics. Even when using a large number 
of farm observations, existing studies had typically sampled these observations from only a 
small number of purposively selected cooperatives. We have added to the literature by using a 
more suitable sampling design. In particular, we randomly sampled farmers from a large 
number of randomly selected cooperatives. This approach has two advantages. First, it allows 
controlling for cooperative characteristics in the estimated impact models. Second, due to the 
large institutional heterogeneity that our data capture, external validity is increased. In other 
words, we can rule out that our results are driven by the peculiarities of a small number of 
cooperatives. 
The empirical research has focused on the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire, where large numbers 
of Fairtrade certified and non-certified cooperatives exist in the same regions. Regression 
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models have shown that Fairtrade certification contributes to higher cocoa yields, higher cocoa 
prices, and higher household living standards (measured in terms of per capita consumption 
expenditures). The estimated benefits for farmers remain positive and significant also after 
controlling for cooperative characteristics. However, the magnitude of the effects differs with 
and without controlling for cooperative characteristics, confirming that estimates that do not 
account for institutional heterogeneity suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Interesting is also the direction of the bias. Better-endowed cooperatives are more beneficial for 
member farmers than less-endowed cooperatives, which is true independent of certification. But 
better-endowed cooperatives are also more likely to be certified, which might mean that the 
benefits of certification might be overestimated when not controlling for cooperative 
characteristics. However, we find bias in the opposite direction, that is, the estimated effects of 
certification increase after controlling for cooperative characteristics. This is especially true for 
cocoa yield, where the effect of Fairtrade certification increases from 14% to 21% after 
controlling for cooperative characteristics. This unexpected effect can be explained by farmers 
in less-endowed cooperatives benefiting more from certification than farmers in better-endowed 
cooperatives, which is good news from an equity perspective and is actually quite plausible in 
the local context. Better-endowed cooperatives can offer more beneficial services to their 
members – such as input provision and training – also when not being Fairtrade certified. Hence, 
the additional effect of certification is smaller than in less-endowed cooperatives where an 
increase in service provision is possible only through the Fairtrade premium, the better prices 
in Fairtrade markets, and certification-related organizational support. 
The result on the direction of bias may be specific to Côte d’Ivoire and should not be 
generalized. But the finding that cooperatives and their institutional characteristics matter, and 
that institutional heterogeneity deserves more explicit focus in future research on the effects of 
sustainability standards in the small farm sector, is certainly true also beyond the concrete study 
setting. Improved sampling frameworks – such as suggested here – should be used for data 
collection to facilitate disentangling certification effects from cooperative effects. 
In closing, we mention two limitations of our study that could be addressed in follow-up 
research. First, while we have controlled for cooperative characteristics, we have not analyzed 
in more detail what particular cooperative characteristics matter most for the size and 
distribution of certification benefits. This could be a useful extension to better understand under 
what institutional conditions sustainability standards are most successful in terms of meeting 
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their socioeconomic and environmental objectives. Second, cooperative characteristics 
influence the benefits of certification, but – on the other hand – they may also be influenced by 
certification. For instance, certification may lead to capital accumulation and to a higher 
intensity of cooperative services. While we tried to measure cooperative characteristics in a way 
that reduces issues of reverse causality, we cannot rule out completely that some level of 
endogeneity remains. Noteworthy in this connection is that – if some of the benefits of 
certification were channeled through changes in the variables that we used for measuring 
cooperative characteristics – the estimated effects of certification should decrease after 
controlling for cooperative characteristics. In our models, the opposite is true, namely the effects 
increase after controlling for cooperative characteristics. This is not a proof that issues of reverse 
causality do not exist, but it clearly suggests that any related bias would unlikely overturn the 
finding that Fairtrade certification benefits farmers also after controlling for cooperative effects. 
Dealing with endogeneity more rigorously would require panel data with observations of farm, 
household, and cooperative characteristics before and after certification.  
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3. Fairtrade, agrochemical input use, and effects on human health and the 
environment11 
 
Abstract. It is often assumed that voluntary sustainability standards – such as Fairtrade – could 
not only improve the socioeconomic wellbeing of smallholder farmers in developing countries 
but could also help to reduce negative health and environmental impacts of agricultural 
production. The empirical evidence is thin, as most previous studies on the impact of 
sustainability standards only focused on economic indicators, such as prices, yields, and 
incomes. Here, we argue that Fairtrade and other sustainability standards can affect 
agrochemical input use through various mechanisms with possible positive and negative health 
and environmental effects. We use data from farmers and rural workers in Cote d’Ivoire to 
analyze effects of Fairtrade certification on fertilizer and pesticide use, as well as on human 
health and environmental toxicity. Fairtrade increases chemical input quantities and aggregated 
levels of toxicity. Nevertheless, Fairtrade reduces the incidence of pesticide-related acute health 
symptoms among farmers and workers. Certified cooperatives are more likely to offer training 
and other services related to the safe handling of pesticides and occupational health, which can 
reduce negative externalities in spite of higher input quantities. These results suggest that 
simplistic assumptions about the health and environmental effects of sustainability standards 
may be inappropriate. 
Key words: Agrochemicals; certification; Fairtrade; pesticides; sustainability standards; 
toxicity  
 
11 This chapter is published in Ecological Economics (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106718). It is co-
authored by Eva-Marie Meemken (E.-M.M.) and Matin Qaim (M.Q.). I (J.S.) developed the research idea, 
conducted the data analysis, and wrote the paper. J.S., E.-M.M., and M.Q. designed the study. J.S. and E.-M.M. 




Global food demand will continue to grow in the coming decades with concomitant challenges 
for sustainable agricultural supply (Gouel & Guimbard, 2019). In the past, several factors have 
contributed to growth in agricultural supply, with substantial differences across geographic 
regions. In many parts of the world, production increases during the last 50 years were strongly 
associated with a more intensive use of agrochemicals (Christiaensen, 2017; Meemken & Qaim, 
2018a). While chemical fertilizers and pesticides help to increase crop yields, their misuse can 
lead to soil, water, and air pollution causing serious problems for the environment and human 
health (Elahi et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019; Sheahan et al., 2017; Stoner & Eitzer, 2013). 
Appropriate public policies can reduce negative environmental and health externalities. In 
addition, voluntary sustainability standards – such as Fairtrade, Organic, UTZ, or Rainforest 
Alliance – could potentially help, especially in developing countries where related public 
policies are often absent or poorly enforced. 
During the last decade, voluntary sustainability standards grew in importance for all major 
tropical food commodities, with cocoa seeing the biggest increase in its share of certified area 
(Willer et al., 2019). However, to what extent sustainability standards actually deliver on their 
promises remains an open question (Meemken, 2020; Oya et al., 2018). Several studies 
analyzed effects of sustainability standards on economic indicators, such as crop yields, prices, 
profits, and household income (Akoyi & Maertens, 2018; Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011; Chiputwa 
et al., 2015; Jena et al., 2017; Meemken et al., 2017; Sellare, Meemken, Kouamé, et al., 2020; 
van Rijsbergen et al., 2016; Vanderhaegen et al., 2018). Effects on environmental and health 
indicators were analyzed much less. 
A few studies on selected environmental effects exist for Organic standards, suggesting that 
Organic certification (sometimes in combination with other standards) leads to more 
environmentally-friendly production and decreases in the use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides (Blackman & Naranjo, 2012b; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Vanderhaegen et al., 
2018). However, Organic standards have a particular focus on the environment and ban the use 
of any chemical inputs, which is not the case for most other sustainability standards. Hence, 
these effects cannot be generalized. We are aware of only two studies that analyzed effects of 
sustainability standards other than Organic on environmental indicators with somewhat mixed 
results: Vanderhaegen et al. (2018) used data from farmers in Uganda showing that UTZ-
Rainforest Alliance-4C triple certification increases the likelihood of farmers using 
33 
 
agrochemicals, whereas Elder et al. (2013) used data from Rwanda concluding that Fairtrade 
certification has no effect on chemical input use. 
We add to this existing literature by analyzing effects of Fairtrade on chemical fertilizer and 
pesticide use with data from farmers and rural workers in Cote d’Ivoire, the world’s largest 
exporter of cocoa. Unlike previous studies, we do not only look at chemical input quantities, 
but also at toxicity by calculating the pesticide environmental impact quotient (EIQ) and the 
hazard quotient (HQ). In addition, we evaluate effects of Fairtrade on pesticide-related health 
symptoms as reported by farmers and rural workers, similar to the approach used by Asfaw et 
al. (2010) in their analysis of the health effects of GlobalGAP certification in Kenya. 
While less stringent than Organic, Fairtrade involves certain regulations and measures to reduce 
negative environmental and health effects of agrochemicals. For instance, certain types of toxic 
pesticides are banned (Fairtrade, 2014, 2019a). At the same time, it is possible that Fairtrade 
increases agrochemical input use through price incentives, agricultural extension, and other 
services often provided by Fairtrade-certified cooperatives. Which of these effects dominates is 
an important question that we address empirically with our data from Cote d’Ivoire. Most 
previous studies on the effects of sustainability standards used data from only a small number 
of purposively selected cooperatives. We use data from 50 randomly selected cooperatives, 
which facilitates the analysis of cooperative-level mechanisms and also adds to external 
validity. Possible issues of endogeneity in the impact evaluation are addressed through 
instrumental variable approaches. 
3.2.Fairtrade and agrochemical input use 
It is often assumed that Fairtrade and other sustainability standards lead to reductions in the use 
of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, but this is not necessarily true in every situation. In fact, 
there are various mechanisms through which Fairtrade could affect the use of agrochemical 
inputs and their effects on human health and the environment. In this section, we briefly discuss 
the different mechanisms, before evaluating the effects empirically in subsequent sections. 
First, Fairtrade standards have several concrete regulations related to agrochemical input use 
that must be met by certified cooperatives and their member farmers (Fairtrade, 2014, 2019a). 
Chemicals marked as ‘red’ in Fairtrade’s list of hazardous materials are prohibited. This list 
mainly refers to pesticides and is based on classification systems of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and other internationally accepted institutions (Fairtrade, 2018a). In 
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addition, Fairtrade farmers receive training on integrated pest management, in order to learn 
about economic thresholds and non-chemical measures of pest control. These regulations are 
expected to reduce chemical input use, at least in situations where pesticide use is 
commonplace. 
Second, Fairtrade certification also requires training of farmers on the safe utilization of 
hazardous materials and the use of protective clothes by all persons handling pesticides. 
Furthermore, Fairtrade regulations involve a buffer zone for the application of pesticides of at 
least 10 meters from other human activity (Fairtrade, 2019a). While these measures do not 
necessarily reduce chemical input quantities, they are expected to reduce the direct human 
exposure to pesticides and thus negative health impacts. 
Third, Fairtrade cooperatives often provide general agricultural extension and agronomic 
training to help farmers increase their crop productivity (Meemken & Qaim, 2018b; Sellare, 
Meemken, Kouamé, et al., 2020). Such extension services are frequently financed through the 
Fairtrade premium, an amount of money paid to certified cooperatives dependent of the quantity 
of produce marketed through Fairtrade channels. In addition, cooperatives often use the 
Fairtrade premium to facilitate farmers’ access to inputs through bulk purchases, subsidized 
distribution, and sometimes other forms of financial or credit assistance (Loconto et al., 2019). 
Smallholders in Africa often use low amounts of purchased inputs due to human and financial 
capital constraints. In such situations, the services offered by Fairtrade cooperatives may 
increase agrochemical input use. 
Fourth, Fairtrade offers a floor price for the certified output, which is usually higher than the 
free market price. Higher output prices increase the profit-maximizing levels of input use. 
Hence, this mechanism may lead to an increase in the quantities of agrochemical inputs. 
Which of these mechanisms dominates in a particular context depends on various farm-, 
household-, and cooperative-level variables and on the broader socioeconomic context. In the 
following, we analyze the situation in the cocoa sector of Cote d’Ivoire. 
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3.3.Materials and methods 
3.3.1. Study area 
This study uses data from a survey conducted in 2018 in the Southeast of Cote d’Ivoire, a region 
that is part of the old West African cocoa belt. This region was selected because of the large 
number of Fairtrade certified and non-certified cocoa cooperatives operating there. The 
Southeast of Cote d’Ivoire is characterized by relatively old cocoa plantations, depleted soils, 
and a high incidence of various pests and diseases, such as mirids, black pods, stem borers, and 
the swollen shoot virus (Foundjem-Tita et al., 2017). Most cocoa farmers use chemical 
pesticides to control pests and diseases, even though affordable access to agrochemicals is often 
difficult for the smallholder producers. Cocoa farmers are typically organized in cooperatives, 
which offer certain services to their members and through which the cocoa is also marketed 
(Foundjem-Tita et al., 2017). Usually, several cooperatives are operating in the same locations. 
Farmers are free to choose which of the cooperatives in their vicinity they want to be members 
of. In addition to logistical considerations and expected costs and benefits, factors related to 
kinship and other social ties often influence the decision of which cooperative to join (Sellare, 
Meemken, Kouamé, et al., 2020). 
One important service that many cooperatives provide to their members is facilitating access to 
agricultural inputs. Agrochemicals are not generally subsidized in Cote d’Ivoire, but the Conceil 
du Café et du Cacao (CCC) distributes certain quantities of agrochemicals through the 
cooperatives, which then further distribute these inputs to their members at subsidized rates. 
However, the quantities are rationed, and irregularities in the distribution are commonplace. 
Beyond their role in input provision, cooperatives sometimes also provide agricultural extension 
services and awareness building for the safe use of agrochemicals. Such training services are 
often implemented together with government extension agencies, development organizations, 
or other public and private partners. Some of the cooperatives also offer pesticide spraying 
services for member farmers, meaning that farmers can consult a cooperative specialist who 
supports them in scouting their cocoa fields for pests and implements the spraying operations. 
3.3.2. Sampling and data collection 
One of the key objectives of our study design was to capture a lot of heterogeneity at the 
cooperative level, in order to increase external validity and be able to analyze cooperative-level 
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mechanisms. Hence, we decided to sample from a larger number of cooperatives than previous 
studies on the effects of sustainability standards had done. With the help of different 
international, national, and local organizations, we compiled a list of all active cocoa 
cooperatives in the Southeast of Cote d’Ivoire. From this list, we randomly selected 25 Fairtrade 
certified and 25 non-certified cooperatives, leading to a total of 50 cooperatives.12 In each of 
the 50 cooperatives, we interviewed the cooperative leader in order to collect data on 
cooperative characteristics and the types of services offered to their members. In addition, in 
each cooperative we randomly sampled 10 farmers and 10 workers, leading to a total sample of 
500 farmers and 500 workers. 
Farmers decide what types and quantities of inputs are applied on their cocoa fields. Hence for 
the analysis of input use, we do not include the data from the workers. However, workers may 
apply pesticides or be affected otherwise by exposure to agrochemicals, so for the analysis of 
pesticide-related health symptoms, we use both the data from farmers and workers. There are 
two different types of workers, namely farm workers (locally known as aboussant) and 
cooperative workers (Meemken et al., 2019). Farm workers are employed by farmers to carry 
out field operations, and they typically live near to the cocoa fields. The group of cooperative 
workers is more heterogeneous and includes cooperative staff working in administration, 
logistics, and agriculture-related tasks. Many of the cooperative workers are hardly exposed to 
agrochemicals, but especially those involved in spraying services are exposed to pesticides to a 
significant extent. 
The personal interviews with all respondents were conducted between May and June 2018 by a 
team of local enumerators, who were selected, trained, and monitored by the researchers. The 
structured questionnaires were programmed for use with tablet computers. We used separate 
questionnaires for farmers and workers, although some of the modules – such as those related 
to general household characteristics, income, asset ownership, and exposure to pesticides – were 
identical. 
Questions on details of agrochemical input use were included only in the farmer questionnaire. 
Farmers reported the types and quantities of fertilizers and pesticides (insecticides, fungicides, 
 
12 Of the 25 Fairtrade certified cooperatives in our sample, 16 were additionally certified under UTZ and/or 
Rainforest Alliance (RA). We cannot analyze the effects of UTZ and/or RA separately, because we did not sample 
cooperatives that are only UTZ/RA certified without also being Fairtrade certified. However, in the statistical 
analysis we test whether UTZ/RA has additional effects or changes the effects of Fairtrade in any way. Note that 
in 2018, UTZ and RA legally merged under the name Rainforest Alliance. However, as of April 2020 the new joint 
standard has not been launched in practical terms. 
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and herbicides) they had used in their cocoa fields during the past 12 months. For the pesticides 
used, the brand names or local names of all substances used were also captured. For each 
substance, we later verified active ingredients with the help of local agronomists and input 
dealers. For the analysis of pesticide use, out of the total of 500 farmer observations we had to 
drop 31 because respondents did not remember the quantities of the pesticides applied.  
In order to obtain information about pesticide-related health symptoms, we first asked farmers 
and workers whether they had been exposed to pesticides directly during the last 12 months or 
they had entered a cocoa field within three days after spraying. Of the 500 farmers, 130 reported 
such type of exposure. Of the 500 workers, 125 (104 farm workers and 21 cooperative workers) 
were exposed to pesticides. For these 255 exposed respondents, we followed up by asking 
whether they had experienced any pesticide-related health symptoms during a period of 24 
hours after exposure. For these questions we used a list of common health symptoms as further 
explained below. 
3.3.3. Measurement of outcome variables 
In order to evaluate how Fairtrade affects the use of agrochemical inputs and their impacts on 
the environment and human health, we use three sets of outcome variables, namely (i) 
agrochemical input quantities, (ii) aggregated pesticide toxicity, and (iii) pesticide-related 
health symptoms. Agrochemical input quantities are calculated separately for chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides and are measured in kg per hectare of cocoa. Pesticide quantities 
include the quantities of insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides used. 
There is no uniform measure of pesticide toxicity, as impacts on soils, plants, aquatic organisms, 
insects, and mammals differ. We use two indicators of aggregated pesticide toxicity, namely 
the environmental impact quotient (EIQ) and the hazard quotient (HQ). EIQ is a 
multidimensional measure of the environmental and health effects of pesticides and was 
developed by Kovach et al. (1992). It was extensively used in the recent literature to evaluate 
environmental and health effects of various pest control strategies (Abedullah et al., 2015; 
Kromann et al., 2011; Midingoyi et al., 2019; Veettil et al., 2017). The EIQ is calculated as: 
234 = 	∑ 234'! ∗ [9:;<=>	ℎ<()] ∗ AB:C:BD-:E'!
*
'!+)                                 (3) 
where 234'! is the base EIQ for each active ingredient, dosage ha-1 is the amount of formulation 
in kg per hectare, and AB:C:BD-:E'! is the proportion of each active ingredient in the pesticide 
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formulation. The higher the EIQ, the greater is the aggregated environmental and health toxicity 
of the pesticides used. 
The EIQ combines different types of toxicity and environmental impacts (soil, water, aquatic 
organisms, mammals, etc.) in one indicator, which can be seen as an advantage. However, in 
doing so, it assigns scales and weights to the various components, which can also lead to 
possible misinterpretation, depending on what the concrete purpose is (Kniss & Coburn, 2015; 
Peterson & Iii, 2014). The HQ is narrower, as it only considers toxicity to mammalian species 
(including humans), but is easier to interpret and uses more straightforward data for the 
measurement of acute toxicity, such as the lethal dose of a substance to kill 50% of the test 
animals (LD50) (Kniss, 2017; Nelson & Bullock, 2003; Stoner & Eitzer, 2013). We calculate 





'!+)                                                           (4) 
where N is the total number of pesticide active ingredients applied to cocoa, GH:IED'! is the 
quantity of each active ingredient applied, and ':J-K-DL'! is the acute rat LD50 via oral 
administration, expressed in mg per kg of animal weight.13 A smaller LD50 means higher 
toxicity. However, as toxicity appears in the denominator, a larger HQ indicates a more toxic 
combination of pesticides. 
Pesticide-related health symptoms are indicators of actual human health effects, which are not 
only a function of pesticide toxicity but also of handling practices. We analyze the self-reported 
number of acute health symptoms experienced by farmers and workers, similar to what has been 
used in other studies on the health effects of pesticide use (Asfaw et al., 2010; Kouser & Qaim, 
2011). In particular, the following symptoms are considered: general weakness, vomiting, 
excessive sweating, stomach pain, sleeplessness, skin irritation, headache, fever, eye irritation, 
diarrhea, coughing, breathlessness, other respiratory problems, and other symptoms to be 
specified. Our outcome variable is the sum of the number of all symptoms reported by each 
respondent. 
 
13 Note that other measures of toxicity can be used in principle to calculate the HQ, also including measures of 
chronic toxicity (Kniss, 2017). We concentrate on acute toxicity, as reliable data on chronic toxicity are not 
available for many of the active ingredients relevant in the local context. 
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3.3.4. Econometric models 
We analyze the effect of Fairtrade on the outcome variables using regression models of the 
following type: 
L!"# = # + %&'"# + ()$%& + *+& + 01%& + ,!"#                                    (5) 
where L!"# is the respective outcome variable for household - belonging to cooperative . in 
district /. We estimate separate models for each of the outcome variables (i.e., quantity of 
fertilizer and pesticides, EIQ, HQ, number of health symptoms). The main explanatory variable 
of interest is &'"#, which is a dummy variable indicating whether or not cooperative . is 
Fairtrade certified. A statistically significant % would imply that Fairtrade has an effect on the 
respective outcome variable, also after controlling for possible confounding factors. In the 
estimations, we control for a vector of exogenous household-level variables, )$%&, such as 
farmer age, education, and asset ownership. Furthermore, we control for cooperative 
characteristics, 1%&, such as the age of the cooperative and the number of service providers, as 
these may also affect farmers’ behavior with and without Fairtrade certification (Sellare, 
Meemken, Kouamé, et al., 2020). Lastly, we include a set of district dummies, +&, to account 
for possible geographical differences in terms of infrastructure and market access. In all 
estimations the error term, ,!"#, is clustered at the cooperative level. 
Depending on the particular outcome variable, we use different model specifications and 
functional forms. Some of the farmers do not use any fertilizers and pesticides, so that the 
variables measuring agrochemical quantities and toxicity levels are censored at zero. Such 
corner solution models can be estimated with a double-hurdle specification as follows (Ricker-
Gilbert et al., 2011): 
M!"#
6 = p7 + p)&'"# + p8)$%& + p91%& + p:+& + I!"# , where M!"#6 = N
1	if	M!"# > 0	
0	otherwise
          (6) 
M!"# = w7 + w)&'"# + w8)$%& + w91%& + w:+& + [!"# , given M!"#6 = 1                     (7) 
In the first hurdle in equation (6), M!"#6  is a dummy variable that represents the farmer’s choice 
whether or not to use the particular type of agrochemical. In the second hurdle in equation (7), 
M!"# is a continuous variable representing the quantity of agrochemicals used (or their toxicity), 
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conditional on the first hurdle being passed. I!"# and [!"# are normally distributed and 
independent error terms.14 
The number of pesticide-related health symptoms is a count variable drawn from a Poisson 
distribution. Therefore, we use an exponential conditional mean model as follows: 
L!"# = >JC\# + %&'"# + ()$%& + *+& + 01%& + ]^$%&_ + ,!"#                          (8) 
As this model includes observations from farmers, farm workers, and cooperative workers, we 
include an additional set of two dummy variables, ^$%&, indicating to which group the particular 
observation belongs. We use the group of farmers as the reference category. 
3.3.5. Identification strategy 
As Fairtrade certification is not randomly assigned to cooperatives and farmers, the variable 
&'"# in the regression models is potentially endogenous, which could lead to biased estimates. 
Cooperatives decide whether or not they want to be certified, and farmers decide which 
cooperative they want to be member of. In all specifications, we control for several cooperative 
characteristics and also include farmer-level measures such as individual risk aversion (Dohmen 
et al., 2011) that proxy for possible unobserved heterogeneity. Nevertheless, correlation 
between &'"# and the error terms cannot be ruled out, so that we use instrumental variable (IV) 
approaches to test and control for endogeneity. 
In particular, we use three instruments for &'"#, building on previous work by Meemken et al. 
(2019) and Sellare et al. (2020) and exploiting different dimensions of social networks that 
influence the certification decision. These instruments are: (i) the share of Fairtrade certified 
farmers in a 5 km radius; (ii) the distance to the closest Fairtrade certified cooperative; and (iii) 
the mobile phone provider of the cooperative leader. These instruments are further explained 
and tested for validity in the following. 
The first instrument, the share of certified farmers in a 5 km radius, captures household-level 
social network effects, as farmers located closer to other certified farmers are more likely to 
 
14 The tobit model is a specific case of the double-hurdle model where the influencing factors in both hurdles are 
identical. Table B1 in the Appendix shows likelihood ratio tests, the results of which suggest that in most cases the 
two-equation double-hurdle model is preferred over the single-equation tobit specification. 
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learn about certification and its possible advantages.15 Farmers cannot get Fairtrade certification 
individually, but they can decide to join (or leave) a Fairtrade certified cooperative. Our data 
confirm a significant correlation between the share of certified farmers in the neighborhood and 
own certification (Table B2 in the Appendix), which is the key condition for instrument 
relevance. In addition, for an instrument to be valid, it must not affect the outcome variables 
directly. One could expect that locations with more Fairtrade certified cooperatives and farmers 
are those that also have more extension offices or better infrastructure and access to markets, 
all of which could influence farmers’ input use independent of own certification. However, 
government extension offices are spread throughout the study area. Moreover, our data show 
that there is no pronounced geographic clustering of certified cooperatives, meaning that 
certified and non-certified cooperatives are found in the same locations. Using a simple 
falsification test, as proposed by Di Falco et al. (2011), we find that the share of certified farmers 
in a 5 km radius is not significantly correlated with agrochemical input use or pesticide toxicity 
(Table B2).16 
Our second instrument, the distance to the headquarters of the closest Fairtrade certified 
cooperative, is defined with respect to the respondent’s household and also captures network 
effects. Farmers who live close to the headquarters of a certified cooperative are more likely to 
learn about Fairtrade and join this cooperative. Also for workers, the closer they live to the 
headquarters of a certified cooperative, the more likely they will work there. Table B2 in the 
Appendix confirms the expected negative correlation between this distance measure and own 
Fairtrade certification status, whereas the instrument is not significantly correlated with any of 
the outcome variables. Even though living closer to the headquarters of a certified cooperative 
can be associated with better access to inputs and training, this effect works through cooperative 
membership and therefore own certification, as cooperatives rarely offer related services to non-
members. 
The third instrument, the mobile phone provider of the cooperative leader, captures network 
effects at the cooperative level. In total, there are three network providers operating in the study 
area, namely Orange, MTN, and Moov. All three offer similar services at similar costs, so the 
choice for the individual mainly depends on the strength of the network signal in a particular 
 
15 Some of the cooperative workers, whose observations are included in the analysis of health symptoms, live 
elsewhere (e.g., in a nearby city). In those cases, we do not consider the location of the own household but use the 
cooperative mean of the share of certified farmers in a 5 km radius. 
16 While the instrument is individually significant in the health symptom regression, the falsification test shows 
that all three instruments together are jointly insignificant at the 5% level (Table B2). 
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location and on which provider others in the personal social network are subscribed to. There 
are economic advantages of communicating with people who have the same network provider, 
since the providers offer discounts for calls and text messages exchanged within their networks. 
Our data show that cooperatives whose leader is subscribed to Orange are more likely to be 
certified. Hence, it is likely that more information about Fairtrade is exchanged within the 
Orange network than within other networks. Table B2 in the Appendix confirms the positive 
correlation between the cooperative-level instrument and own certification status. One could 
argue that the decision of the cooperative to become certified might have influenced the leader’s 
decision of the mobile phone provider, which would make the instrument endogenous. 
However, this is not the case in our context, as people rarely switch their mobile phone 
providers. In fact, only three of the 25 certified cooperative leaders in our sample switched their 
phone provider after the cooperative became certified. The instrument is not directly correlated 
with any of the outcome variables (Table B2). 
Using a Wald test we also show that our three instruments are jointly correlated with Fairtrade 
certification (Table B2). Furthermore, we show that the three instruments are not jointly 
correlated with any of the outcome variables at the 5% significance level. As we have more 
instruments than endogenous regressors, we can also test whether our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term with a test of over-identifying restrictions. Hansen’s J test 
statistic indicates that our instruments are valid (Table B3). 
For the double-hurdle models to analyze agrochemical input quantities and toxicity levels, we 
use the three instruments in a control function (CF) framework (Wooldridge, 2015). The CF 
approach entails first regressing the endogenous variable on the instruments and all exogenous 
covariates. The residuals from this first-stage regression are then included in the outcome 
models. The significance of the residuals in the outcome models tests for endogeneity. If the 
residuals are insignificant, the exogeneity hypothesis cannot be rejected and estimation without 
the residuals included leads to consistent and more efficient results. If the residuals are 
statistically significant, however, the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected and inclusion of the 
residuals controls for endogeneity bias. Following previous research (Benali et al., 2018; Rao 
& Qaim, 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Woldeyohanes et al., 2017), we test for endogeneity 
in both hurdles of the double-hurdle model (Table B4 in the Appendix) and include the residuals 
in those cases where the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. 
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For the exponential model to analyze pesticide-related health symptoms, we use a nonlinear IV 
approach based on the generalized method of moments estimator (IV-GMM) (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2013; Hirvonen & Hoddinott, 2017). This is an appropriate approach for nonlinear 
models, even when the model is over-identified with clustered errors (Mullahy, 1997; 
Wooldridge, 2001). The exogenous instruments are used to create additional moment conditions 
and solve a minimization problem, namely that the correlation between the endogenous variable 
and the error term is as close to zero as possible. 
3.4.Results and discussion 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for agrochemical input use and related indicators by 
certification status. Fairtrade certification is associated with significantly higher chemical input 
quantities per hectare of cocoa. On average, certified farmers use almost twice as much fertilizer 
as non-certified farmers. Certified farmers also use 25% more pesticides (total quantities of 
insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides) than non-certified farmers. This is not necessarily an 
indication that certified farmers overuse agrochemicals, as it is also possible that non-certified 
farmers underuse fertilizers and pesticides. Higher input intensities contribute to higher cocoa 
yields, as can also be seen in Table 6. Nevertheless, they potentially also contribute to higher 












Table 6. Agrochemical input use and related indicators by Fairtrade certification status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Number of fertilizer applications 500 0.94 1.20 0.67 0.54*** 
  (0.95) (0.98) (0.84)  
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 492 37.91 48.49 27.49 21.00*** 
  (78.67) (78.48) (77.62)  
Number of pesticide applications 500 2.51 2.62 2.40 0.23* 
  (1.41) (1.46) (1.36)  
Total pesticide use (kg/ha) 469 1.92 2.14 1.71 0.43** 
  (2.09) (2.50) (1.61)  
Insecticides (kg/ha) 489 1.01 1.14 0.89 0.24*** 
  (0.82) (0.94) (0.66)  
Fungicides (kg/ha) 476 0.66 0.84 0.49 0.35** 
  (1.65) (2.09) (1.07)  
Herbicides (kg/ha) 487 0.27 0.18 0.36 -0.18** 
  (0.76) (0.67) (0.83)  
Cocoa yields (kg/ha) 500 540.31 573.58 507.03 66.55*** 
  (250.36) (265.70) (229.76)  
Environmental impact quotient (EIQ) 469 20.20 23.98 16.71 7.27** 
  (36.41) (45.19) (25.39)  
Hazard quotient (HQ) 469 747.01 864.66 638.53 226.12** 
  (1157.08) (1355.52) (927.42)  
Number of acute health symptoms a 255 1.83 1.20 2.30 -1.10*** 
  (2.69) (2.61) (2.66)  
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Health symptoms refer to both farmers and workers. Data are shown only for those that reported having been exposed to pesticides. 
 
We identified 20 different pesticide active ingredients that cocoa farmers commonly use in 
different combinations. These active ingredients are listed in Table 7 together with their 
Fairtrade color classifications, WHO classifications, and levels of toxicity in terms of EIQ and 
LD50. Interesting to note is that EIQ and LD50 values are not significantly correlated. As 
explained above, LD50 only looks at mammalian toxicity, whereas EIQ also tries to evaluate 
other environmental risks. For some of the active ingredients in Table 7, notable disparities are 
observed. For instance, of the products considered, the fungicide Carbendazim has one of the 
highest toxicity levels when evaluated with the EIQ, but the lowest toxicity level in terms of 
LD50. Hence, both indicators are not directly comparable, and the LD50 (as well as the HQ) 







Table 7. List of pesticide active ingredients used by farmers and various toxicity classifications 





EIQ LD50 (mg kg-1) c 
Acetamiprid   Insecticide - II 28.73 146 
Bifenthrin Insecticide Orange II 44.35 54.5 
Chlorantraniliprole Insecticide Orange U 18.34 5000 
Cypermethrin Insecticide Orange II 36.35 250 
Deltamethrin Insecticide Orange II 28.38 135 
Diazinon Insecticide Yellow II 44.03 300 
Imidaclopride Insecticide Orange II 36.71 450 
Lambda-cyhalothrin Insecticide Orange II 44.17 56 
Profenofos Insecticide Yellow II 59.53 358 
Thiacloprid Insecticide Yellow II 31.33 396 
Thiamethoxam Insecticide Orange II 33.3 1563 
Mefanoxam, metalaxyl-M Fungicide - II 19.07 670 
Carbendazim Fungicide Orange U 50.5 10000 
Copper hydroxide Fungicide Yellow II 33.2 1000 
Copper oxide Fungicide - U 33.2 7792 
Mancozeb Fungicide Orange U 25.72 8000 
Mandipropamid Fungicide - U 27.14 5000 
2.4-D dimethylamine Herbicide - II 20.67 625 
Glyphosate Herbicide Orange III 15.33 4230 
Paraquat Herbicide Red II 24.73 150 
a In the Fairtrade classification, red means ‘prohibited,’ orange means ‘restricted,’ and yellow means ‘flagged’. 
b II = Moderately hazardous; III = Slightly hazardous; U = unlikely to present acute hazard 
c Lethal dose for 50% of the population based on the acute toxicity for rats via oral administration. 
 
Comparing actually applied quantities of each active ingredient between certified and non-
certified cocoa farmers in our sample reveals that Fairtrade certification is associated with 
significantly higher aggregated toxicity, measured in terms of both EIQ and HQ (Table 6). At 
the same time, Fairtrade certification is associated with a significantly lower number of 
pesticide-related acute health symptoms experienced by farmers and rural workers. Fewer 
health problems in spite of higher levels of pesticide toxicity in Fairtrade certified cocoa point 
at safer pesticide application practices. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the data by health 
symptom. Certified farmers and workers reported lower frequencies of health problems for 








A bit more context about the local division of labor and farmers’ and workers’ exposure to 
chemical pesticides may be useful for the interpretation of the results. In the study area in Cote 
d’Ivoire, many of the routine operations in cocoa production, such as pruning, fertilization, and 
harvesting, are carried out by farm workers (aboussant) with lesser involvement by the farmers 
themselves (Meemken et al., 2019). In principle, farm workers also apply chemical pesticides, 
but for pest control, farmers often also use spraying services offered by many cooperatives, 
meaning that the pesticides are applied by cooperative field workers or extension agents. In our 
sample, only 15% of the farmers and 25% of the farm workers mentioned that they were directly 
involved in pesticide applications during the 12 months prior to the survey. However, farmers 
and farm workers may also be exposed to pesticides more indirectly. Most farmers live in 
villages that are typically located at some distance to the cocoa fields. In contrast, farm workers 
often live in houses or huts near the cocoa fields, increasing the likelihood of being exposed to 
pesticides. Indeed, 41% of the farm workers in our sample reported having been exposed to 
pesticides directly or indirectly, compared to only 26% of the farmers in the sample. 
Tables B5 and B6 in the Appendix show descriptive statistics for the control variables used in 
the regression analysis. For farmers (Table B5), a few significant differences between certified 
and non-certified can be observed in terms of household and cooperative characteristics (Table 
B5). For instance, Fairtrade certified cooperatives are older than non-certified cooperatives. 
Also, certified cooperatives make a larger share of the decisions democratically, and they 
cooperate with more external partners to provide inputs, training, and other services to their 
members. In terms of cocoa farm characteristics, such as the size of the landholdings, pest 
infestation levels, or age of the cocoa trees, most of the differences are small and not statistically 
significant. For the sample of workers (Table B6), no significant differences are observed. 
 
3.4.2. Effects on the intensity of agrochemical use 
Table 8 shows marginal effects of Fairtrade certification on fertilizer and pesticide quantities, 
as derived from double-hurdle model estimation. We start the discussion with fertilizer. The 
first-hurdle estimation results suggest that certification increases the probability of using 
chemical fertilizer by 18 percentage points. This is a relatively large effect. Many of the non-
certified farmers do not use any chemical fertilizer on their cocoa fields, often because fertilizers 
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are inaccessible or too expensive for them. The estimation results suggest that Fairtrade 
certification improves farmers’ access to chemical fertilizers. However, the second-hurdle 
estimates for fertilizer are not statistically significant, suggesting that certification has no effect 
on fertilizer quantity. The conditional marginal effect (ME) is conditional on the first-hurdle 
being passed; the estimate is positive but relatively small in magnitude. The unconditional ME 
considers both hurdles together. The estimate for the unconditional ME is much larger, 
suggesting that certification possibly increases fertilizer quantities, but the standard error is also 
relatively large, so the estimate is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 8. Effects of certification on agrochemical input use (double-hurdle marginal effects) 
   (1) (2) 





Probit ME  0.18*** -9e-3 
 (0.06) (0.03) 
Second hurdle 
(kg/ha)  
Conditional ME 4.33 0.35** 
 (26.96) (0.18) 
Unconditional ME 21.12 0.31* 
 (14.55) (0.18) 
Observations 492 469 
Note: Average marginal effects (ME) are shown with delta-method standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions include household and cooperative-level control variables. Full results are shown in Tables B7 and B8 in the Appendix. 
 
We now look at the results for pesticides in Table 8. Fairtrade certification does not significantly 
affect the probability of using pesticides (first hurdle), but – conditional on using pesticides – 
certification increases the quantity of pesticides by 0.35 kg/ha (second hurdle). The 
unconditional ME suggests additional pesticide use of 0.31 kg/ha, which is equivalent to an 
18% increase over the mean pesticide use by non-certified farmers. These results are plausible 
in the local context. Due to high pest and disease pressure, over 90% of the sample farmers use 
chemical pesticides in cocoa production anyway, with or without certification. But certification 
raises farmers’ awareness and knowledge about pest control, facilitates access to pesticides, and 
provides incentives to use additional quantities. According to local agronomists, at least the 
mean application rates observed in our sample do not point at an overuse of chemical pesticides. 
To gain a better understanding of the institutional factors that contribute to higher agrochemical 
input use, we ran auxiliary regressions where we included farmers’ access to and use of various 
cooperative services as additional explanatory variables. Results of these auxiliary regressions 
are shown in Table B9 in the Appendix. As expected, access to agricultural credit and 
participation in agricultural training increase the likelihood of using fertilizer significantly. 
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Similarly, the availability of subsidized fertilizer and pesticides through the cooperatives also 
increases the likelihood of using these inputs. Furthermore, access to cooperative spraying 
services increases the pesticide and fertilizer quantities used. All of these services are more 
likely to be offered in Fairtrade certified cooperatives, as we will show in more detail further 
below. At the same time, cocoa prices do not seem to affect agrochemical input use 
significantly, probably because cocoa prices are regulated by the state and actually observed 
price differences are small (Sellare et al., 2020). 
3.4.3. Effects of Fairtrade on aggregated pesticide toxicity 
Table 9 shows the effects of Fairtrade certification on the aggregated EIQ and HQ. Both 
indicators are calculated based on the quantities of pesticides applied. As shown above, 
certification does not affect the probability of using pesticides. Hence, it is not surprising that 
the first-hurdle estimates of the toxicity models do not show significant effects either. For EIQ, 
the second-hurdle results are positive but statistically insignificant. However, for HQ the 
second-hurdle results are significant and quite large in magnitude. The unconditional ME of 
259 points suggests that Fairtrade certification increases the HQ by 40% in comparison to the 
mean value observed for non-certified farmers. 
Table 9. Effects of certification on aggregated pesticide toxicity (double-hurdle marginal effects) 
   (1) (2) 
   EIQ HQ 
Certification  
(1/0) 
First hurdle (1/0) Probit ME -6e-3 -6e-3  (0.03) (0.03) 
Second hurdle 
(continuous) 
Conditional ME 5.86 285.00** 
 (4.31) (112.37) 
Unconditional ME 5.24 258.87** 
 (4.16) (106.96) 
Observations 469 469 
Note: Average marginal effects (ME) are shown with delta-method standard errors in parentheses. EIQ, environmental impact quotient; HQ, 
hazard quotient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
All regressions include household and cooperative-level control variables. Full results are shown in Tables B10 and B11 in the Appendix. 
 
That certification has significant effects on the HQ but not on the EIQ can be explained by the 
differences in what exactly these two indicators measure (see above). The relatively large 
Fairtrade effect on HQ is not only due to higher overall pesticide quantity but also to differences 
in the pesticide mix that certified and non-certified farmers use. Figure B1 in the Appendix 
shows that certification is positively correlated with active ingredients such as Thiacloprid and 
Lambda-cyhalothrin. Especially the latter is very toxic for mammalian species in terms of its 
LD50 (Table 2). The use of Lambda-cyhalothrin is not recommended by Fairtrade, but it seems 
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that through certain mechanisms certified farmers have better access to this active ingredient 
than non-certified farmers. In fact, Lambda-cyhalothrin is flagged ‘orange’ in the Fairtrade list 
of hazardous materials and its use by certified farmers should be phased out by 2020 (Fairtrade, 
2019a). 
3.4.4. Effects of Fairtrade on pesticide-related health symptoms 
Aggregated toxicity, as analyzed above, is a measure of the potential impact of pesticides on 
the environment and human health. Actual health effects may differ, as these also depend on 
the level of exposure to the toxic substances. Table 10 shows the effect of Fairtrade certification 
on the number of pesticide-related health symptoms reported by farmers and rural workers. 
Fairtrade reduces the number of health problems significantly, in spite of the fact that larger 
quantities of pesticides and active ingredients with higher mammalian toxicity are used. This 
positive health effect can likely be explained by better training about the safe use of pesticides 
and more widespread use of protective devices among Fairtrade certified farmers and workers. 
The marginal Fairtrade effect of -0.92 shown in Table 10 implies a 40% reduction in the annual 
number of pesticide-related health symptoms. 
Table 10. Effects of certification on the number of pesticide-related acute health symptoms 
 Number of reported 
health symptoms  
 (marginal effect) 
Certified (1/0) -0.92** 
 (0.36) 
Observations 255 
Note: Clustered standard error shown in parentheses. Estimates based on exponential IV-GMM model. ** p < 0.05 
Regression includes household and cooperative-level control variables. Full results are shown in Table B3 in the Appendix. 
 
3.4.5. Effects of Fairtrade at the cooperative level 
As argued above, effects of Fairtrade on farmers’ agrochemical input use and environmental 
and health impacts are likely channeled through mechanisms at the cooperative level, at least 
to a large extent. In particular, expected cooperative-level mechanisms include improved 
services related to input provision and training, which are partly funded through the Fairtrade 
premium. Figure 3 shows the share of cooperatives in our sample that offer certain types of 
services to their members, differentiating between cooperatives with and without Fairtrade 
certification. We compare the 25 certified with the 25 non-certified cooperatives and test for 
significant differences using Fisher’s exact test. In addition, we compare the 25 certified 
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cooperatives before and after they became Fairtrade certified, building on cooperative records 
and leadership recall data. We use McNemar’s test for paired data to test for significant 
differences in this within-cooperative comparison. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, certified cooperatives are more likely than non-certified cooperatives 
to provide fertilizers and pesticides to their members at subsidized rates and to offer training on 
input use and the safe handling of pesticides, protective clothing, and spraying services. Most 
of these differences are statistically significant. We showed above that agricultural training and 
the provision of inputs at subsidized rates contribute to higher agrochemical input use. 
However, by also offering spraying services, protective clothing, and training on occupational 
health and safety, cooperatives can reduce negative health impacts in terms pesticide-related 
health symptoms. Comparing the 25 certified cooperatives before and after certification, 
significant differences are observed for all variables shown in Figure 3. This means that the 






Figure 3. Share of cooperatives offering services related to input provision and training by certification status. 
Each group includes 25 cooperative observations. Differences are tested for statistical significance with p-values shown above the respective bars. 
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3.4.6. Role of other standards 
So far, we concentrated only on Fairtrade certification. However, there are two other 
sustainability standards that are also widely observed for cocoa production in the Southeast of 
Cote d’Ivoire, namely UTZ and Rainforest Alliance (RA). As mentioned above, of the 25 
Fairtrade certified cooperatives in our sample, 16 were also certified under UTZ and/or RA 
standards. Similar to Fairtrade, UTZ and RA have certain regulations concerning the use of 
agrochemicals and promote alternative practices of pest and disease control. However, in terms 
of pesticide regulations, Fairtrade standards are stricter than those of UTZ and RA (Rainforest 
Alliance, 2020). In this subsection, we test whether UTZ and RA have additional effects on any 
of the outcome variables considered or significantly change the effects of Fairtrade. We do so 
by re-estimating our regression models and including an UTZ/RA dummy as an additional 
explanatory variable. This dummy takes a value of one if the respondent certified under 
Fairtrade was additionally also certified under UTZ and/or RA, and zero otherwise. As 
mentioned, we do not have any farmers or workers in our sample that were certified under 
UTZ/RA and not also under Fairtrade. Results of these additional regressions are summarized 
in Table 11. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 suggest that UTZ/RA leads to a reduction in the use of 
fertilizer. In all other models, the coefficients of the UTZ/RA dummy are small in magnitude 
and statistically insignificant. The Fairtrade effects, on the other hand, remain very similar to 
those estimated above. For fertilizer quantity, the Fairtrade effect increases and turns 
statistically significant after controlling for UTZ/RA (column 2 of Table 11). For pesticide 
quantity, the Fairtrade effect turns statistically insignificant, but remains similar in magnitude. 
For pesticide-related health symptoms, both the magnitude and the significance level of the 
Fairtrade effect remain unchanged. Hence, the main findings for Fairtrade are quite robust: 
Fairtrade certification leads to an increase in agrochemical input use and aggregated toxicity, 







Table 11. Effects of Fairtrade on agrochemical input use, toxicity, and health controlling for UTZ/RA 
 Fertilizer  
(kg/ha) 
Total pesticide use 
(kg/ha) EIQ HQ 
Health 
symptoms 















ME a ME 
b 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fairtrade (1/0) 36.87 37.59** 0.38 0.29 3.99 2.96 282.95* 239.63 -1.03** 
 (25.63) (18.01) (0.24) (0.24) (5.28) (5.05) (169.22) (157.86) (0.51) 
UTZ/RA (1/0) -67.68** -33.97* -0.05 0.04 3.46 4.19 3.79 34.47 0.25 
 (29.29) (19.13) (0.27) (0.26) (6.27) (6.16) (181.65) (164.88) (0.73) 
Observations 492 492 469 469 469 469 469 469 255 
Note: Average marginal effects (ME) are shown with delta-method standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Regressions were estimated with double-hurdle models. b Regression was estimated with IV-GMM model. 
All regressions include household and cooperative-level control variables. Full results are shown in Tables B12-B14 in the Appendix. 
 
3.5.Conclusion 
In this article, we have analyzed the effects of Fairtrade certification on agrochemical input use 
and related impacts on the environment and human health. Even though Fairtrade focuses 
primarily on the social dimension of sustainability, it also has certain environmental objectives 
and related rules and regulations. For instance, Fairtrade bans certain pesticides that are 
particularly toxic and requires certified farmers to be trained in the safe handling of 
agrochemicals. Very few previous studies have evaluated the effects of Fairtrade on 
agrochemical input use (Elder et al., 2013). We are not aware of any study that has looked at 
environmental and health impacts beyond pesticide quantity. Hence, our study adds to the 
existing literature. 
Conceptually, we have discussed different mechanisms how Fairtrade certification can either 
increase or decrease fertilizer and pesticide use and related externalities. While the Fairtrade 
regulations as such may rather reduce the use of toxic agrochemicals, the Fairtrade premium 
and related services offered by certified cooperatives may facilitate and incentivize higher input 
intensities. Indeed, our empirical results from Cote d’Ivoire show that Fairtrade increases 
agrochemical input use. Fairtrade also leads to higher aggregated levels of toxicity, which proxy 
potential negative impacts on the environment and human health. At least to some extent, these 
effects are driven by Fairtrade cooperatives being more active in agricultural training and in 
facilitating chemical input provision to their member farmers. 
However, interestingly, higher pesticide quantities among Fairtrade certified farmers do not 
lead to more health problems. On the contrary, our data show that Fairtrade significantly reduces 
the incidence of pesticide-related acute health issues experienced by farmers and rural workers. 
This is plausible against the background of Fairtrade cooperatives being more likely to provide 
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protective devices and other services for spraying, as well as training on the safe handling of 
pesticides. 
These empirical results cannot be generalized beyond Cote d’Ivoire, as the role of the 
underlying mechanisms may differ from one place to another. However, a conclusion that can 
be generalized is that simplistic assumptions about the health and environmental effects of 
Fairtrade and other sustainability standards are inappropriate, as there are various possible 
mechanisms that can work in opposite directions. Cooperatives and the services they offer play 
an important role and should be the key entry point for interventions to further improve the 
outcomes of sustainability certification. 
Our study has two limitations that should be addressed in follow-up research. First, while we 
went beyond pesticide quantities and also analyzed aggregated levels of toxicity, the 
environmental impact quotient (EIQ) and the hazard quotient (HQ) only capture potential and 
not actual environmental and health impacts of pesticide use. Actual health impacts were 
additionally analyzed by looking at pesticide-related symptoms, but we were not able to 
examine actual environmental effects, which would require soil, water, and biodiversity 
measurements. Second, the cooperative-level effects deserve further scrutiny. We improved 
upon previous research by sampling a larger number of cooperatives, but our main focus was 
on the farmer and worker level. Future research should focus more on the cooperative level, 
possibly with panel data to be able to analyze possible changes through sustainability 







4. New insights on the use of the Fairtrade social premium 
 
Abstract. Fairtrade standards differentiate themselves from other sustainability standards such 
as Rainforest Alliance and UTZ by demanding that buyers pay to farmers at least a minimum 
price and a Fairtrade social premium – a sum that is paid to cooperatives in addition to the 
agreed price to be used in projects to strengthen the cooperative and to benefit the community 
in the villages more broadly. The latter is often mentioned in the literature as one of the key 
mechanisms through which Fairtrade engenders changes in the small farm sector. However, no 
previous study has explicitly analyzed what the social premium is used for, which factors affect 
the decision-making processes, and whether farmers, workers, and the local communities more 
broadly benefit from projects implemented with the premium money. In this article, I use 
multivariate statistical techniques to analyze how patterns in the use of the premium are related 
to cooperatives’ organizational characteristics. To illustrate the potential benefits of the social 
premium to the local community, I use regression analyses to evaluate the effects of certification 
and educational projects financed with the social premium on household education expenditure. 
I find evidence that living in a village where an educational project was implemented has a 
positive effect on education expenditure among farmers, but does not have an effect among 
rural workers. 
 






Developing countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and especially Africa still face major 
challenges to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, despite some 
progress in recent years (Moyer & Hedden, 2020). In the absence of government funds, 
mobilization of necessary financial resources for investment in public goods via the private 
sector can have positive impacts (Aust et al., 2020). Given the potential of the agricultural sector 
to deliver broad scale economic growth in developing countries (Christiaensen & Martin, 2018), 
initiatives that foster the development of global value chains, are an important private-sector-
led option to support rural development and overall economic growth (World Bank, 2020a). In 
this context, sustainability standards emerged as a mechanism to ensure that farmers in 
developing countries have access to higher value markets and receive a better price for their 
produce while addressing consumers’ concerns about social injustice and environmental 
degradation (Ladhari & Tchetgna, 2015). 
Fairtrade standards use mainly three mechanisms to foster sustainable development. The first 
are the standards themselves. These standards provide guidance, for instance, on how to develop 
democratic governance structures within small producer organizations and how to implement 
agricultural practices that are environmentally friendly and less dangerous to farmers and 
workers (Sellare, Meemken, & Qaim, 2020). The second is the minimum price, which aims to 
mitigate the risks related to price volatility in international markets (Fairtrade, 2016). Whenever 
the international market price drops below the minimum price established by Fairtrade, buyers 
must pay the latter.17 The third mechanism is the Fairtrade social premium18, which is a sum of 
money paid in addition to the agreed price for cooperatives, farmers, and workers to use in 
projects to address their social, economic, and environmental needs (Fairtrade, 2019a). These 
projects include but are not limited to direct payments to farmers, investments in operations and 
production, and improvements in community infrastructure. Decisions related to how the 
premium is spent are supposed to take place in a democratic arena, with structures in place to 
ensure that individual and collective interests are heard (Loconto et al., 2019). As such, the 
Fairtrade social premium has a significant potential to be used as a means to privately finance 
community-led investments in infrastructure. 
 
17 The minimum price for conventional cocoa beans in 2020 is 2,400 USD/MT. 
18 Fairtrade refer to it simply as “Fairtrade premium” while the term “Fairtrade social premium” is more often 
used in the academic literature. 
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The social premium has been pointed out by many studies as one of the main mechanisms 
through which Fairtrade benefits farmers and workers (Jena & Grote, 2017; Meemken et al., 
2017; Sellare, Meemken, & Qaim, 2020; Van den Broeck et al., 2017; van Rijn et al., 2019), 
but it has not received explicit focus in the literature. Little is known about what exactly the 
premium money is used for, how the decision-making processes take place, and if the projects 
implemented actually benefit certified farmers, workers, and the local community more broadly. 
The lack of attention dedicated to these issues can be at least partially explained by the data that 
researchers work with. Most studies use data from household surveys only, where farmers and 
workers are sampled from a few purposefully selected cooperatives or commercial farms. The 
two exceptions in the literature are the studies by Meemken et al. (2019) and Sellare et al. 
(2020). Without data from a sufficiently large number of cooperatives, it is impossible to make 
generalizable statements about how cooperatives spend the premium and to analyze to what 
extent the use of the premium is associated with the organizational structure of the cooperatives. 
A better understanding of these issues can help us learn to what extent cooperatives are willing 
to invest their money in public goods and support them to implement such projects effectively. 
In this paper, we use data from 1,000 farmers and rural workers (cooperative workers and farm 
workers) sampled from 50 cocoa cooperatives of Côte d’Ivoire to address the following research 
questions: 1) What is the Fairtrade social premium used for? 2) Are there associations between 
the organizational structure of cooperatives and how the premium money is used? 3) Who 
benefits from the projects implemented with the Fairtrade social premium?  
We start by describing how cooperatives have spent the premium and then use principal 
component analysis (PCA) to analyze if the organizational structure of the cooperatives is 
correlated with the allocation of the premium into different kinds of projects. To illustrate how 
the local community might benefit from the social premium, we discuss in more detail about 
projects focused on child education. We analyze whether (i) being certified and (ii) living in a 
village where an education project was implemented have effects on household education 
expenditures by using regression analysis with instrumental variables to account for self-
selection into certification 
4.2. Fairtrade, the social premium, and child education 
According to Fairtrade International, in 2016, more than 150 million euros have been paid to 
small producer organizations as social premium (Fairtrade, 2018b), while the cocoa sector alone 
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received 44 million euros in 2018 (Fairtrade, 2019b). Around 40% of all Fairtrade certified 
cooperatives choose to invest part of the premium in community infrastructure and services 
(Loconto et al., 2019). The literature on Fairtrade certification often mentions these projects 
aimed at improving community welfare. These include investments in child education, 
promotion of health campaigns, improvements in the infrastructure of health clinics, 
construction of roads and bridges, installation of clean water facilities, construction of tanks 
and latrines (Darko et al., 2017; Dragusanu & Nunn, 2018; Jena & Grote, 2017; Meemken et 
al., 2017; Ruben & Fort, 2012; Valkila & Nygren, 2010). 
The wide range of projects and investments supported through the Fairtrade social premium 
suggests that certified producers and workers, as well as the local community in general, can 
benefit from the social premium. However, some studies have been critical of the social 
premium, and have pointed out that not everyone benefits equally from these projects and that 
there are problems in the decision-making processes. Cramer et al (2017), for instance, noted 
that often the poorest did not benefit from community projects as they were not granted access 
to certain facilities. Other studies have pointed out that even when farmers and workers do 
benefit from these projects, the processes through which they are implemented are marked by 
patronage and exclusion (Dolan, 2010), and many farmers undervalue investments that are 
made to benefit the community as a whole (Ruben & Fort, 2012). 
Earlier studies have highlighted how the effectiveness of projects financed with the social 
premium and the processes through which decisions are made often depend on the 
organizational structure of the cooperatives (Valkila & Nygren, 2010). More precisely, 
premium management structure and the form of participation can directly affect what the 
premium money is spent on. A formal separation between the premium decision-making 
processes from ordinary business decisions might support more investments in social projects. 
However, embedded decision-making can lead to a prioritization of projects aimed at improving 
the cooperatives themselves (Loconto et al., 2019). This relationship between the organizational 
structure of cooperatives and the use of the social premium has been neglected in the literature. 
Among the projects that are often implemented with the social premium, those related to 
education are of particular importance. Child labor is a well-known issue in the production of 
many tropical commodities (Akoyi et al., 2018; Ruggeri & Corsi, 2019; Van den Broeck et al., 
2017), especially in the cocoa sector (Luckstead et al., 2019; Nkamleu & Kielland, 2006). 
Despite Fairtrade prohibiting child labor, its effects on education are not very clear, as it creates 
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an income and a substitution effect that might affect education adversely. The income effect 
relates to households experiencing income gains from participating in certified value chains and 
facing lower volatility in terms of income. These benefits might encourage higher investments 
in education and thus positively affect education (Gitter et al., 2012). The substitution effect 
describes a potential increase in the opportunity cost of a child’s time in school (Becchetti et 
al., 2013; Gitter et al., 2012). Besides these two effects, Fairtrade can also affect education 
through investments of the social premium. A large number of studies mention investments of 
the social premium in projects focused on child education, such as building schools, providing 
financial assistance to cover school-related expenses, or supporting awareness campaigns about 
the importance of child education (Akoyi et al., 2018; Dragusanu & Nunn, 2018; Karki et al., 
2016; Meemken et al., 2017; Ruben & Fort, 2012).  
Seeing community-led investments to improve schools and having access to information about 
the importance of child education can encourage households to use a larger share of their income 
for education-related expenditures. Most studies that look at the effects of Fairtrade on 
education find positive relationships. Meemken et al. (2017), for example, found that Fairtrade 
certification increases education expenditure by 64%. Similarly, Gitter et al. (2012) concluded 
that Fairtrade participation contributed to a 0.7 year increase in schooling for girls, while 
Becchetti et al. (2013) found that Fairtrade increases schooling ratio (the average ratio between 
potential and effective schooling) by 2.6%. Akoyi et al. (2018) also found that Fairtrade 
increases the likelihood of children being enrolled and they explain that this positive effect is 
likely the result of increased awareness and higher investments in child education. It is 
important to note, however, that none of these studies explicitly analyze whether these effects 
on child education are the result of higher incomes from certification or from community 
projects paid by the social premium. 
4.3.Materials and methods 
4.3.1. Study area 
This study was conducted in the Southeast of Côte d’Ivoire, an area that includes the traditional 
cocoa belt of West Africa. This area was purposefully selected because of its high number of 
Fairtrade certified cooperative and non-certified cooperatives. Since the late 1970s, Côte 
d’Ivoire has been the leading cocoa producing country, currently accounting for over 40% of 
the global cocoa production (FAO, 2020). The cocoa sector, marked by smallholder farmers, 
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has been one of the major drives of the economic growth of Côte d’Ivoire, but this economic 
success has not translated into higher equality. Around 50% of the rural population still lives 
below the poverty line (IFAD, 2017) and the families that rely on cocoa production for their 
livelihoods face serious threats to production, such as a myriad of pest and diseases, degraded 
soils, and old trees, all of which keep yields low (Wessel & Quist-Wessel, 2015). 
The rural population faces several other challenges. According to data from the World Bank 
(2020b), around 64% of the rural population does not have electricity in their homes and 44% 
still practice open defecation. Access to water services is very deficient, as 43% of the rural 
population does not have access to basic drinking water services, while only 10% have access 
in their homes to basic hand-washing facilities, including soap and water. These figures show 
that the region still faces serious problems related to the provision of basic services. 
Côte d’Ivoire has more than 600 cocoa cooperatives (MADR, 2017). Out of these, in 2017, 152 
were Fairtrade certified, with a total of 129,783 registered members (Fairtrade, 2019b). These 
cooperatives vary substantially in terms of size and many of them have registered members 
living in several villages. Their headquarters, however, are usually located in bigger towns. 
Together, these cooperatives sold over 150,000 MT of cocoa as Fairtrade certified, which has 
generated more than 26 million euros in Fairtrade social premium. This represents 70% of the 
social premium that has been paid to the world’s cocoa sector in that year (Fairtrade, 2019b). 
4.3.2. Sampling and data 
For the empirical analyses, we use primary data collected between May and June 2018 from 
500 farmers and 500 rural workers (cooperative workers and farm workers) randomly sampled 
from 50 cocoa cooperatives. With the help of local extension agencies, Fairtrade International, 
and other international organizations, we compiled a list of all cooperatives in the Southeast of 
Côte d’Ivoire. From this list, we randomly selected 25 certified cooperatives and 25 non-
certified cooperatives. We conducted an interview with the leader of each cooperative using a 
structured questionnaire, in which we collected detailed data about the organizational structure 
of the cooperative, including number of members and employees, volumes of cocoa 
commercialized, provision of services to members, assets owned, among others. 
For the 25 certified cooperatives, we also collected data on the use of the Fairtrade social 
premium. More specifically, we asked the cooperative leadership to list all projects financed 
with the social premium that had been implemented between 2013 and 2017. For each project, 
63 
 
we collected information about the purpose of the project, the total amount that was spent in 
West African Francs (CFA), the names of the villages where the projects were implemented, 
and whether everyone in the villages could benefit from the projects or if they were exclusive 
to those associated with the cooperative. Cooperatives often have members in many different 
villages and the catchment area of these cooperatives tend to overlap. Therefore, projects with 
public goods characteristics can benefit farmers from multiple cooperatives. 
In addition to the cooperative leaders, from each cooperative we randomly sampled and 
interviewed 10 farmers, 5 cooperative workers and 5 farm workers (locally known as 
aboussant). We designed specific questionnaires for each group of respondent in which we 
captured data on socioeconomic characteristics, agricultural production, off-farm employment, 
among others. In all questionnaires we included identical modules to capture information about 
life in their villages. We asked respondents to name the top three issues that should be addressed 
in their villages and how satisfied they were with the provision of basic services (e.g. health and 
education) in a scale from 1-10. By calculating the village mean of these variables, we obtain a 
rough picture of the perceived quality of the infrastructure and services available in the villages. 
4.3.3. Classification of projects and education expenditure 
The Fairtrade social premium can be used in a broad variety of projects. Since cooperatives 
have to report on what exactly the social premium was used, Fairtrade International keeps 
records of all the projects that are implemented and classifies them into five major categories: 
(i) services to farmer members; (ii) investment in producer organizations; (iii) services to 
communities; (iv) services for workers and their families; and (v) training and empowerment of 
worker. These are further disaggregated into minor categories and subsequently into sub-
categories (Loconto et al., 2019). Although their categorization is certainly useful for internal 
monitoring purposes, we found that neither their major, minor, nor sub-categories fit well to our 
data, either because the total number of projects was too small in any given category or because 
the total amount spent was not substantial. Therefore, for our analyses we let the data guide the 
process of categorization. Table 12 shows the ten categories that we used and describes what 





Table 12. Classification of projects financed with the Fairtrade social premium 
Project categories Description 
Ag. Inputs Purchase of fertilizers, pesticides, protective clothes, machetes and other tools 
Cooperative 
Purchase of land, computers, vehicles, and other assets; construction / improvement of 
storage rooms, and headquarters’ facilities; strengthening of the financial capacity of the 
cooperative 
Credit Provision of credit 
Direct payments Cash payment to farmers 
Education Construction / improvement of schools; promotion of education campaigns; provision of financial support for families to pay for education-related expenses 
Health Construction / improvement of health care centers; promotion of health campaigns 
Other community infrastructure Construction of radio towers, latrines, improvement of housing, purchase of generator 
Roads / Transportation Construction / improvement of roads and bridges 
Water Construction of wells and hydraulic pumps 
Miscellaneous Provision of training for farmers and the cooperative staff; payment of certification fees; finance of reforestation and waste management projects 
 
As explained in section 4.2, several sources report that the social premium is often used to 
finance projects related to child education and these kinds of projects are even more relevant in 
the cocoa sector of West Africa, where child labor is a well-known issue. Therefore, we want 
to focus on education projects to illustrate whether the social premium can benefit the local 
community in the villages. In our analyses, we will use household education expenditure per 
child as a proxy to educational quality, which has been used before in other studies that look on 
the effect of certification on child education (Becchetti et al., 2013; Meemken et al., 2017). This 
variable is defined as the total amount of money that a household spends in one year with child 
education, such as uniforms, school materials, and fees. This value is then divided by the 
number of children in schooling age (between 6 and 18 years) present in the household. In our 
data, 288 respondents reported not having any children in schooling age; hence they were 
omitted from the analyses. 
4.3.4. Data analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Agricultural cooperatives can be very heterogeneous in their characteristics and rather complex 
in terms of how they benefit their members. Characteristics that would be beneficial to their 
members at first glance can actually result in negative outcomes. Some studies have shown that 
inclusiveness and marketing performance, for example, are negatively correlated (Bernard & 
Spielman, 2009), while others have shown that cooperatives that provide too many services to 
their members can become less competitive in the market because of their higher coordination 
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and management costs (Tadesse et al., 2018). Therefore, to group cooperatives together and 
understand how different characteristics are related to each other can be challenging given the 
high number of factors one would have to take into account. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is an appropriate methodological tool to analyze how 
cooperative characteristics are correlated with the use of the Fairtrade social premium. PCA is 
a technique for multivariate statistical analysis that allows us to deal with high-dimensional data 
by converting a larger number of correlated variables into a set of linearly uncorrelated 
variables, i.e. the principal components, also referred to as dimensions (Abdi & Williams, 
2010). Furthermore, this technique allows us to use biplots and circles of correlations to 
visualize the data in a two-dimensional space and thus easily interpret how the variables are 
correlated with one another and to what degree the observations are (dis)similar. 
In order to run a PCA, we first have to select the active individuals and active variables that will 
be used in the computations. In our case, these are respectively the certified cooperatives and 
the characteristics of these cooperatives. Out of the 25 sampled certified cooperatives, 3 were 
excluded from the analysis because they had not yet implemented any project using the 
premium. The choice of variables was made taking into consideration different aspects of these 
cooperatives that might play a role in determining how well they function. Therefore, we chose 
variables that describe the cooperatives in terms of their governance structure, human, physical, 
and social capital. The complete list of variables can be seen in Table 14.  
In addition to the active variables, we can use supplementary variables to enrich the 
interpretation of the analyses. Supplementary variables do not influence the calculation of the 
principal components but can be plotted onto the two-dimensional space and interpreted in 
relation to the active variables. In our case, the supplementary variables are the share of the 
social premium that the cooperatives spent on the different kinds of projects, which were 
categorized according to Table 12. The PCA and all corresponding graphical representations 
were carried out in R using the FactoMineR package, which by default standardizes the 
variables used in the analysis (Lê et al., 2008). 
Regression analysis 
To analyze the effects of Fairtrade certification and education projects on household 
expenditure with child education, we estimate separate regression models for the full sample, 
farmers, cooperative workers, and farm workers of the following type: 
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log	(1 + ((!"#$) = + + ,-."#$ + /(0#$ + 12%&'( + 34&'( ++56'( + 78( + 9!"#$       (9) 
((!"#$ represents our outcome variable, the education expenditure per child for household : in 
cooperative ;, village <, and district =. To reduce the effect of outliers and facilitate de 
interpretation of the results, we log-transform the outcome variable. However, around 10% of 
the observations in our sample have reported zero expenditure with education, despite having 
school-aged children in the household. Since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, to retain 
these observations for the analyses, we add a one to the outcome variable before taking the 
logarithm. -."#$ and (0#$ are our dummy variables of interest; the former represents if the 
respondent is Fairtrade certified (i.e. if member of a certified cooperative in the case of farmers 
and if works for a certified employer in the case of workers) and the latter if the respondent 
lives in a village where an education project financed with the Fairtrade social premium was 
implemented. Previous studies have reported that Fairtrade certification has positive effects on 
child education and attributed such effects to the use of the social premium. With our model 
specification, we can analyze if (i) participating in certified value chains and (ii) living in a 
village where an education project was implemented with the social premium have an effect on 
child education. If the coefficients , and / are positive and statistically significant, we can 
conclude, respectively, that certification and the social premium have positive effects on 
education expenditure. 
In all regression models we control for vectors of household, cooperative, and village-level 
variables that might influence the certification status of respondents and expenditure with 
education, here represented respectively by 2%&'(, 4&'(, and 6'(. It is noteworthy that since we 
did not collect village-level data, the variables in 6'( were constructed calculating the village 
mean of variables captured in the farmer and worker questionnaires that proxy the perceived 
quality of the infrastructure and services provided in the villages. Furthermore, we include a set 
of district dummies 8( to control for differences at a larger geographical scale. In all estimations 
the error term, 9!"#$, is clustered at the village level. For these regressions, we excluded the 
respondents that did not have any children between 6 and 18 years old in the household. 
Therefore, we used a total of 712 observations: 433 farmers, 147 cooperative workers, and 132 
farm workers. 
Whether cooperatives, farmers, and workers participate in a certified value chain is not 
determined at random. Although we control for a broad range of variables that might 
simultaneously influence (i) cooperatives’ and households’ ability and willingness to participate 
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in a certified value chain, and (ii) expenditures with education, it is possible that we do not 
capture all factors. Therefore, we estimate the models above using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to test and control for endogeneity. We use three instruments that have been used in 
other studies conducted in the same setting (Meemken et al., 2019; Sellare et al., 2020): (i) the 
share of Fairtrade certified farmers in a 5 km radius19, (ii) the distance to the closest Fairtrade 
certified cooperative; and (iii) the mobile phone provider of the cooperative leader. These 
instruments are further explained and tested for validity below. 
The first instrument captures social network effects at the household level. We argue that the 
more certified neighbors a farmer has, the more likely he or she is to learn about the benefits of 
joining a certified cooperative. Our data indeed shows a positive correlation between the 
number of certified neighbors a farmer has and own certification status, which indicates that 
our instrument is relevant. However, for an instrument to be valid it is important that it does not 
affect the outcome variable other than through the treatment. One could expect that areas with 
a higher concentration of certified farmers are more likely to receive information about the 
importance of child education. However, child labor is a well-known issue in the cocoa sector 
and both the government and NGOs have implemented campaigns throughout the country to 
raise awareness about child labor and the importance of child education. 
Our second instrument is defined as the distance from the respondent’s house to the 
headquarters of the closest Fairtrade certified cooperative. Farmers who live close to the 
headquarters of a certified cooperative are more likely to learn about Fairtrade and join this 
cooperative. Similarly, the closer a farm or cooperative worker lives to the headquarters of a 
certified cooperative, the higher is the likelihood to work for a certified employer. Although 
living closer to the headquarters of a certified cooperative could mean easier access to 
information about child education, as explained above, child labor and child education are 
issues that the local population is very aware about, regardless of where they live. 
The third instrument is defined as the primary cellphone network provider that the cooperative 
leader is subscribed to. In our study area there are three network providers: Orange, MTN, and 
Moov. All of them offer similar services at similar costs, so the choice of which provider to 
subscribe to is mostly a matter of the strength of the network in a particular location and which 
provider the others in one’s own social network are subscribed to. There are economic 
 
19 For the analyses in which we use data from workers, we do not consider the location of the own household. 
Instead, we use the cooperative mean of the share of certified farmers in a 5 km radius. 
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advantages of communicating with people within the same network provider, since companies 
offer discounts for calls and messages exchanged between their subscribers. Our data show that 
cooperatives whose leader is subscribed to the network Orange are more likely to be certified. 
Therefore, it is likely that there is a more intense flow of information about certification within 
the Orange network than between networks. One could argue that the decision to become 
certified might have influenced the leader’s decision of to which network to subscribe to. 
However, our data show that people do not switch their main cellphone provider often. In fact, 
only three out of the 25 certified cooperative leaders interviewed switched their main provider 
after the cooperative became certified. 
Using a falsification test as proposed by Di Falco et al. (2011), we show that none of our 
instruments are correlated with household education expenditure (Table C1). Furthermore, we 
show that our instruments pass the test of weak instruments (p<0.01). As we have more 
instruments than endogenous regressors, we can also test whether our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term with a test of over-identifying restrictions. Hansen’s J test 
statistic indicates that our instruments are valid. The results of these tests are shown in Table 
C2 in the Appendix. It is important to notice that we do not instrument the variable (0#$. 
However, in our regression specifications, we control for variables at the village level that 
describe the perceived quality of education in the villages and the presence of schools. With 
these variables, we proxy factors that could simultaneously affect the likelihood of a given 
village having an education project and household expenditure with education. Nevertheless, 
since these variables capture perceived quality of infrastructure and services in the villages at 
the time of data collection, endogeneity at the village level cannot be completely ruled out. This 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
4.4.Results and discussion 
4.4.1. Village needs and participation in the premium’s decision-making 
As explained in subsection 4.3.1., despite its economic growth, the rural population of Côte 
d’Ivoire still faces some serious constraints in terms of access to education, sanitation, 
electricity, and other basic services. In our survey, we asked respondents to name the top three 
types of services, infrastructure, and investments that are needed in their villages to have a better 
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overview of their main challenges.20 We grouped their answers into the same categories that we 
used to group the projects financed with the Fairtrade social premium (Table 12) so that we 
could draw a parallel between the needs of the villages and the investments that have been made 
with the social premium. The answers are shown in Figure C1 in the Appendix. 
Most respondents mentioned education as one of the main needs of their villages. Although 
most villages that we visited have some sort of infrastructure available that is used for schooling, 
these are often of very poor quality. In the smaller villages, it is not uncommon to see that the 
schools are simply small spaces with a rooftop but without walls, with some chairs for the 
students and an old chalkboard for the teacher. The second category mentioned most often was 
roads/transportation, followed by health in third place. The quality of the roads in Côte d’Ivoire 
is indeed very poor and during data collection several farmers mentioned them as one of the 
main constraints for cocoa commercialization.  
When we look at the disaggregated data, we see a few differences in the answers between 
groups. electricity and water have been mentioned as major issues by around 29% and 48% of 
the farm workers respectively. Among farmers, these were mentioned as major issues by around 
22% and 35% of the respondents, while among cooperative workers only by 12% and 27%. 
These figures show that there are substantial differences in the places where these groups live. 
Cooperative workers usually live closer to the cooperatives, whose headquarters tend to be 
located in bigger cities, with better services and infrastructure. Farmers usually live in villages 
where the provision of services and infrastructure can vary substantially depending on their size 
and proximity to bigger towns. Meanwhile, most farm workers live on the farms or in camps 
dedicated to farm workers, where basic infrastructure such as electricity and water is usually 
missing. 
Some of these issues related to infrastructure and basic service provision could be mitigated 
with the use of the Fairtrade premium, either through direct investments in infrastructure or in 
awareness campaign regarding education, sanitation, water treatment, etc. In fact several 
cooperatives use the social premium for community development projects and these tend to be 
highly appreciated by the members of the cooperatives (Loconto et al., 2019). In order to 
implement effective projects to address the most urgent needs of these villages, it is essential 
that farmers participate in the decision-making processes and voice their needs. The leaders of 
 
20 Although we specifically asked about needs of the village, around 20% of cooperative workers and 10% of 
farmers mentioned issues related to the cooperative in their answers. 
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the cooperatives that we interviewed told us that decisions regarding the use of the premium are 
done in the general assemblies, which all farmers are supposed to attend. Nevertheless, our data 
show that only 48% of the certified farmers participate in the general assembly. One could argue 
that farmers make their voices heard by sending delegates to these assemblies. However, only 
55% of the certified farmers are aware of the existence of the social premium and 35% claim to 
have voted on how the social premium should be used. 
4.4.2. Projects implemented with the Fairtrade social premium 
In Table 13 we show a summary of all the projects that have been implemented with the 
Fairtrade social premium between 2013 and 2017. As explained in subsection 4.3.2., for each 
one of the projects we asked what its purpose was, how much was spent, and whether the whole 
village had access to the benefits of the project (as opposed to only the registered members of 
the cooperative and its staff). The 22 cooperatives who had implemented projects by the time 
of the interview reported using the social premium to finance 96 different projects, which totaled 
1.4 billion CFA. 21 The categories with the largest number of projects were cooperative, 
education, and miscellaneous, which includes projects related to training, reforestation, waste 
management, and certification fees. Projects related to agricultural production such as ag. 
inputs, credit, and direct payments were restricted to the members of the cooperatives, while all 
projects in the categories health, roads/transportation, and water were accessible to the whole 
village. Out of the 18 projects in the category education, five were restricted to the members of 
the cooperatives. The goal of these projects was to give financial assistance to families to pay 
for costs related to education. The projects on education related awareness campaigns and 
investments in infrastructure were accessible to the whole village. 











(in 1M CFA) 
Mean value 
spent  
(in 1M CFA) 
% of projects 
that the whole 
village has 
access to 
Ag. inputs 8 7 165.2 20.7 0 
Cooperative 39 17 630.4 16.2 7% 
Credit 2 2 20.6 10.3 0 
Direct payments 5 5 220.6 44.1 0 
Education 18 12 175.5 9.7 72% 
Health 2 2 43.7 21.9 100% 
Miscellaneous 10 6 19.7 2.0 10% 
Other community infrastructure 3 2 42.9 14.3 33% 
Roads/transportation 5 5 43.2 8.6 100% 
Water 4 4 60.6 15.2 100% 
Total 96 22 1,422.5 14.8 29% 
 
21 At the time of the survey, the exchange rate was 1 Euro = 656 CFA. 
71 
 
Despite the large number of projects on education that were implemented, these represent only 
a small percentage of the total premium that was used by the cooperatives. The 39 projects 
related to investments in the cooperative account for almost 45% of the total money spent on 
projects between 2013 and 2017. The 18 projects on education account for less than 15% of the 
total. Investments in other projects with public goods characteristics, such as health, 
roads/transportation, and water, have also received only a fraction of the total social premium, 
with less than 5% each. These figures point towards a mismatch between what the local 
population deems to be urgent needs in their villages and how the premium is being allocated 
to different kinds of projects. We should not immediately conclude that farmers are not being 
heard in the decision-making process, but this indicates the need to investigate in more detail 
how these processes take place inside the cooperatives. 
4.4.3. Cooperative characteristics and the use of the Fairtrade social premium 
One common hypothesis in the literature is that how the Fairtrade social premium is used 
depends on the organizational structure of the cooperatives that receive this money. Our data 
show that certified cooperatives can be rather heterogeneous in terms of their characteristics. In 
Table 14 we show descriptive statistics for some selected variables that describe these 
cooperatives in terms of their governance structure, human, physical, and social capital. The 
certified cooperatives in our sample are very large and most of them have male leaders who 
have attended at least technical training post high school. The boards of directors have on 
average 9.6 members and 70% of the members own farms larger than 5 ha.22 Regarding the 
decision-making processes, we presented the leaders of the cooperatives with a list of issues 
that are important for the functioning of the cooperative (e.g. choosing a new president, 
choosing the members of the board of directors, accepting new members, excluding members, 
hiring employees, etc.) and asked them to indicate which of these issues were decided 
democratically in the general assembly. On average, 39% of these issues were decided in 
general assemblies. Some of these variables have very large standard deviations, which 




22 In our data, the average cocoa farm has 4.9 ha. Other sources report that the average cocoa farm in West Africa 
has between 3 and 4 ha (Wessel & Quist-Wessel, 2015). 
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We follow by analyzing the relationship between the cooperative characteristics described in 
Table 14 and the use of the social premium. The results from the PCA show that almost 70% 
of the variation in the data can be explained by the first three dimensions (Figure C2 in the 
Appendix). The first dimension captures mostly the assets owned by the cooperatives, their size, 
and how long they have been Fairtrade certified, while the second dimension is better described 
by the education of the leader, the share of board members who own big farms, and the existence 
of a business plan for the following cocoa season (Table 14). Furthermore, in Table 15 we see 
that investments in water (p<0.00) and investments in education and other community 
infrastructure (p<0.10) are also positively correlated with the first dimension. In Figure C3 in 
the Appendix we show a biplot of the cooperatives and the variables used in the PCA, where 
we can see that most cooperatives have negative scores on the first component, but positive 
scores on the second component. In other words, most cooperatives have low values for the 







characteristics Description Mean SD 
Board big farms Share of members in the board of directors who own farms larger than 5 ha 0.70 0.29 
Board size Number of members in the board of directors 9.68 2.15 
Business plan Cooperative has a business plan prepared for the following cocoa season 0.73 0.46 
Computer Number of computers owned by the cooperative 6.32 3.82 
Democratic decisions Share of issues that are discussed and decided democratically in the general assembly 0.39 0.17 
Edu leader Education of the leader of the cooperative in years 15.68 2.92 
Female leader Leader of the cooperative is female 0.18 0.39 
Members Number of members registered in the cooperative 948.73 807.98 
Service providers 
Number of actors (NGOs, extension agencies, 
commercial partner, etc.) who help the 
cooperatives provide services to their members 
2.36 1.50 
Vehicles Number of vehicles owned by the cooperative 9.32 6.78 
Years certified Number of years that the cooperative has been Fairtrade certified 4.45 1.68 
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Table 15. Correlation between variables and the five main dimensions of the PCA. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Dim. 3 Dim. 4 Dim. 5 
Active variables      
Board big farms -0.095 0.642*** 0.679*** -0.020 0.125 
Board members 0.595*** 0.265 0.061 0.601*** 0.375* 
Business plan 0.193 0.852*** -0.205 -0.288 0.228 
Computers 0.843*** 0.142 -0.064 -0.396* -0.074 
Democratic decisions 0.420* -0.323 0.650*** -0.271 0.303 
Edu leader 0.423** 0.551*** 0.324 0.204 -0.201 
Female leader 0.532** -0.026 -0.649*** -0.019 0.450** 
Members 0.568*** 0.396* -0.305 0.154 -0.444** 
Service providers 0.397* -0.789*** 0.065 0.119 0.060 
Vehicles 0.906*** -0.211 0.067 -0.205 -0.170 
Years certified 0.625*** -0.296 0.228 0.189 -0.149 
Supplementary variables      
Ag. inputs -0.211 0.137 -0.328 -0.082 0.128 
Cooperative -0.201 0.062 0.317 -0.210 0.445** 
Credit -0.197 0.157 0.070 -0.147 0.159 
Dir. payments 0.199 0.079 -0.243 0.233 -0.336 
Education 0.383* -0.088 -0.218 0.094 -0.024 
Health -0.067 0.116 0.139 -0.147 -0.113 
Misc. 0.051 0.045 0.260 0.040 0.121 
Other infrastr. 0.388* -0.336 0.161 0.188 -0.018 
Roads -0.198 0.356 -0.150 0.015 -0.028 
Water 0.659*** 0.087 -0.044 -0.333 -0.239 
Note: The values represent Pearson’s correlation coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In Figure 4 we show a circle of correlations, where we can see the relationship between 
cooperative characteristics (vectors in black) and the use of the social premium (vectors in blue). 
When two vectors are close, forming a small angle, the two variables they represent are 
positively correlated, while vectors that form an angle close to 180° are negatively correlated. 
The length of the vectors on the plot represents how well the variables are represented by the 
two dimensions on which the variables are being plotted. If a variable is perfectly represented 
by only two dimensions, its vector will touch the circle; when more than two dimensions are 
needed, the length of the vector will be shorter. The closer to the center of the plot a variable is, 
the less important it is for those two dimensions and its interpretation should be done carefully. 
Among the variables that represent the share of the social premium used, the ones that are better 
described by the two first dimensions are water, other infrastr., education, and roads. The first 
three are positively correlated with the number of assets owned by the cooperative, the share of 
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issues decided democratically, the number of years the cooperative has been certified, and 
having a female leader. Roads is negatively correlated with these variables, as they are in 
opposite quadrants on the circle of correlations (Figure 4). Given that a large share of 
respondents indicated the need for projects related to basic community infrastructure, seeing 
that cooperatives with more democratic decision-making processes invest a larger share of the 
premium in projects related to water, education, and other community infrastructure is a 
welcoming finding.  
 
Figure 4. Principal component analysis on cooperative characteristics (in black) and their correlation with 
cooperatives’ investments using the Fairtrade social premium (in blue) (Dim. 1 and Dim. 2) 
It is important to note that the variables that represent the uses of the social premium are not 
particularly well-projected on the circle of correlations, since most of them are closer to center 
of the circle than to its edges. This means that the relationship between these variables could be 
different if they were projected using other dimensions of the PCA. Figure 5 shows the circle 
of correlations using the first and third dimensions, and Figure 6 using the second and third 
dimensions. The relationships shown in Figure 5 are mostly similar to those shown in Figure 4 
but not all of them hold in Figure 6. These results indicate that while there are certainly 
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important relationships between cooperative characteristics and how these cooperatives use the 
premium, we should be careful in concluding exactly which sets of characteristics are correlated 
with which uses of the social premium. 
 
 
Figure 5. Principal component analysis on cooperative characteristics (in black) and their correlation with 





Figure 6. Principal component analysis on cooperative characteristics (in black) and their correlation with 
cooperatives’ investments using the Fairtrade social premium (in blue) (Dim. 2 and Dim. 3) 
 
4.4.4. Effects on education 
In the previous section we have seen some evidence that cooperative characteristics matter for 
the allocation of the Fairtrade social premium into different kinds of projects. However, the 
question whether these projects are beneficial to the local communities is at least equally 
important. Given that more than half of the respondents indicated that improvements in 
education are among the most pressing needs of their communities, we want to take education 
as an example to further analyze the possible benefits of living in a village where an education 
project financed with the social premium was implemented. 
In Table 16 we show descriptive statistics for variables related to child education, 
disaggregating them by whether the respondent is certified and whether he/she lives in a village 
with an education project financed with the social premium. We observe that certified 
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households, either living in a village where an education project was implemented or not, have 
higher education expenditure per child than non-certified households living in villages without 
a project. We find no statistically significant differences between groups for distance to the 
nearest primary school nor for satisfaction with education system, measured in a 10-points likert 
scale. 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for variables at the household level 















Education expenditure per child 122.74 85.10 127.26 143.66** 236.55*** 
(in 1,000 CFA/child) b (246.74) (141.54) (236.74) (309.11) (293.18) 
Distance to primary school (km) 1.68 1.72 1.03 1.74 1.57 
 (4.29) (4.41) (1.49) (4.30) (4.95) 
Distance to secondary school (km) 9.37 10.76 3.09*** 8.25*** 12.74 
 (10.79) (12.36) (2.95) (9.13) (10.88) 
Satisfaction with education system  5.19 5.08 5.37 5.21 5.72 
(1-10) (2.18) (2.07) (2.06) (2.28) (2.32) 
Observations 1,000 448 52 442 58 
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a For the statistical testing we used ANOVA and the Tukey-Kramer post-hoc test for multiple group comparisons; p-values indicate statistical 
significance of differences in means between those in the base category (i.e. Non-certified and No project) and the other categories. 
b For this variable we are using only values from the households that have children, totaling 712 observations. 
 
In Table 17 we show the results of our regression analyses. Here we analyze the effect of being 
certified and the effect of living in a village where an education project was implemented on 
household education expenditure. We first run the analysis on the full sample of respondents, 
followed by sub-sample analyses using each group of respondents at a time (i.e. farmers, 
cooperative workers, farm workers). Then, we rerun these regressions using only data from the 
respondents who are not certified. This last set of regressions allows us to analyze spillover 
effects of the social premium on non-certified households. These results are shown in Table 18. 
Looking at the model where we use the full sample, we see positive statistically significant 
effects for both our variables of interest. However, when we run sub-sample analyses for each 
group of respondents, we see that the effects on the full sample were driven by the farmer sub-
group. Being certified does have a positive effect on education expenditure for farmers and 
cooperative workers, but not for farm workers. However, living in a village where an education 
project was implemented is only beneficial for farmers. These results are in line with previous 
findings conducted in Côte d’Ivoire that show that while Fairtrade has a positive financial effect 
on farmers and cooperative workers, it does not benefit farm workers (Meemken et al., 2019; 
Sellare et al., 2020). Studies conducted elsewhere have also reported that Fairtrade only has 
limited benefits to hired laborers (Valkila & Nygren, 2010; van Rijn et al., 2019). Therefore, 
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since certification does not have an effect on overall income among farm workers, it is not 
surprising that it does not have an effect on education expenditure either. While living in a 
village with an education project also benefits farmers, it has no effect among cooperative 
workers. This might be explained by the fact that most cooperative workers live in towns with 
better infrastructure for schooling and better access to information about the importance of 
investing in child education, thus having a project implemented in such places has no added 
benefit. 
Table 17. Effects of certification and education projects on household education expenditure (log) 
 Full sample Farmers Coop workers Farm workers 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Certification (1/0) 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.35** 0.46** 0.82** 0.89** 0.33 0.29 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.32) (0.40) (0.32) (0.38) 
Education project (1/0) 0.41** 0.43*** 0.71*** 0.73*** -0.24 -0.21 0.52 0.51 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.51) (0.47) (0.41) (0.37) 
Observations 712 712 433 433 147 147 132 132 
Note: Clustered standard error shown in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Regressions include household, cooperative, and village-level control variables. Full results are shown in Table C2 in the Appendix. 
 
Focusing only on non-certified households, we do not observe statistically significant effects of 
living in a village with an education project, neither for the full sample nor for the sub-groups. 
This suggests that only households that participate in certified value chains benefit from the 
social premium, despite the public good nature of these education projects. However, it is 
important to note that the estimates are all positive in magnitude. A larger sample size might 
have resulted in significant estimates. Therefore, we should be careful in concluding that 
community development projects implemented with the social premium have no benefit at all 
for non-certified households.  
Table 18. Spillover effects of education projects on household education expenditure (log) 
 Full sample Farmers Coop workers Farm workers 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Education project (1/0) 0.31 0.39 0.42 0.79 
 (0.20) (0.34) (0.54) (0.52) 
Observations 353 210 78 65 
Note: Clustered standard error shown in parentheses.  Regressions include household, cooperative, and village-level control variables.  
Full results are shown in Table C3 in the Appendix. 
 
4.5.Conclusion 
In this article, we have discussed how the Fairtrade social premium can be used to address some 
needs of rural communities related to basic infrastructure and the provision of services. Using 
79 
 
data from cocoa cooperatives from Côte d’Ivoire, we have analyzed what kinds of projects are 
financed with the social premium and how its allocation into different kinds of projects is 
correlated with the organizational structure of these cooperatives. We show that certified 
cooperatives are very heterogeneous in terms of their characteristics and our results suggest that 
larger investments into projects related to education, water, and other community infrastructure 
are positively correlated with having a female leader, being certified for many years, and having 
more democratic decision-making processes. Although we should be careful in concluding that 
these are the specific characteristics that are more likely to result into higher investments in 
projects that can benefit the local community, we observe some evidence that cooperative 
heterogeneity is indeed important. 
To illustrate the possible benefits of projects financed with the Fairtrade social premium, we 
used data from cocoa farmers, cooperative workers, and farm workers to analyze the effects of 
certification and education projects on household education expenditure. Our results suggest 
that while being certified has a positive effect on education expenditure among farmers and 
cooperative workers, only farmers benefit from living in a village where an education project 
financed with the social premium had been implemented. It is not surprising that cooperative 
workers do not benefit from education projects, given that most of them live in places with 
better infrastructure and better information about the importance of child education. However, 
the fact that we do not see an effect among farm workers might be due to financial constraints 
to spend more on child education. 
Our study has two limitations that should be addressed in follow-up research. First, because we 
have cross-sectional data, we cannot observe time trends in how the social premium is used. 
There is likely a dynamic interaction over time between how the cooperatives develop and what 
they spend the social premium. To further explore the relationship between cooperative 
characteristics and the use of the premium, it would be important to have panel data and 
preferably count with an even larger number of cooperatives. Second, our analyses of the effects 
of education projects on household education expenditure should not be interpreted as causal. 
Although we control in the model specification for some variables at the village level, these 
were subjective measures, calculated using data from the farmers and workers surveys. Better 
data and more robust econometric approaches should be used in the future to estimate the causal 







5. General conclusions 
 
During the last decade, voluntary sustainability standards have significantly grown in 
importance for the production and marketing of all major tropical commodities, such as cocoa, 
coffee, cotton, and palm oil. These standards address several economic, environmental, and 
social issues – such as poverty alleviation, reduced deforestation, and improvements in labor 
conditions – and have the potential to engender changes in agricultural value chains to make 
them more sustainable. Several studies have tried to quantify the effect of sustainability 
standards on economic, environmental, and social outcomes in the small farm sector. However, 
these studies have almost completely neglected the role of agricultural cooperatives in certified 
value chains, both in their sampling strategy and in their empirical analyses. Because 
certification in the small farm sector is usually done through cooperatives, smallholder 
participation in certification schemes and the benefits from certification may both be affected 
by cooperative characteristics. The articles included in this dissertation are the first attempt to 
explicitly account for cooperative heterogeneity and how this can affect the impact of 
sustainability standards on economic, environmental, and social outcomes. 
5.1.Main conclusions 
There are at least two main conclusions drawn from this dissertation that should be highlighted. 
First, participating in a certified value chain has benefits for smallholder farmers, even when 
taking into account possible cooperative effects. This finding reinforces the potential that 
sustainability standards have for fostering sustainable development in the small farm sector, and 
suggests that these effects are not exclusively driven by membership in agricultural cooperatives 
with specific characteristics. I find evidence that certification has significant economic benefits 
for farmers, such as improvements in yields, higher prices, and overall better livelihoods. These 
are benefits that are also often associated with membership in well-functioning cooperatives, 
which is why the literature on sustainability standards has emphasized the need to disentangle 
cooperative effects from certification effects. I have shown that certification has positive 
economic effects on smallholder farmers even after controlling for cooperative characteristics in 
the regression analyses. Similar results were found for social outcomes. Certification has health 
benefits for farmers and rural workers, as it reduces the acute health symptoms commonly 
associated with pesticide use. Furthermore, I have found evidence that certification has positive 
effects on household expenditures for child education. From an environmental perspective, I 
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could not identify positive effects of certification. On the contrary, I showed that certified farmers 
use larger quantities of agrochemicals, with higher overall levels of toxicity. Nonetheless, it is 
important to notice that the quantities of pesticide used by certified farmers are much closer to the 
recommendations of local authorities than the quantities used by non-certified farmers. This 
suggests that in spite of increases in quantity, certification does not necessarily induce farmers to 
overuse agrochemicals. 
Second, cooperatives are highly heterogeneous and they are a key mechanism through which 
sustainability standards benefit farmers and workers. It is not surprising that there are important 
differences between certified and non-certified cooperatives, as one would expect certified 
cooperatives to have more members, commercialize larger volumes of produce, have more 
stable business relationships, etc. However, the data used in this dissertation shows that there is 
also significant heterogeneity within the groups of certified and non-certified cooperatives. This 
highlights the importance of using data from a large number of cooperatives when assessing the 
effects of sustainability standards in the small farm sector. Otherwise, it is impossible to ensure 
that the estimated effects would hold for cooperatives beyond those being analyzed. In other 
words, external validity would be quite limited. Because in the small farm sector, standards are 
usually managed and implemented by these cooperatives, there can be significant differences 
in terms of what kind of investments the cooperatives prioritize. Some cooperatives might 
choose to invest the premium they obtain from certification in providing inputs and training to 
their members, while others might prefer to pass this premium directly to farmers as bonus 
payments. These issues are even more relevant when analyzing the effects of Fairtrade 
certification. Because Fairtrade mandates that buyers pay to cooperatives an additional sum of 
money on top of the agreed price to be used for business and/or community development 
projects, how this money is used can affect some of the mechanisms through which farmers and 
workers benefit from certification. Therefore, I conclude that cooperative heterogeneity matters 
to correctly estimate the effects of certification in the small farm sector and its many pathways. 
5.2. Limitations and considerations for future research 
Some studies on sustainability standards reach far less positive conclusions about their effects 
on the small farm sector. Many of these studies highlight the high costs associated with 
certification (Latynskiy & Berger, 2017; Snider et al., 2017), small price premiums (Minten et 
al., 2018; Ruben & Fort, 2012), no significant increases in yields and overall low productivity 
(Akoyi & Maertens, 2018; Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011), undemocratic decision-making processes 
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(Cramer et al., 2017; Dolan, 2010), and farmers’ lack of knowledge about certification (Jena & 
Grote, 2017). These are all issues that could be affected by how the standards are managed at 
the cooperative level. However, since previous studies do not provide good descriptions of the 
characteristics and functioning of the cooperatives selected, it is not possible to know if these 
negative conclusions are the result of some idiosyncratic features of these cooperatives. Other 
contextual conditions could also explain why other studies fail to find effects. For example, the 
structure of value chains can affect how much of the money paid by consumers trickles down 
to farmers. Moreover, the presence of a well-functioning network of NGOs, development 
agencies, and extension agencies can also affect how effectively farmers are able to meet the 
requirements set in standards. These are issues that have received little to no attention by the 
literature on sustainability standards, although they could significantly affect the findings 
regarding the effects of certification. To empirically test how different contextual factors affect 
certification is very challenging as it would require very specific and rich datasets. However, 
giving readers a better explanation of such factors could already be quite enlightening. 
It is important to note that although the external validity of my findings is considerably higher 
than in previous studies, my concrete results might be specific to the cocoa sector of Côte 
d’Ivoire and should therefore not be extrapolated to other contexts. The Ivorian cocoa sector is 
marked by a series of policies and institutional arrangements that could also influence how 
sustainability standards affect farmers, workers, and cooperatives. The floor price set by the 
government, for example, adds complexity to the conceptual and empirical analysis, especially 
when considering Fairtrade standards that also set a floor price. The organization of the cocoa 
sector is also particular to Côte d’Ivoire and it is significantly different from what we can 
observe in Ghana, for instance. In Côte d’Ivoire, cooperatives are important actors who provide 
many services to their members and have substantial autonomy to trade directly with exporters 
or processors. In Ghana, cooperatives are much weaker and the government-led Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) is the most powerful actor in the sector and absorbs a significant share of the 
value that is exported to implement several programs to support farmers (e.g. production of 
seeds, provision of inputs, quality control, pest and disease management) (Amankwah-Amoah 
et al., 2018; Foundjem-Tita et al., 2016). Therefore, despite being neighboring countries with 
many similar characteristics, a thorough analysis of the effects of certification in the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector would probably result in different findings than those I have reported for Côte 
d’Ivoire. These considerations notwithstanding, the main conclusion of this dissertation is 
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certainly true beyond specific case studies: cooperatives matter and they deserve more explicit 
focus in future studies about the effects of sustainability standards in the small farm sector. 
This dissertation has some additional limitations that are noteworthy. First, the use of cross-
sectional data raises some concerns regarding self-selection bias. To mitigate this problem, I 
have used several econometric techniques that rely on instrumental variables defined both at 
the household and cooperative levels, such as two-stage least squares, control function, and 
generalized method of moments techniques. However, all of these approaches have limitations. 
Panel data would allow using more robust econometric techniques, which might further increase 
the validity of the results. Although randomized control trials are still seen as the gold standard 
to deal with issues of self-selection bias, designing such study to analyze the effects of 
certification in a large number of cooperatives (to capture institutional heterogeneity) would be 
highly challenging, as this would require the cooperation of many different actors, such as all 
the cooperatives, buyers, and certification agencies. 
Second, reverse causality at the cooperative level cannot be ruled out completely. On the one 
hand, we expect certification to improve the functioning of cooperatives, but, on the other hand, 
the better functioning cooperatives are the ones more likely to become certified. In my analyses, 
I have controlled for cooperative characteristics that are less likely to suffer from reverse 
causality issues, such as the age of the cooperative and the number of members before 
certification. However, to fully address possible issues of reverse causality would require panel 
data containing information about farm, household, and cooperative characteristics before and 
after certification. 
Third, in my analyses I only control for cooperative characteristics, without further exploring 
this source of heterogeneity. It is possible that certification has heterogeneous effects across 
different types of cooperatives. A better understanding of which kinds of organizational setups 
are more likely to reap the benefits of certification could lead to important recommendations 
for local stakeholders. However, as mentioned above, controlling for a full set of cooperative 
characteristics would increase the risk of suffering from reverse causality. Furthermore, to find 
out which organizational setup best maximizes the benefits from certification would probably 
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A. Appendix for chapter 2 
Table A1. Agroecological characteristics by district 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Comoe Lacs Lagunes 
Annual mean temperature (°C) 26.54 26.65 26.65 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) 
Mean temperature of wettest quarter (°C) 26.99 27.19 27.19 
 (0.28) (0.13) (0.12) 
Mean temperature of driest quarter (°C) 27.03 27.10 27.15 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) 
Annual precipitation (mm) 1,390.17 1,118.38 1,328.78 
 (167.89) (30.97) (39.17) 
Precipitation of wettest quarter (mm) 582.58 475.30 572.75 
 (85.84) (11.21) (21.09) 
Precipitation of driest quarter (mm) 100.48 70.95 96.59 
 (25.31) (4.29) (6.21) 
Good soil (1/0) 0.81 0.72 0.73 
 (0.39) (0.45) (0.45) 
Steep terrain (1/0) 0.37 0.45 0.46 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) 
Observations 260 40 200 
Notes: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. Temperature and precipitation data were obtained from WorldClim 
(Fick, S.E., & Hijmans, R.J. (2017). WorldClim 2: new 1-km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas. International Journal of 
Climatology, 37(12), 4302–4315) and matched with the GPS coordinates of the sample farmers. These variables represent historical averages 
for the years 1970-2000. 
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix between certification and instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Certified 
(1/0) 
Share of certified 
farmers  
(5 km radius) 
Network provider of coop 
leader (1= Orange) 
Certified (1/0) 1.00   
Share of certified farmers (5 km radius) 0.85*** 1.00  
Network provider of coop leader (1 = Orange) 0.19*** 0.15*** 1.00 





Table A3. First-stage IV regression and instrument falsification tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First-stage IV 
certification 
(1/0) 
Yield Price Expenditure 
(log) 
Share of certified farmers (5 km radius) 0.82*** 47.77 4.25 0.10 
 (0.09) (82.81) (7.69) (0.31) 
Network provider of coop leader (1 = Orange) 0.07 -2.75 0.92 -0.11 
 (0.06) (46.20) (2.41) (0.10) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.00** -0.21 -0.26 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (1.09) (0.22) (0.00) 
Household size 0.00 3.00 -0.06 -0.06*** 
 (0.00) (2.34) (0.29) (0.01) 
Age -0.00* 0.74 -0.07 0.00* 
 (0.00) (1.12) (0.05) (0.00) 
Female (1/0) 0.14*** 14.71 -8.14 0.27 
 (0.03) (51.62) (5.76) (0.16) 
Education (yrs.) -0.00 -6.28** -0.23 0.02** 
 (0.00) (2.71) (0.33) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.01* 9.86 0.92 0.00 
 (0.00) (7.40) (0.96) (0.02) 
Trust on people (1-4) -0.01 4.38 -4.07 0.00 
 (0.01) (15.59) (2.93) (0.04) 
Distance to road (km.) -0.00 0.89 -0.13 -0.01 
 (0.00) (1.42) (0.09) (0.00) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) 0.00 -29.08 5.05* -0.03 
 (0.03) (45.35) (2.62) (0.13) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.00 0.70*** 0.01 -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.00** 1.47 -0.11 -0.00 
 (0.00) (1.15) (0.09) (0.00) 
Good soil (1/0) 0.04 58.92 -0.64 0.01 
 (0.03) (36.94) (2.40) (0.07) 
Distance to water sources (km) 0.00 0.88 -0.18 0.00* 
 (0.00) (1.38) (0.11) (0.00) 
Lacs district (1/0) 0.00 160.56** 8.99 -0.41* 
 (0.08) (60.06) (5.52) (0.22) 
Lagunes district (1/0) -0.03 73.68* -8.52** -0.43*** 
 (0.08) (38.81) (3.09) (0.11) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.01 -2.80 0.66** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (4.10) (0.26) (0.01) 
Coop members before certification (number) 0.00*** -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) 
Share of decisions made democratically -0.02 -111.76 28.52** -0.29 
 (0.27) (126.21) (10.25) (0.32) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.) -0.00 2.81 -0.47 0.02 
 (0.01) (5.79) (0.43) (0.02) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0) -0.12* 57.20 7.14* 0.08 
 (0.07) (52.08) (3.64) (0.13) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc. (number) 0.00 -33.37** 0.87 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (14.44) (1.17) (0.04) 
Coop vehicles (number) 0.01 37.21*** 1.62* 0.01 
 (0.01) (10.78) (0.86) (0.03) 
Constant 0.12 227.50* 702.26*** 6.82*** 
 (0.21) (126.29) (12.61) (0.39) 
Wald test on instruments. F-stat 50.12*** 0.18 0.23 0.67 
Observations 500 250 241 250 




Table A4. Correlation between instruments and other regional factors that could influence welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) 





Share of certified farmers (5km radius) -3.60 4.53 -5.30 
 (2.89) (4.52) (46.40) 
Network provider of coop leader (1 = Orange) -1.56 -4.24 -65.35* 
 (2.17) (3.45) (38.61) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) -0.10*** 0.05 0.60 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.52) 
Household size 0.06 -0.10 -2.82** 
 (0.12) (0.18) (1.34) 
Age -0.01 -0.02 -0.44 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.48) 
Female (1/0) -1.25 -0.79 -25.02 
 (1.79) (2.91) (20.18) 
Education (yrs.) 0.14 -0.22* -3.23 
 (0.12) (0.13) (1.97) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.12 -0.08 1.60 
 (0.21) (0.26) (1.86) 
Trust on people (1-4) 0.43 0.63 7.33 
 (0.46) (0.68) (5.82) 
Distance to road (km.) 0.16  2.19* 
 (0.10)  (1.20) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) 0.21 -2.20 12.17 
 (1.32) (1.99) (11.75) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.03*** -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.02 0.11** -0.62 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.48) 
Good soil (1/0) -0.07 -0.00 9.67 
 (0.97) (1.68) (13.80) 
Distance to water sources (km) 0.01 0.05 -0.47 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.32) 
Lacs district (1/0) -2.50 -19.55*** -259.88*** 
 (4.03) (4.85) (44.90) 
Lagunes district (1/0) 1.03 -9.05* -57.61 
 (2.22) (4.73) (36.28) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.16 -0.28 -2.61 
 (0.19) (0.28) (3.05) 
Coop members before certification (number) 0.00 0.01* -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Share of decisions made democratically 4.03 14.15 -56.92 
 (7.01) (12.83) (166.01) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.) -0.52 0.09 -2.29 
 (0.44) (0.81) (6.23) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0) 0.32 13.07*** -21.37 
 (2.00) (3.09) (40.65) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc. (number) -1.06 1.43 -13.35 
 (1.02) (1.54) (13.67) 
Coop vehicles (number) 0.21 -0.27 1.70 
 (0.21) (0.36) (3.69) 
Constant 13.07 4.29 1547.19*** 
 (8.35) (15.33) (131.65) 
Wald test on instruments. F-stat 1.20 1.59 1.48 
Observations 500 500 500 




Table A5. Effects of Fairtrade certification on cocoa yield (kg/ha) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Certified (1/0) 63.32** 69.60** 111.75*** 106.61** 
 (27.20) (35.27) (37.27) (49.66) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 1.06 1.06 0.69 0.69 
 (1.78) (1.73) (1.76) (1.70) 
Household size 1.62 1.58 1.14 1.18 
 (1.97) (1.95) (2.04) (2.00) 
Age -1.61* -1.62* -1.16 -1.17 
 (0.93) (0.91) (0.98) (0.95) 
Female (1/0) 31.64 31.00 21.86 22.41 
 (45.58) (44.79) (45.23) (44.13) 
Education (yrs.) -0.89 -0.91 -1.54 -1.54 
 (2.71) (2.64) (2.64) (2.55) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 7.59 7.69 8.47* 8.40* 
 (5.11) (5.07) (5.05) (4.96) 
Trust on people (1-4) 15.26 15.08 15.04 15.19 
 (12.84) (12.61) (13.28) (12.90) 
Distance to road (km.) 1.16 1.16 0.50 0.51 
 (0.84) (0.82) (0.98) (0.95) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) -34.87 -35.35 -37.86 -37.95 
 (22.76) (22.19) (24.59) (23.82) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.89 -0.86 -0.49 -0.50 
 (1.02) (1.01) (1.06) (1.03) 
Good soil (1/0) 89.19*** 88.59*** 82.04*** 82.57*** 
 (27.76) (26.99) (26.25) (25.35) 
Distance to water sources (km) -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.15 
 (0.90) (0.87) (0.93) (0.90) 
Lacs district (1/0) 11.32 14.15 -6.51 -7.73 
 (61.61) (63.66) (67.23) (66.10) 
Lagunes district (1/0) 30.66 32.67 39.03 38.07 
 (24.55) (24.21) (27.65) (26.90) 
Age of the coop (yrs.)   1.68 1.73 
   (2.91) (2.85) 
Coop members before certification (number)   -0.04 -0.04 
   (0.05) (0.04) 
Share of decisions made democratically   59.23 59.11 
   (102.23) (98.78) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.)   0.11 0.28 
   (4.07) (4.02) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0)   76.95** 76.10** 
   (35.05) (34.98) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc. (number)   -4.27 -3.99 
   (13.85) (13.62) 
Coop vehicles (number)   -2.05 -1.92 
   (2.43) (2.38) 
Constant 413.69*** 410.14*** 322.40*** 322.12*** 
 (72.60) (72.38) (101.76) (98.35) 
F-value 5.85*** 5.88*** 5.24*** 5.05*** 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic. a  0.18  0.04 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic b  207.83***  50.12*** 
Hansen J statistic. c  0.62  0.67 
Observations 500 500 500 500 
Note: Cluster robust standard errors shown in parentheses. First-stage results for the IV regressions are shown in Table A3 (column 1). 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Test of endogeneity (H0: certified variable is exogenous) 
b Test for weak instruments (H0: coefficients of instruments in first stage are not different from zero) 




Table A6. Effects of Fairtrade certification on cocoa price (CFA/kg) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Certified (1/0) 26.52*** 29.27*** 22.11*** 25.18*** 
 (3.86) (4.23) (3.38) (3.69) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Household size 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.28 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) 
Age -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Female (1/0) -5.57 -5.86 -6.47 -6.82* 
 (4.73) (4.68) (4.12) (4.11) 
Education (yrs.) 0.25 0.24 0.11 0.11 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.35 -0.31 -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.71) (0.68) 
Trust on people (1-4) -5.38* -5.48** -5.48** -5.59** 
 (2.78) (2.70) (2.60) (2.51) 
Distance to road (km.) -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) 1.48 1.25 1.98 2.03 
 (3.07) (2.94) (2.54) (2.47) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.36** -0.35** -0.30* -0.29* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Good soil (1/0) 1.77 1.52 1.90 1.58 
 (2.77) (2.71) (2.55) (2.53) 
Distance to water sources (km) -0.15 -0.14 -0.25** -0.24** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Lacs district (1/0) -0.56 0.68 2.02 2.77 
 (11.44) (11.73) (5.23) (5.60) 
Lagunes district (1/0) -7.55 -6.65 -5.84* -5.24* 
 (4.71) (4.62) (2.97) (2.79) 
Age of the coop (yrs.)   0.74*** 0.71*** 
   (0.26) (0.24) 
Coop members before certification (number)   -0.01*** -0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of decisions made democratically   23.57** 23.55** 
   (9.45) (9.62) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.)   -1.47*** -1.58*** 
   (0.42) (0.40) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0)   -1.22 -0.75 
   (3.39) (3.34) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc. (number)   2.04* 1.87* 
   (1.17) (1.11) 
Coop vehicles (number)   0.64* 0.57* 
   (0.33) (0.34) 
Constant 730.10*** 728.55*** 734.69*** 735.01*** 
 (14.28) (14.16) (15.80) (15.51) 
F-value 9.25*** 13.50*** 24.24*** 50.35*** 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic. a  1.40  0.69 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic b  201.57***  49.33*** 
Hansen J statistic. c  0.16  0.00 
Observations 490 490 490 490 
Note: Cluster robust standard errors shown in parentheses. First-stage results for the IV regressions are shown in Table A3 (column 1). 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Test of endogeneity (H0: certified variable is exogenous) 
b Test for weak instruments (H0: coefficients of instruments in first stage are not different from zero) 




Table A7. Effects of Fairtrade certification on per capita consumption expenditure (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Certified (1/0) 0.14* 0.17* 0.15* 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female (1/0) 0.25** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Education (yrs.) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trust on people (1-4) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance to road (km.) -0.01** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Good soil (1/0) -0.17** -0.17*** -0.14** -0.14** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Distance to water sources (km) 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lacs district (1/0) -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
Lagunes district (1/0) -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.33*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age of the coop (yrs.)   -0.02*** -0.02*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Coop members before certification (number)   -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of decisions made democratically   -0.07 -0.07 
   (0.27) (0.26) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.)   0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0)   0.07 0.07 
   (0.09) (0.09) 
Service providers for inputs, training etc. (number)   0.05* 0.06* 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Coop vehicles (number)   0.00 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 7.14*** 7.13*** 6.97*** 6.97*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.28) (0.27) 
F-value 15.27*** 14.95*** 15.14*** 14.78*** 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic. a  0.42  0.10 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic b  207.84***  50.12*** 
Hansen J statistic. c  0.06  0.00 
Observations 500 500 500 500 
Note: Cluster robust standard errors shown in parentheses. First-stage results for the IV regressions are shown in Table A3 (column 1). 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Test of endogeneity (H0: certified variable is exogenous) 
b Test for weak instruments (H0: coefficients of instruments in first stage are not different from zero) 




Table A8. descriptive statistics for household characteristics by certification status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Certified Non-certified Mean diff. 
Age of household head (yrs.) 49.51 49.67 49.34 0.33 
 (10.90) (10.56) (11.24)  
Education of household head (yrs.) 6.11 5.87 6.34 -0.48 
 (4.90) (4.82) (4.98)  
Female household head (1/0) 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04* 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.21)  
Household size 7.13 7.31 6.94 0.36 
 (3.92) (3.85) (3.99)  
Akan ethnicity (1/0) 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.04 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.45)  
Risk aversion (1-10) 6.13 5.99 6.28 -0.29 
 (2.34) (2.31) (2.36)  
Trust on people (1-4) 2.30 2.35 2.25 0.10 
 (0.81) (0.79) (0.83)  
Off-farm employment (1/0) 0.36 0.39 0.33 0.06 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.47)  
Access to credit (1/0) 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.04 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.42)  
Distance to road (km) 14.92 16.56 13.27 3.28** 
 (15.79) (16.01) (15.41)  
Land owned (ha) 9.81 9.62 10.00 -0.38 
 (10.12) (11.29) (8.82)  
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 8.76 8.80 8.72 0.08 
 (10.82) (12.17) (9.29)  
Land under cocoa (ha) 4.95 5.35 4.56 0.79* 
 (4.55) (5.63) (3.10)  
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 20.32 19.79 20.85 -1.06 
 (10.64) (10.79) (10.47)  
Distance to water source (walking min.) 10.00 9.46 10.55 -1.09 
 (13.75) (12.41) (14.97)  
Good soil (1/0) 0.77 0.82 0.73 0.09** 
 (0.42) (0.39) (0.45)  
Soil steep (1/0) 0.41 0.38 0.44 -0.05 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)  
Observations 500 250 250 500 




Table A9. Effects of Fairtrade certification on outcome variables controlling for other standards 
 Cocoa yield (kg/ha) Cocoa price (CFA/kg) Per capita expenditure 
(log) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Fairtrade certified (1/0) 116.92*** 109.21** 22.74*** 25.95*** 0.17** 0.14 
 (41.60) (54.52) (3.57) (4.32) (0.08) (0.11) 
UTZ and/or RA certified -15.98 -11.91 -1.93 -3.60 -0.09 -0.07 
 (49.49) (49.72) (4.10) (4.76) (0.14) (0.13) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.69 0.70 -0.09 -0.09 0.01** 0.01*** 
 (1.76) (1.70) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size 1.18 1.22 0.30 0.29 -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (2.04) (1.98) (0.28) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -1.21 -1.21 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
 (1.00) (0.97) (0.15) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female (1/0) 22.16 22.77 -6.44 -6.72* 0.27*** 0.27*** 
 (45.40) (44.26) (4.08) (4.02) (0.09) (0.08) 
Education (yrs.) -1.55 -1.54 0.11 0.11 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (2.64) (2.55) (0.31) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 8.41* 8.34* -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.01 
 (4.99) (4.86) (0.71) (0.68) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trust on people (1-4) 14.72 14.99 -5.52** -5.65** -0.01 -0.00 
 (13.28) (12.92) (2.63) (2.53) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance to road (km.) 0.50 0.51 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.98) (0.95) (0.11) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) -37.53 -37.72 2.01 2.08 -0.04 -0.05 
 (24.73) (23.96) (2.58) (2.52) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.50 -0.52 -0.30* -0.30* 0.00 0.00 
 (1.06) (1.03) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) 
Good soil (1/0) 81.77*** 82.49*** 1.87 1.56 -0.14** -0.14** 
 (26.43) (25.42) (2.55) (2.55) (0.06) (0.06) 
Distance to water source (km) 0.15 0.14 -0.25** -0.25** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.93) (0.89) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lacs district (1/0) -10.25 -10.82 1.57 1.83 -0.16 -0.16 
 (66.15) (63.22) (5.28) (5.55) (0.16) (0.15) 
Lagunes district (1/0) 38.37 37.34 -5.92* -5.46* -0.33*** -0.33*** 
 (27.79) (26.99) (3.01) (2.87) (0.08) (0.07) 
Constant 327.65*** 325.97*** 735.32*** 736.16*** 7.00*** 6.99*** 
 (103.32) (99.09) (16.10) (15.62) (0.29) (0.28) 
F-value 5.15*** 4.84*** 30.99*** 42.35*** 15.25*** 14.43*** 
Cooperative controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 500 500 490 490 500 500 




Table A10. Effects of Fairtrade certification on outcome variables without controlling for number of 
service providers 
 Cocoa yield (kg/ha) Cocoa price (CFA/kg) Per capita  
expenditure (log) 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Certified (1/0) 109.73*** 103.90** 23.14*** 26.49*** 0.17** 0.17 
 (35.07) (46.65) (3.53) (3.75) (0.09) (0.11) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.70 0.70 -0.10 -0.10 0.01** 0.01*** 
 (1.76) (1.70) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Household size 1.19 1.23 0.28 0.26 -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (2.05) (2.00) (0.28) (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -1.19 -1.20 -0.02 -0.01 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.96) (0.93) (0.15) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female (1/0) 22.17 22.79 -6.64 -7.02* 0.27*** 0.27*** 
 (45.10) (43.97) (4.15) (4.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
Education (yrs.) -1.57 -1.56 0.12 0.12 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (2.62) (2.53) (0.31) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 8.66* 8.56* -0.16 -0.11 0.01 0.01 
 (5.12) (5.03) (0.70) (0.68) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trust on people (1-4) 15.02 15.19 -5.50** -5.62** -0.00 -0.00 
 (13.32) (12.94) (2.63) (2.54) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance to road (km.) 0.46 0.47 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.98) (0.96) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) -38.68 -38.71 2.40 2.41 -0.04 -0.04 
 (24.68) (23.92) (2.61) (2.53) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cocoa experience (yrs.) 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.49 -0.51 -0.30* -0.29* 0.00 0.00 
 (1.06) (1.03) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) 
Good soil (1/0) 82.76*** 83.32*** 1.55 1.23 -0.15** -0.15** 
 (26.80) (25.95) (2.62) (2.58) (0.07) (0.06) 
Distance to water sources (km) 0.12 0.12 -0.23** -0.23** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.93) (0.90) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lacs district (1/0) -8.36 -9.65 2.91 3.67 -0.11 -0.11 
 (62.83) (61.44) (6.06) (6.42) (0.15) (0.14) 
Lagunes district (1/0) 40.50 39.27 -6.54** -5.80** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
 (26.71) (26.24) (2.98) (2.81) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 1.31 1.41 0.91*** 0.86*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (2.88) (2.83) (0.30) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) 
Coop members before  -0.04 -0.04 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 
certification (number) (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Share of decisions made  53.34 53.66 26.47*** 26.17*** 0.01 0.01 
democratically (96.36) (93.37) (9.61) (9.74) (0.28) (0.27) 
Education of coop. leader (yrs.) 0.57 0.73 -1.70*** -1.80*** 0.01 0.01 
 (3.94) (3.88) (0.47) (0.43) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leader grows cocoa (1/0) 78.80** 77.67** -2.10 -1.48 0.05 0.05 
 (37.05) (36.87) (3.62) (3.58) (0.10) (0.10) 
Coop vehicles (number) -2.43 -2.26 0.82** 0.73** 0.01 0.01 
 (1.99) (2.03) (0.31) (0.33) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 316.13*** 316.28*** 737.78*** 737.85*** 7.05*** 7.05*** 
 (107.02) (103.94) (16.36) (16.05) (0.28) (0.27) 
F-value 5.34*** 5.15*** 33.58*** 63.32*** 16.18*** 15.81*** 
Observations 500 500 490 490 500 500 





B. Appendix for chapter 3 
Table B1. Comparison between tobit and double-hurdle models (likelihood ratio tests) 
 Tobit 
Double Hurdle 
LR c2 First hurdle Second hurdle Total 
Fertilizer (kg/ha) -3696.10 -308.92 -370.69 -679.61 6032.97*** 
Total pesticide use (kg/ha) -503.73 -104.21 -390.57 -494.78 17.89 
EIQ -842.44 -106.14 -106.14 -212.28 1260.30*** 
Hazard quotient (HQ) -1002.48 -106.14 -616.65 -722.79 559.38*** 





Table B2. First-stage of IV models and instrument falsification tests 






use (kg/ha) a 




       
Share of certified farmers (5km radius) 19.72*** -9.80 0.71 10.17 413.30 -2.58** 
 (1.92) (24.36) (0.73) (11.78) (392.93) (0.94) 
Phone provider of coop leader  8.27*** -0.22 0.08 0.67 163.82 0.42 
(1=Orange) (1.10) (9.12) (0.13) (2.29) (98.05) (0.59) 
Dist. to the closest certified coop -27.74*** 20.87 3.91* 27.63 1639.24 -3.51 
 (9.39) (59.02) (2.10) (35.61) (1218.00) (4.44) 
Resp. = coop. worker      -0.74 
      (1.08) 
Resp. = aboussant      -0.42 
      (0.64) 
Female (1/0) 1.60*** 55.39 0.21 1.88 0.85 -2.31*** 
 (0.51) (57.80) (0.39) (7.83) (188.61) (0.65) 
Age -0.06*** -0.53 -0.01 -0.01 -3.27 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.54) (0.01) (0.14) (5.49) (0.03) 
Education (yrs.) -0.14*** -0.10 -0.02 -0.27 -9.25 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.85) (0.02) (0.32) (9.72) (0.04) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.00 -0.37 0.02 0.47 24.49 -0.09 
 (0.06) (1.26) (0.04) (0.55) (20.50) (0.11) 
Household size -0.10* 3.22* 0.01 0.32 2.72 0.07 
 (0.06) (1.76) (0.03) (0.61) (23.20) (0.04) 
Dist. to input market (km.) 0.07 -0.31 0.00 0.01 -6.84 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.31) (0.01) (0.16) (5.48) (0.04) 
Dist. to road (km.) -0.08*** -0.11 0.01 0.02 2.99 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.23) (0.01) (0.13) (4.58) (0.02) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) -0.02 1.24* 0.02 0.44 12.40 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.72) (0.02) (0.27) (10.08) (0.03) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.05 -2.75 0.07 0.37 24.23 -0.26 
 (0.10) (4.47) (0.06) (1.14) (45.34) (0.22) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) 1.21*** -25.22** -0.40 -4.04 16.64  
 (0.30) (11.24) (0.49) (6.37) (278.40)  
Infected with black pod (1/0) -0.78 -6.90 -0.02 1.54 113.03  
 (0.69) (8.14) (0.38) (4.66) (149.54)  
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 0.25 8.07 0.61** 8.85** 250.22**  
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 (0.36) (9.46) (0.24) (3.51) (118.28)  
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.02* 0.63 -0.02 -0.14 -5.42  
 (0.01) (0.48) (0.01) (0.23) (8.19)  
Number of shade trees per hectare -0.00 -0.13 0.05** 0.85* 41.12*  
 (0.03) (0.60) (0.02) (0.44) (23.22)  
District=Lacs -0.06 -51.08* -0.45 -10.38 -469.59* 1.25 
 (1.63) (29.26) (0.49) (6.75) (262.55) (1.36) 
District=Lagunes -0.69 -33.06* -0.93** -11.16** -524.60** 0.05 
 (0.73) (17.94) (0.38) (4.85) (201.72) (0.55) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.48*** -1.21 -0.01 -0.01 1.83 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.72) (0.01) (0.23) (7.83) (0.05) 
Share of decisions made  -0.47 -111.60** -1.05 -18.72 -975.11 0.87 
Democratically (1.63) (48.08) (1.05) (17.52) (588.02) (1.45) 
# service/inputs/training providers 3.56*** 4.92 0.02 0.25 22.22 -0.61** 
 (0.59) (5.96) (0.07) (1.08) (37.02) (0.24) 
Constant -17.51*** 133.02* 0.97 5.90 71.89 6.89** 
 (2.22) (71.47) (1.29) (22.45) (768.62) (2.58) 
Wald test on instruments c2 = 116.22*** F = 0.11 F = 1.32 F = 0.29 F = 1.34 F = 2.97* 
Observations 500 248 244 244 244 146 
Note: Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a In these regressions we use the subsample of non-certified respondents.  
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Table B3. Effects of certification on the number of pesticide-related acute health symptoms 
 (1) (2) 
 IV-GMM dy/dx 
   
Certified (1/0) -0.50** -0.92** 
 (0.20) (0.36) 
Resp.=Aboussant (1/0) -0.41 -0.60 
 (0.36) (0.47) 
Resp.=Coop. worker (1/0) 0.12 0.23 
 (0.28) (0.53) 
Female (1/0) -0.68 -1.24 
 (1.26) (2.32) 
Age 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Education (yrs.) -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
Household size 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.07) 
Dist. to input market (km) -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Dist. to road (km) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Land owned 10 years. ago (ha) 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 years ago -0.09 -0.17 
 (0.07) (0.13) 
District=Lacs 0.36 0.77 
 (0.22) (0.49) 
District=Lagunes -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.23) (0.40) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.03* 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
Share of decisions made democratically 1.00 1.83 
 (0.64) (1.21) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.31*** -0.57*** 
 (0.08) (0.16) 
Constant 1.59*  
 (0.93)  
Test of over-identifying restrictions: Hansen's J c2 1.44  
Observations 255 255 





Table B4. Significance of generalized residuals in double-hurdle models (p-values) 
 (1) (2) 
 First hurdle Second hurdle 
Fertilizer (kg/ha) 0.252 0.045 
Total pesticide use (kg/ha) 0.146 0.281 
EIQ 0.154 0.848 
Hazard quotient (HQ) 0.154 0.479 
 
Table B5. Descriptive statistics for control variables by certification status (farmer sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Certified Non-certified Mean 
differences 
Female (1/0) 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04* 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.21)  
Age 49.51 49.67 49.34 0.33 
 (10.90) (10.56) (11.24)  
Education (yrs.) 6.11 5.87 6.34 -0.48 
 (4.90) (4.82) (4.98)  
Risk aversion (1-10) 6.13 5.99 6.28 -0.29 
 (2.34) (2.31) (2.36)  
Household size 7.13 7.31 6.94 0.36 
 (3.92) (3.85) (3.99)  
Dist. to input market (km) 2.75 2.11 3.39 -1.28*** 
 (5.28) (3.61) (6.48)  
Dist. to road (km) 14.92 16.56 13.27 3.28** 
 (15.79) (16.01) (15.41)  
Land owned 10 years ago (ha) 8.76 8.80 8.72 0.08 
 (10.82) (12.17) (9.29)  
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 12.25 12.38 12.12 0.26** 
 (1.23) (1.19) (1.26)  
Infected with mirids (1/0) 0.88 0.86 0.90 -0.04 
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.30)  
Infected with black pod (1/0) 0.87 0.85 0.90 -0.05* 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.30)  
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.01 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)  
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 20.32 19.79 20.85 -1.06 
 (10.64) (10.79) (10.47)  
Number of shade trees per hectare 6.09 5.88 6.30 -0.43 
 (5.72) (5.45) (5.99)  
Age of the coop (yrs.) 7.70 9.48 5.92 3.56*** 
 (5.00) (4.46) (4.88)  
Share of decisions made  0.39 0.41 0.37 0.04*** 
democratically (0.15) (0.16) (0.13)  
# service/inputs/training providers 1.56 2.24 0.88 1.36*** 
 (1.47) (1.42) (1.18)  
Observations 500 250 250 500 




Table B6. Descriptive statistics for control variables by certification status (worker sample) 
 Aboussant Cooperative worker 
 Certified Non-certified a Certified Non-certified a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female (1/0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 36.98 36.17 42.86 40.93 
 (10.62) (9.89) (8.11) (9.16) 
Education (yrs.) 2.64 4.42* 11.43 9.57 
 (3.84) (5.02) (5.65) (6.88) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 6.40 6.49 7.00 6.36 
 (2.56) (2.47) (2.58) (2.79) 
Household size 4.64 4.73 6.29 5.43 
 (2.90) (2.95) (3.59) (3.72) 
Dist. to input market (km) 5.71 5.05 1.90 1.31 
 (6.26) (6.76) (1.85) (3.13) 
Dist. to road (km) 14.89 13.32 9.50 11.46 
 (14.13) (13.38) (11.97) (15.69) 
Land owned 10 years ago (ha) 0.54 1.08 7.00 6.07 
 (2.26) (4.16) (14.73) (6.15) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 10.61 10.92 13.13 12.55 
 (1.28) (1.29) (1.35) (0.95) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 9.42 6.41*** 8.71 6.07 
 (4.70) (5.73) (5.94) (5.95) 
Share of decisions made democratically 0.42 0.36** 0.46 0.33** 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12) 
# service/inputs/training providers 2.22 1.12*** 2.86 0.64*** 
 (1.49) (1.26) (1.95) (1.15) 
Observations 45 59 7 14 
Note: Mean values are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 





Table B7. Effect of certification on agrochemical input use (double-hurdle models) 
 Fertilizer (kg/ha) Total pesticide use (kg/ha) 
 First hurdle Sec. hurdle. First hurdle Sec. hurdle. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Certification (1/0) 0.51*** 0.04 -0.08 0.17** 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.26) (0.08) 
Female (1/0) 0.01 0.38 -0.18 0.13 
 (0.29) (0.40) (0.36) (0.12) 
Age -0.01** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Education (yrs.) -0.02 -0.06*** 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.04 -0.00 0.11*** 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Household size -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Dist. to input market. (km) -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Dist. to road (km) -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Land owned 10 years. ago (ha) 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -0.25 -0.38 -0.18 -0.14 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.31) (0.13) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) -0.15 0.34 -0.14 0.14 
 (0.21) (0.32) (0.23) (0.12) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 0.24 -0.41* -0.39* 0.13 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.22) (0.10) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of shade trees per hectare -0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
District=Lacs -0.10 -0.09 0.32 0.16 
 (0.28) (0.44) (0.49) (0.10) 
District=Lagunes -0.36* -0.24 -0.60** -0.18* 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.09) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -0.02 -0.01 0.04* -0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share of decisions made  -0.53 -0.18 1.86** -0.51 
democratically (0.59) (0.67) (0.80) (0.37) 
# service/inputs/training providers 0.01 0.08 -0.24*** 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) 
Constant 0.13 4.33*** 2.19* 0.76 
 (1.00) (1.11) (1.13) (0.52) 
Generalized residuals included No Yes No No 
Observations 492 229 469 433 





Table B8. Marginal effects of certification on agrochemical input use (double-hurdle models) 
 Fertilizer (kg/ha) Total pesticide use (kg/ha) 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Certification (1/0) 4.33 21.12 0.35** 0.31* 
 (26.96) (14.55) (0.18) (0.18) 
Female (1/0) 39.09 19.58 0.26 0.20 
 (42.54) (22.14) (0.25) (0.26) 
Age -1.57 -1.30** -0.01 -0.01** 
 (1.08) (0.60) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education (yrs.) -6.27** -3.83*** -0.03* -0.03* 
 (2.53) (1.32) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.00 1.47 0.00 0.03 
 (2.73) (1.97) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household size -0.49 -0.36 0.01 0.01 
 (2.71) (1.71) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to input market (km) 0.73 0.03 0.01 0.01 
 (1.82) (1.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to road (km) -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.60) (0.36) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.40 0.68 0.00 0.00 
 (0.91) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 8.10 5.19 -0.01 0.00 
 (8.71) (5.18) (0.06) (0.06) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -38.65 -28.39* -0.29 -0.31 
 (29.03) (16.97) (0.28) (0.27) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) 34.63 11.75 0.29 0.23 
 (34.28) (17.52) (0.24) (0.23) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) -41.98 -11.86 0.27 0.15 
 (25.83) (12.02) (0.21) (0.20) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -1.21 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.12) (0.54) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of shade trees per hectare 3.26** 1.55* 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (1.63) (0.86) (0.01) (0.01) 
District=Lacs -9.92 -9.22 0.37 0.41 
 (45.57) (20.33) (0.25) (0.25) 
District=Lagunes -23.94 -24.20 -0.36* -0.49** 
 (24.55) (15.21) (0.19) (0.20) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -1.00 -1.09 -0.03* -0.02 
 (2.30) (1.38) (0.01) (0.01) 
Share of decisions made  -17.90 -28.54 -1.05 -0.53 
democratically (68.05) (35.64) (0.77) (0.71) 
# service/inputs/training providers 8.62 4.77 0.05 -0.01 
 (8.76) (5.60) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant     
     
Generalized residuals included No Yes No No 
Observations 492 492 469 469 





Table A9. Marginal effects of certification on agrochemical input use controlling for potential pathways 
(double-hurdle models) 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Fairtrade (1/0) 0.30* -20.91 -0.51 -0.50* 0.38** 0.25 
 (0.17) (30.05) (15.37) (0.27) (0.18) (0.18) 
Cocoa price (CFA/kg) 0.00 0.19 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Access to credit (1/0) 0.46*** -31.19 0.01 -0.21 0.13 0.08 
 (0.16) (19.90) (10.22) (0.29) (0.21) (0.19) 
Participated in ag. training (1/0) 0.43*** 24.14 26.80** 0.38 -0.21 -0.12 
 (0.13) (23.88) (12.96) (0.28) (0.16) (0.16) 
Received pesticides (1/0) -0.08 37.00 16.04 0.85*** -0.12 0.06 
 (0.16) (26.49) (14.67) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) 
Received fertilizer (1/0) 0.60*** 16.07 28.67** 0.43 0.19 0.27 
 (0.18) (21.65) (11.72) (0.26) (0.21) (0.21) 
Received spraying services (1/0) -0.04 43.69* 20.63* 0.60** 0.26 0.37* 
 (0.14) (23.40) (11.35) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) 
Female (1/0) 0.09 33.11 19.93 -0.39 0.12 0.03 
 (0.29) (37.29) (20.85) (0.39) (0.26) (0.27) 
Age -0.01 -1.48 -1.13** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.93) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education (yrs.) -0.02 -6.35** -4.05*** 0.00 -0.03* -0.02 
 (0.02) (2.56) (1.29) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.04 -1.61 0.56 0.09 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.03) (3.46) (2.20) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household size -0.01 -1.37 -1.17 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (2.80) (1.69) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to input mkt. (km.) -0.01 -0.38 -0.43 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (1.88) (1.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to road (km.) -0.00 -0.18 -0.19 0.01 -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.56) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.01* 0.47 0.74 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.95) (0.56) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago -0.00 1.20 0.59 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.06) (9.76) (5.68) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -0.22 -38.38 -26.95 -0.07 -0.30 -0.29 
 (0.23) (27.04) (16.82) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) -0.12 37.59 14.83 -0.20 0.28 0.22 
 (0.22) (33.02) (16.17) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 0.23 -44.05* -14.46 -0.50* 0.24 0.12 
 (0.15) (25.20) (11.62) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 0.01** -0.80 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (1.13) (0.56) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of shade trees per hectare -0.01 2.00 0.73 0.01 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (1.73) (0.96) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
District = Lacs -0.08 -1.02 -3.32 0.32 0.35 0.39* 
 (0.30) (43.21) (19.73) (0.57) (0.23) (0.23) 
District = Lagunes -0.31 -11.67 -16.07 -0.31 -0.41** -0.44** 
 (0.21) (23.15) (14.42) (0.27) (0.18) (0.19) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -0.02 -1.31 -1.18 0.04* -0.03** -0.02 
 (0.02) (2.29) (1.30) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Share of decisions made democratically -0.80 -44.31 -49.53 1.40* -1.14 -0.77 
 (0.62) (63.08) (34.08) (0.75) (0.74) (0.67) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.04 2.18 -0.17 -0.33*** 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.07) (7.92) (5.23) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant -0.38   3.27   
120 
 
 (1.52)   (2.56)   
Generalized residuals included No Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 482 482 482 459 459 459 
Note: Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table B10. Effects of certification on aggregated toxicity (double-hurdle models) 
 EIQ Hazard quotient 
 First hurdle Sec. hurdle. First hurdle Sec. hurdle. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Certification (1/0) -0.05 0.23 -0.05 0.35*** 
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.25) (0.13) 
Female (1/0) -0.19 0.08 -0.19 0.03 
 (0.36) (0.25) (0.36) (0.18) 
Age -0.03*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Education (yrs.) -0.00 -0.04** -0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.11*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Household size 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to input market (km) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Dist. to road (km) 0.01 -0.01** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) -0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.05 -0.11** 0.05 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -0.17 -0.31 -0.17 -0.19 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.18) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) -0.15 0.33* -0.15 0.30* 
 (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) -0.41* 0.32** -0.41* 0.24* 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of shade trees per hectare 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
District=Lacs 0.35 -0.03 0.35 0.03 
 (0.48) (0.27) (0.48) (0.16) 
District=Lagunes -0.59** -0.14 -0.59** -0.14 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.14) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.04** 0.01 0.04** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share of decisions made  1.81** -0.80 1.81** -0.66 
democratically (0.79) (0.64) (0.79) (0.54) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.23*** 0.03 -0.23*** -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Constant 2.01* 3.67*** 2.01* 6.92*** 
 (1.08) (0.86) (1.08) (0.63) 
Generalized residuals included No No No No 
Observations 492 492 469 469 





Table B11. Marginal effects of certification on aggregated toxicity (double-hurdle models) 
 EIQ Hazard quotient 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Certification (1/0) 5.86 5.24 285.00** 258.87** 
 (4.31) (4.16) (112.37) (106.96) 
Female (1/0) 2.03 1.27 24.24 3.94 
 (6.28) (5.97) (142.56) (136.40) 
Age -0.05 -0.14 -2.47 -5.24 
 (0.16) (0.15) (3.60) (3.54) 
Education (yrs.) -0.92** -0.86** -14.44* -13.70* 
 (0.37) (0.36) (8.02) (7.86) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.24 0.56 16.41 25.55 
 (0.79) (0.73) (18.87) (17.44) 
Household size -0.20 -0.16 -3.02 -2.08 
 (0.49) (0.44) (13.26) (11.67) 
Dist. to input market (km) 0.45 0.45* 9.91 10.14 
 (0.29) (0.27) (7.40) (7.09) 
Dist. to road (km) -0.30** -0.25** -3.52 -2.42 
 (0.13) (0.13) (3.36) (3.10) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.29* 0.25* 3.92 3.32 
 (0.15) (0.14) (3.39) (2.99) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago -2.80** -2.42** -46.95 -38.29 
 (1.22) (1.16) (31.36) (30.84) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -7.82 -7.72 -155.48 -159.91 
 (6.87) (6.55) (148.97) (142.81) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) 8.19 7.07 245.47* 212.55 
 (4.99) (4.49) (141.19) (132.34) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 7.97* 6.06 193.65* 139.68 
 (4.12) (3.90) (114.82) (108.62) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 0.05 0.02 -4.45 -4.69 
 (0.20) (0.19) (4.56) (4.45) 
Number of shade trees per hectare 0.71*** 0.69*** 23.06*** 22.37*** 
 (0.27) (0.26) (7.46) (7.08) 
District=Lacs -0.89 -0.16 26.66 47.19 
 (6.95) (6.87) (139.27) (142.45) 
District=Lagunes -3.52 -5.21 -115.53 -167.32 
 (5.20) (4.95) (111.52) (107.99) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.15 0.27 -13.94 -8.89 
 (0.40) (0.38) (9.33) (8.46) 
Share of decisions made  -20.17 -12.96 -534.61 -321.16 
democratically (16.30) (15.28) (452.58) (406.81) 
# service/inputs/training providers 0.87 0.09 -0.38 -22.28 
 (1.64) (1.60) (40.78) (38.50) 
Constant     
     
Generalized residuals included No No No No 
Observations 469 469 469 469 





Table B12. Marginal effects of Fairtrade on agrochemical input use controlling for UTZ/RA (double-
hurdle models) 
 Fertilizer (kg/ha) Total pesticide use (kg/ha) 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Fairtrade (1/0) 36.87 37.59** 0.38 0.29 
 (25.63) (18.01) (0.24) (0.24) 
UTZ/RA (1/0) -67.68** -33.97* -0.05 0.04 
 (29.29) (19.13) (0.27) (0.26) 
Female (1/0) 38.48 19.40 0.26 0.20 
 (39.92) (21.30) (0.25) (0.26) 
Age -1.99* -1.51** -0.01 -0.01** 
 (1.16) (0.65) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education (yrs.) -6.36** -3.89*** -0.03* -0.03 
 (2.47) (1.32) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.22 1.36 0.00 0.03 
 (2.78) (2.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Household size -0.19 -0.21 0.01 0.01 
 (2.86) (1.79) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to input market (km) 0.67 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (1.83) (1.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dist. to road (km) -0.23 -0.18 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.56) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.39 0.67 0.00 0.00 
 (0.99) (0.56) (0.01) (0.01) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 6.77 4.56 -0.01 0.00 
 (8.87) (5.32) (0.06) (0.06) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -38.92 -28.69 -0.29 -0.31 
 (29.82) (17.67) (0.28) (0.28) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) 37.95 13.49 0.29 0.23 
 (34.74) (18.33) (0.24) (0.23) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) -47.58* -14.73 0.27 0.15 
 (26.40) (12.37) (0.21) (0.20) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) -1.31 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.12) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of shade trees per hectare 3.09* 1.47* 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (1.69) (0.89) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lacs -32.90 -20.82 0.35 0.41 
 (38.31) (17.98) (0.24) (0.25) 
Lagunes -30.00 -27.33* -0.36* -0.48** 
 (23.71) (14.94) (0.19) (0.20) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 1.47 0.14 -0.03* -0.02 
 (2.68) (1.28) (0.02) (0.01) 
Share of decisions made democratically -60.06 -49.79 -1.07 -0.53 
 (63.16) (34.12) (0.76) (0.71) 
# service/inputs/training providers 9.23 5.11 0.05 -0.01 
 (7.79) (5.13) (0.07) (0.07) 
Gen. residuals included Yes Yes No No 
Observations 492 492 469 469 




Table B13. Marginal effects of Fairtrade on aggregated toxicity controlling for UTZ/RA (double-hurdle 
model) 
 EIQ HQ 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fairtrade (1/0) 3.99 2.96 282.95* 239.63 
 (5.28) (5.05) (169.22) (157.86) 
UTZ/RA (1/0) 3.46 4.19 3.79 34.47 
 (6.27) (6.16) (181.65) (164.88) 
Female (1/0) 1.96 1.25 24.17 5.04 
 (6.25) (5.95) (141.58) (135.58) 
Age -0.05 -0.14 -2.46 -5.17 
 (0.16) (0.15) (3.62) (3.56) 
Education (yrs.) -0.92** -0.85** -14.44* -13.52* 
 (0.37) (0.36) (8.02) (7.83) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.24 0.56 16.41 25.64 
 (0.79) (0.73) (18.87) (17.42) 
Household size -0.21 -0.17 -3.03 -1.97 
 (0.49) (0.44) (13.23) (11.67) 
Dist. to input market (km) 0.45 0.44 9.90 9.99 
 (0.29) (0.27) (7.39) (7.12) 
Dist. to road (km) -0.29** -0.24* -3.51 -2.36 
 (0.13) (0.12) (3.34) (3.14) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.29* 0.26* 3.92 3.36 
 (0.15) (0.13) (3.38) (2.99) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago -2.79** -2.40** -46.93 -38.06 
 (1.22) (1.15) (31.36) (30.85) 
Infected with mirids (1/0) -8.01 -7.91 -155.68 -160.43 
 (6.93) (6.65) (149.60) (144.12) 
Infected with black pod (1/0) 8.01 6.87 245.28* 211.08 
 (5.00) (4.50) (143.39) (134.40) 
Infected with stem borer (1/0) 7.96* 6.03 193.65* 138.60 
 (4.10) (3.89) (114.80) (108.25) 
Age cocoa trees (yrs.) 0.05 0.03 -4.44 -4.66 
 (0.20) (0.19) (4.44) (4.35) 
Number of shade trees per hectare 0.71*** 0.69*** 23.06*** 22.31*** 
 (0.27) (0.26) (7.46) (7.10) 
Lacs 0.19 1.01 27.88 52.49 
 (6.90) (6.87) (140.30) (143.31) 
Lagunes -3.47 -5.05 -115.47 -164.22 
 (5.20) (4.95) (111.38) (107.95) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.06 0.16 -14.04 -9.88 
 (0.42) (0.39) (9.51) (8.20) 
Share of decisions made democratically -18.91 -11.69 -533.22 -315.32 
 (16.82) (15.83) (457.68) (413.14) 
# service/inputs/training providers 0.74 -0.04 -0.52 -22.80 
 (1.72) (1.67) (42.74) (40.62) 
Observations 469 469 469 469 





Table B14. Effects of Fairtrade on health symptoms controlling for UTZ/RA 
 (1) (2) 
 IV-GMM dy/dx 
   
Fairtrade (1/0) -0.56** -1.03** 
 (0.28) (0.51) 
UTZ/RA (1/0) 0.14 0.25 
 (0.40) (0.73) 
Resp.=Aboussant (1/0) -0.40 -0.59 
 (0.36) (0.47) 
Resp.=Coop. worker (1/0) 0.12 0.22 
 (0.28) (0.54) 
Female (1/0) -0.72 -1.31 
 (1.31) (2.39) 
Age 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Education (yrs.) -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
Household size 0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Risk aversion (1-10) -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.07) 
Dist. to input market (km) -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Dist. to road (km) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Land owned 10 yrs. ago (ha) 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago -0.09 -0.17 
 (0.07) (0.13) 
Lacs 0.39 0.85 
 (0.25) (0.58) 
Lagunes -0.05 -0.09 
 (0.23) (0.39) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) 0.03* 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
Share of decisions made democratically 1.02 1.86 
 (0.64) (1.22) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.32*** -0.58*** 
 (0.08) (0.17) 
Constant 1.61*  
 (0.95)  
Test of overidentifying restrictions: Hansen's J c2 1.41  
Observations 255 255 











C. Appendix for chapter 4 
Table C1. Instrument falsification test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Full sample Farmers Coop workers Farm workers 
Share of certified farmers (5km radius)  0.34   
  (0.77)   
Share of certified farmers (5km radius; coop mean) 0.70  0.63 -0.90 
 (0.54)  (1.20) (2.20) 
Phone operator of coop leader (1=Orange) -0.17 -0.07 -0.39 0.05 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.79) (0.56) 
Dist. to the closest certified coop 0.12 -0.09 -0.91 0.55 
 (1.05) (1.84) (2.32) (5.05) 
Education project (1/0) 0.16 0.30 0.25 0.96 
 (0.22) (0.31) (0.63) (0.72) 
Resp. = coop. worker -0.50**    
 (0.20)    
Resp. = coop. farm worker -0.64***    
 (0.24)    
Female (1/0) -0.75 -0.54 -1.66** 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.54) (0.61) (.) 
Age 0.17*** 0.17** 0.29*** 0.17 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22) 
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (yrs.) 0.07*** 0.06** 0.12** 0.10 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.03 0.06 -0.12 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
Household size -0.04 -0.06** -0.09 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
Dist. to input mkt. (km.) -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.07) 
Dist. to road (km.) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Dist. to the closest primary school (km.) 0.02 0.01 -0.47* 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.27) (0.08) 
Dist. to the closest secondary school (km.) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.10 0.15 -0.01 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.22) 
Satisfaction w/ education (village mean) 0.04 -0.06 0.47 0.58 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.58) (0.67) 
Satisfaction w/ life (village mean) 0.45** 0.42** -0.13 0.20 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.61) (0.81) 
Satisfaction w/ health (village mean) -0.29 -0.30 0.35 -1.22* 
 (0.21) (0.32) (1.11) (0.60) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -0.03* -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Share of decisions made democratically -1.45*** -0.82 -3.81*** 0.61 
 (0.47) (0.82) (1.23) (1.62) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.05 0.04 -0.33 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.29) (0.35) 
District=Lacs -0.05 -0.09 -0.99 -0.77 
 (0.37) (0.60) (1.30) (1.12) 
District=Lagunes -0.36 -0.44 -1.03 -0.43 
 (0.22) (0.31) (0.72) (0.57) 
Constant -2.67 -2.68 -3.51 -1.98 
 (1.92) (2.84) (6.51) (9.16) 
Observations 353 210 78 65 




Table C2. Effects of certification and education projects on household education expenditure (log) 
 Full sample Farmers Coop workers Farm workers 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Certification (1/0) 0.43*** 0.52*** 0.35** 0.46** 0.82** 0.89** 0.33 0.29 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.32) (0.40) (0.32) (0.38) 
Education project (1/0) 0.41** 0.43*** 0.71*** 0.73*** -0.24 -0.21 0.52 0.51 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.51) (0.47) (0.41) (0.37) 
Resp. = coop. worker -0.30* -0.30*       
 (0.17) (0.17)       
Resp. = coop. farm worker -0.54*** -0.54***       
 (0.16) (0.16)       
Female (1/0) -0.24 -0.26 -0.36 -0.36 -0.40 -0.42 0.00 0.00 
 (0.30) (0.29) (0.34) (0.32) (0.50) (0.43) (.) (.) 
Age 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.16 0.16* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) 
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (yrs.) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.03* 0.09** 0.09*** 0.12** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.06** 0.06** 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.14* 0.14** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
Household size -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05 -0.06* -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.38 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24) (0.55) (0.49) (0.48) (0.44) 
Dist. to input mkt. (km.) -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dist. to road (km.) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dist. to the closest primary school (km.) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dist. to the closest secondary school (km.) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04* -0.04* 0.02 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.09* 0.09* 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) 
Religion = Catholic 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.35) (0.31) (0.57) (0.51) 
Religion = Muslim 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.08 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.46 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.28) (0.28) (0.50) (0.43) (0.38) (0.33) 
Satisfaction w/ education (village mean) -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.38) (0.34) (0.21) (0.19) 
Satisfaction w/ life (village mean) 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.43 0.43 0.28 0.29 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.33) (0.29) (0.26) (0.24) 
Satisfaction w/ health (village mean) -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 0.27 0.27 -0.37 -0.37* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.29) (0.26) (0.23) (0.21) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -0.02* -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 -0.08** -0.08** -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
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Share of decisions made democratically -0.74** -0.74** -0.41 -0.42 -1.52 -1.53 0.14 0.14 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.44) (0.41) (1.18) (1.06) (1.10) (0.99) 
# service/inputs/training providers 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) 
District = Lacs 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.23 -0.79 -0.76 -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.37) (0.33) (0.77) (0.70) (0.58) (0.53) 
District = Lagunes -0.27* -0.24* -0.29* -0.27* -0.47 -0.45 -0.35 -0.36 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.43) (0.37) (0.41) (0.38) 
Constant -4.06*** -4.04*** -3.20 -3.13 -5.54* -5.58** -3.98 -3.99* 
 (1.26) (1.23) (2.00) (1.94) (2.95) (2.61) (2.67) (2.40) 
Wu-Hausman F-statistic. a  0.97  0.73  0.08  0.02 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic b  112.05***  72.88***  60.44***  78.02*** 
Hansen J statistic. c  1.18  0.68  2.11  1.49 
Observations 712 712 433 433 147 147 132 132 
Note: Cluster robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Test of endogeneity (H0: certified variable is exogenous) 
b Test for weak instruments (H0: coefficients of instruments in first stage are not different from zero) 





Table C3. Spillover effects of education projects on household education expenditure (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Farmers Coop workers Farm workers 
Education project (1/0) 0.31 0.39 0.42 0.79 
 (0.20) (0.34) (0.54) (0.52) 
Resp. = coop. worker -0.55**    
 (0.22)    
Resp. = coop. farm worker -0.67***    
 (0.24)    
Female (1/0) -0.75 -0.48 -1.80*** 0.00 
 (0.49) (0.57) (0.57) (.) 
Age 0.17*** 0.17** 0.28*** 0.18 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.23) 
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (yrs.) 0.07*** 0.06** 0.12** 0.13 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) 
Risk aversion (1-10) 0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
Household size -0.04 -0.06** -0.10 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
Akan ethnicity (1/0) -0.21 -0.40 -0.29 -0.18 
 (0.26) (0.37) (0.90) (0.82) 
Dist. to input mkt. (km.) -0.03* -0.04 -0.07 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) 
Dist. to road (km.) 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Dist. to the closest primary school (km.) 0.03 0.02 -0.51* 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.25) (0.05) 
Dist. to the closest secondary school (km.) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
(Log) Total value of assets 10 yrs. ago 0.09 0.15 -0.03 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.20) 
Religion = Catholic 0.17 0.21 -0.27 0.19 
 (0.19) (0.26) (0.64) (0.74) 
Religion = Muslim -0.01 -0.13 -0.31 0.63 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.81) (0.77) 
Satisfaction w/ education (village mean) 0.09 -0.05 0.28 0.33 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.41) (0.44) 
Satisfaction w/ life (village mean) 0.41** 0.37** -0.01 0.33 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.50) (0.71) 
Satisfaction w/ health (village mean) -0.31 -0.31 0.73 -1.05** 
 (0.18) (0.26) (0.66) (0.40) 
Age of the coop (yrs.) -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
Share of decisions made democratically -1.38** -0.74 -4.01*** 0.84 
 (0.51) (0.82) (1.28) (1.81) 
# service/inputs/training providers -0.04 0.05 -0.27 0.25 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.28) (0.41) 
Ditrict = Lacs 0.04 -0.05 -0.55 -0.27 
 (0.38) (0.50) (0.94) (0.82) 
District = Lagunes -0.29 -0.40 -0.93 -0.28 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.58) (0.53) 
Constant -2.62 -2.22 -4.89 -3.21 
 (1.71) (2.61) (5.38) (8.83) 
Observations 353 210 78 65 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Figure C1. Most pressing needs of the villages that should be addressed 
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